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The phenomenon whereby people suffering from an illness or disability seem to be 
unaware of their symptoms was termed anosognosia, by Joseph Babinksi in 1914 
(Langer & Levine, 2014). Originally described as a specific inability to recognise or 
acknowledge left-sided hemiplegia after lesions to the right hemisphere of the brain, 
the term now incorporates unawareness of a range of post-stroke impairments, such 
as hemianopia (Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno & Berti, 1986), hemianaesthesia 
(Pia et al., 2014), aphasia (Cocchini, Gregg, Beschin, Dean & Della Sala, 2010) and 
unilateral neglect (Jehkonen, Ahonen, Dastidar, Laippala & Vilkki, 2000). 
Anosognosia has also been observed in association with several other disorders, 
including Alzheimer’s disease (Agnew & Morris, 1998) and traumatic brain injury 
(Prigatano, 2010a).  
While advances have been made in understanding anosognosia, there are still many 
contradictory findings in relation to the nature and expression of impaired self-
awareness (Prigatano, 2010a), which are partly attributable to diverse 
methodological approaches. Furthermore, research into anosognosia frequently rests 
on the assumption that neurologically intact individuals have accurate insight into 
their own abilities, particularly in regard to motor skill. The experiments reported in 
this thesis highlight that this may be a false assumption. Through a series of 
interrelated studies, I demonstrate that the type of questions typically asked of 
anosognosic patients may be inappropriate to elicit the manifestations of chronic 
stage unawareness after a stroke, that underestimation may be just as prevalent as 
overestimation, and that healthy individuals are not always able to monitor whether 
their executed movements match their intended movements. Moreover, those with 
poorer motor skills are less able to judge movement successes and failures than their 
more skilled counterparts, suggesting a mechanism analogous to the anosognosia 
observed in clinical populations.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the main neuropsychological models that have 
been proposed to account for anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP); unawareness in the 
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context of other impairments is discussed in the introductions to individual chapters. 
Chapter 2 presents some background research investigating stroke clinicians’ 
knowledge of the lateralization of right hemisphere cognitive symptoms, and their 
judgements of the impact of selected symptoms on the lives of patients and 
caregivers. While the clinicians were equally able to identify cognitive symptoms 
associated with left or right brain damage, they were far more likely to misattribute 
symptoms to right brain damage, suggesting a lack of confidence in their knowledge 
of the cognitive functions of the right hemisphere. They also regarded anosognosia 
as having relatively low impact on the lives of patients and caregivers, in stark 
contrast with the highly negative impact reported in the literature (Jehkonen, 
Laihosalo & Kettunen, 2006a). 
Chapters 3 and 4 present two experimental studies investigating different facets of 
awareness in two groups of stroke patients. Chapter 3 reports the development and 
testing of a tool designed to measure chronic unawareness of functional difficulties, 
the Visual Analogue Test of Anosognosia for impairments in Activities of Daily 
Living (VATA-ADL), with preliminary data from a group of chronic stroke patients. 
Approximately one third of the patients exhibited mild or moderate levels of 
overestimation of their ability to carry out day-to-day activities. This contrasts with 
previous reports that anosognosia is rare in the chronic stages, a discrepancy that 
may be explained in part by the inappropriateness of the measures typically used to 
measure it. Overestimation was observed in both right-brain-damaged and left-brain-
damaged patients, and was not associated with higher levels of cognitive impairment.  
The study reported in Chapter 4 examined whether acute stage stroke patients who 
under- or overestimated their motor skills, similarly under- or overestimated 
performance on cognitive tasks in the domains of language, memory and attention 
and executive function. Contrary to the many dissociations between unawareness of 
different impairment reported in the neuropsychological literature, this study found 
that patients classed as overestimators of motor ability were also overly optimistic 
about their cognitive abilities. Overestimators were more likely to have right 
hemisphere lesions, higher levels of general cognitive impairments, and specific 
deficits in attention and executive function. Furthermore, by including patients with a 
range of functional ability, this study revealed that participants were just as likely to 
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underestimate as overestimate their abilities. This unique finding presents a 
challenge to anosognosia research, suggesting that there may be factors other than 
neurological damage that predispose stroke patients to over- or under-estimate their 
abilities and that a baseline of accurate self-insight among control populations cannot 
be assumed.    
Chapter 5 reports three different experiments conducted with younger and older, 
neurologically healthy adults. Using a target-directed reaching task, these 
experiments investigated whether the participants’ ability to monitor the success of 
their movements, on a trial by trial basis, depended upon their motor skill level, and 
whether participants with lower skill were inclined to overestimate their ability, in 
line with a famous observation from cognitive psychology that people who perform 
worst in a given task tend to be unaware of how poorly they are performing (Kruger 
and Dunning, 1999).  Overall, the results demonstrated an association between 
higher accuracy levels and faster movement times, and better ability to monitor 
success and failure. To my knowledge, this represents that first evidence of a 
relationship between motor performance ability and self-monitoring ability in 
healthy individuals, highlighting that some of the mechanisms underpinning 
anosognosia may also be evident in neurologically intact populations. However, 
contrary to the findings from cognitive psychology, poor performance was not 
associated with a specific bias toward overestimation. A similar relationship between 
task performance and self-monitoring ability was also observed for a visual memory 
task. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the results of the clinical and self-
monitoring studies for neuropsychological models of anosognosia, particularly those 
based on motor planning and control, and considers potential ways forward for 










People suffering from a disease or illness are sometimes unaware of their symptoms, 
even when these symptoms would seem to be severe or debilitating. This 
phenomenon was called ‘anosognosia’ by the neurologist Joseph Babinksi in 1914 
(Langer & Levine, 2014). Babinski applied this term specifically to people who 
suffer from left-sided paralysis because of damage to the right side of their brain (for 
example after a stroke), but act as if they can still move their limbs normally. 
However, anosognosia can now also refer to unawareness of other symptoms caused 
by brain damage, including loss of sensation on one side of the body or loss of 
language functions such as the ability to speak in meaningful sentences. While much 
progress has been made in understanding anosognosia, there are still several 
unanswered questions about why people are sometimes unaware of the symptoms 
caused by brain damage.  
In this thesis four different studies are reported, which address different aspects of 
impaired self-awareness. The first study, reported in Chapter 2, investigated whether 
the people who work with stroke patients, mostly physicians, are less able to identify 
symptoms associated with the right side of the brain, like anosognosia, than those 
associated with the left side of the brain, like loss of language functions. While the 
physicians seemed equally good at recognising symptoms associated with both sides 
of the brain, they also tended to think that any obscure symptoms were more likely to 
result from damage to the right side, suggesting that they may have been influenced 
by the common misconception that the right side of the brain is somehow more 
mysterious or unknowable than the left. They also tended to think that anosognosia 
would not have that much of an impact on the lives of patients and caregivers; this 
contrasts with evidence from studies that have investigated this issue, which 
generally find that it has a serious impact.  
The second study, reported in Chapter 3 involved the measurement and testing of a 
new scale to measure anosognosia specifically for difficulties in carrying out 
activities of daily living, for example household tasks and leisure activities. The scale 
is called the Visual Analogue Test of Anosognosia for impairments in Activities of 
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Daily Living (VATA-ADL), and it was created in a format incorporating both text 
and pictures, so that it could be used with stroke patients who have difficult reading 
or speaking. The results of this study showed approximately one third of the patients 
tested with the scale overestimated their ability to carry out day-to-day activities, 
even some patients with damage to the left side of the brain. This is quite an unusual 
finding, as most studies only report unawareness of problems in the early stages after 
a stroke, and only rarely in patients with left brain damage.  
The third study, reported in Chapter 4 examined whether stroke patients in the early 
stages after a stroke who were anosognosic for movement problems, also 
overestimated their performance on tasks assessing their mental abilities, such as 
attention, memory and mental flexibility. This was found to be the case, in contrast 
with other studies that have found that stroke patients tend to be unaware of only one 
problem at a time. 
The final study, reported in Chapter 5 comprised three linked experiments, all of 
which investigated how well people with no brain damage were able to judge success 
and failure in reaching to touch a target, which was removed from view the moment 
they reached for it. The experiments found that people who hit the target less often, 
and who moved more slowly, were worse at judging when they had hit it than those 
who moved faster and hit it more often. This suggests that, even in people who 
haven’t had a stroke, awareness of movements depends upon the skill in performing 
those movements. This knowledge may contribute towards understanding the 
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The phenomenon whereby people suffering from an illness or disability seem to be 
unaware of their disease had been noted by clinicians prior to the 20th century 
(Marková & Berrios, 2014). However it was Joseph Babinksi who, in 1914, first 
gave it a name – anosognosia – and thereby designated it as an object of 
investigation (Langer & Levine, 2014). Babinski briefly presented clinical cases of 
two patients, both of whom were unaware of their left hemiplegia yet retained 
sufficient intellectual capacity that this could not be attributed to general confusion 
or disorientation. He then posed two questions: first, is anosognosia real or feigned; 
and second, could it be associated specifically with lesions to the right cerebral 
hemisphere (Langer & Levine, 2014). Over one hundred years later, the former 
question has been answered to the satisfaction of the majority of researchers; 
anosognosia is real, not feigned, and it can result directly from neurological damage 
(Pia, Neppi-Modona, Ricci & Berti, 2004). Where it concerns hemiplegia, that 
damage is typically located in the right cerebral hemisphere (Pedersen, Jørgensen, 
Nakayama, Raaschou & Olsen, 1996a). Yet, in spite of some advances in the 
understanding of the disorder, there are still many unanswered questions about the 
processes by which awareness for often severe and debilitating conditions breaks 
down (Prigatano, 2010b). 
 
1.1 Anosognosia for Hemiplegia (AHP): hemispheric 
asymmetry and cognitive impairments 
 
One of the most often-repeated phrases concerning unawareness, even within the 
relatively circumscribed field of anosognosia for hemiplegia, is that it is a 
heterogeneous or multi-faceted disorder, both in terms of its clinical presentation and 
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neurological correlates (Cocchini, Beschin & Della Sala, 2012; Orfei et al., 2007; 
Vocat, Staub, Stroppini, & Vuilleumier, 2010). However, there are certain clinical or 
cognitive features that characterise anosognosic patients, and which different 
neuropsychological models emphasise to varying extents. The predominance of right 
hemisphere lesions is foremost among these features, and any neuropsychological 
account of anosognosia may be required to propose a specific role of the right 
hemisphere in motor awareness (Turnbull, Fotopoulou & Solms, 2014). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, therefore, lesion asymmetry forms an integral component of one of 
the earliest neuropsychological models, the ‘disconnexion’ hypothesis, proposed by 
Geschwind (1965). This hypothesis considers anosognosia to be one example of a set 
of visual agnosias, explained by the same general mechanism, rather than an isolated 
phenomenon. It proposes that lesions to the right parietal hemisphere may disconnect 
the right visual and somatosensory cortex from the language areas of the dominant 
left hemisphere, resulting in a loss of information from the right side of the body and 
provoking confabulatory explanations (Geschwind, 1965). 
In addition to accounting for the dominance of right-hemisphere lesions, the 
Disconnexion Theory has the advantage of providing an explanation for why AHP 
often involves confabulation in response to questions about weakness or paralysis 
(Heilman & Harciarek, 2010). However, it has been challenged on several counts. 
Heilman and colleagues conducted a series of experiments on epileptic patients who 
had undergone selective hemispheric anaesthesia through the injection of a 
barbiturate into the carotid artery (WADA procedure) (Adair, Schwartz, Na, Fennell, 
Gilmore and Heilman,1997; Breier, Adair, Gold, Fennell, Gilmore & Heilman, 1995; 
Gilmore, Heilman, Schmidt, Fennell and Quisling, 1992). This procedure mimics the 
effects of a unilateral stroke, causing contralateral hemiplegia and, if injected into the 
left hemisphere, loss of language functions. It is therefore highly useful for 
addressing questions that are more difficult to investigate with stroke patients. For 
example, once the effects of the anaesthetic have worn off, left-hemisphere 
anaesthetised patients can be probed for awareness of their temporary hemiplegia or 
aphasia (Breier et al., 1995; Gilmore et al., 1992). 
Adair et al. (1997) used the WADA procedure to test the Disconnexion Theory, by 
examining whether participants undergoing right hemisphere anaesthesia adjusted 
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their estimation of their ability to move their paralysed left hand once it was moved 
into their right visual field. All participants were initially unaware of their arm 
paralysis, and all were able to name a number attached to their palm after the arm 
was moved, verifying input to language processing regions, however, eight of 15 
continued to deny any weakness or paralysis. In a subsequent group of 17 patients, 
who were instructed to move the hand while observing it, 11 remained unaware of 
the paralysis. This suggests that disconnection of speech areas from the information 
provided by the left side of the body cannot alone account for all cases of AHP. 
Furthermore, if disconnection from the dominant hemisphere were the sole cause of 
AHP, patients should be able to express this through methods that do not rely on 
verbal report (McGlynn, & Schacter, 1989). While this is true for some patients, 
others exhibit behaviours that would suggest they are unaware of their paralysis at an 
unconscious, non-verbal level (Cocchini, Beschin, Fotopoulou & Della Sala, 2010).  
Other neuropsychological models of AHP focus on the contribution of 
somatosensory or cognitive deficits to the genesis and maintenance of unawareness. 
Unilateral neglect is one of the foremost of these; both neglect and AHP are 
associated predominantly with right hemisphere lesions, involve some form of 
unawareness or inattention to the left side of space or the left side of the body, and 
are commonly observed in the same patients (Appelros, Karlsson, Seiger & Nydevik; 
2002). It has even been proposed that they may be part of the same syndrome 
(Bisiach, 1999). This supposition is challenged, however, by the observation that 
either of these conditions can occur in isolation from the other (Berti et al., 2005; 
Bisiach et al., 1986; Dauriac-Le Masson et al., 2002). The association of unilateral 
neglect with AHP more likely arises from lesions to nearby brain regions implicated 
in the two conditions; an anatomical association rather than a functional contingency 
(Bisach et al., 1986; Orfei et al., 2007).  
Loss of somatosensory information from the left side of the body is integral to the 
‘Discovery Theory’ of Levine and colleagues (Levine, 1990; Levine, Calvanio & 
Rinn, 1991). As specific sensory or proprioceptive loss alone may not be sufficient to 
cause AHP (Bisiach et al., 1986), the authors suggest that it is combined with some 
degree of cognitive impairment. Somatosensory loss is not immediately apparent but 
must be discovered through self-observation, with the likelihood of discovery 
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reducing with the severity of the functional and intellectual impairment (Levine, 
1990). The authors suggest that hemiplegia will actually be quite difficult to 
discover, partly because the accompanying loss of somatic sensation prevents any 
immediate knowledge of the paralysis. Furthermore, Levine et al. (1991) propose 
that perceptual completion of sensorimotor plans for the non-hemiplegic right side of 
the body may create phantom limbs that give a compelling impression of movement 
in the hemiplegic limb, sufficient to override any sensory evidence to the contrary. 
Thus a degree of intellectual impairment must be present, but it need not be 
particularly severe to cause AHP.  
To support the theory, the physical and neuropsychological profile of a group of six 
patients with persistent AHP was compared with that of a group of seven who had 
only transient or no AHP. The AHP patients had severe somatosensory deficits in all 
modalities, generally more severe neglect, and higher levels of cognitive 
impairments across all domains, which the authors argue is consistent with their 
theory (Levine et al., 1991). However, there have been several cases of AHP in 
patients without proprioceptive deficits or global cognitive impairment (Berti, 
Làdavas & Della Corte, 1996; Bisiach and Geminiani, 1991; Small & Ellis, 1996), 
which many commentators consider sufficient to preclude the Discovery Theory as a 
general model of anosognosia (Marcel, Tegnér, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004; Orfei et al., 
2007). In defence of the Discovery Theory, Vuilleumier (2004) points out that 
complete proprioceptive or motor loss was never suggested to be a necessary 
condition of AHP. Instead, the theory could be interpreted, to encompass the 
possibility that multiple different predisposing factors may be able to give rise to 
anosognosia, as long as they were sufficient to alter the phenomenal experience of a 
deficit and accompanied by some type of cognitive disturbance that would prevent a 
veridical evaluation of its meaning (Vuilleumier, 2004). 
No one somatosensory or cognitive deficit has been found to be necessary or 
sufficient to cause AHP (Orfei et al. 2007) and it is quite possible, even probable, 
that different deficits – including proprioceptive loss, neglect (both personal and 
extrapersonal) and impairments to memory or executive function - may be 
responsible for AHP in different patients (Marcel et al., 2004) or at different time 
points in the course of the disorder (Vocat, at al., 2010). Neuropsychological models 
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that take a more encompassing approach to the role of sensory and cognitive factors 
in anosognosia have the advantage of flexibility, allowing that different deficits may 
perform equivalent roles in the generation and maintenance of unawareness. 
However, the disadvantage of this approach is that it lacks specificity in determining 
the scope and type of deficits that are implicated in engendering unawareness. 
Moreover, it is difficult to disentangle causative factors, where specific cognitive 
deficits directly instigate anosognosia, from associative factors, where deficits are 
seen in conjunction with anosognosia because they both arise from damage to 
proximal neurological structures (Vuilleumier, 2004). 
 
1.2 Prevalence and impact on the lives of patients and 
caregivers 
 
The idea that someone suffering from a severe and debilitating loss of movement, 
speech or sight could be unaware of it seems bizarre. However, anosognosia is not a 
rare consequence of stroke. Reports of the prevalence of AHP vary from between 7% 
- 77% (Orfei et al., 2007), with the rates being highly influenced by the assessment 
method used and inclusion and exclusion criteria. For example, studies that include 
patients with more severe strokes, or only recruit patients with right hemisphere 
lesions, are likely to report higher levels of AHP (Orfei et al., 2007). The timing of 
the assessment is also crucial. Given that anosognosia typically resolves quite rapidly 
over the initial days or weeks after a stroke (Jehkonen et al., 2000; Starkstein, Jorge 
& Robinson, 2010), the prevalence of AHP is likely to be far higher where patients 
are recruited soon after the injury (Cocchini et al., 2012). This is highlighted by 
studies that measure anosognosia in the same patients over several time points, 
which typically report greater levels of unawareness during the early stage 
assessments (Jehkonen et al., 2001), to the extent that some commentators have 
suggested that, far from being a rare phenomenon, anosognosia may actually be a 
“‘usual’ state after severe brain damage” (Vocat, et al., 2010, p. 3591). 
While the symptoms of anosognosia usually resolve within days or weeks of a 
stroke, the implications of acute unawareness may last far longer. The impact of 
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AHP on functional outcome has been reported less comprehensively than that of 
other cognitive deficits, for example unilateral neglect (Jehkonen, Laihosalo & 
Kettunen, 2006b), but there is evidence that it may be equally, if not more, 
detrimental (Gialanella and Mattioli, 1992). A 2006 systematic review of 
anosognosia reported ten studies that were concerned with the effect of anosognosia 
on functional outcome; of these, eight found that it made a significant independent 
and negative contribution to prognosis (Jehkonen et al. 2006a).  The presence of 
acute stage anosognosia was associated with longer hospital stay and lower ADL 
status at discharge (Jehkonen et al. 2001, Maeshima et al., 1997). Anosognosic 
patients may be less compliant with instructions from healthcare providers, refusing 
acute stage treatments that would have long-term benefits (Jenkinson, Preston & 
Ellis, 2011). It has also been demonstrated that patients with anosognosia may fail to 
retain safety measures, which may cause problems in adjusting to daily life after 
discharge from hospital (Hartman-Maeir, Soroker, & Katz, 2001). Unawareness may 
interact with other conditions, which themselves are detrimental to outcome. For 
example, Gialanella, Monguzzi, Santoro and Rocchi (2005) demonstrated that the 
presence of anosognosia significantly worsened the rehabilitation outcome of 
patients with neglect.  
Any of these issues may have a serious impact the ability of stroke patients to return 
to independent living. Furthermore, variability in the clinical manifestation of 
disorders of awareness creates challenges for the management and rehabilitation of 
patients (Prigatano & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2010). Anosognosia, along with other 
symptoms more typically observed after right lesions, for example flattened affect 
(Heilman, Schwartz & Watson, 1978), may be misapprehended as a motivational 
issue, or lead to the downplaying or underreporting of symptoms (Barrett, 2010). 
Given these issues, it is possible that clinicians may be less aware of these typically 
right hemisphere symptoms than the more clinically salient impairments of language 
function (aphasia) and sequenced movement (apraxia) that are more common after 
left hemisphere lesions. These are the considerations that motivated the research in 
Chapter 2. The chapter reports findings from two brief questionnaires that were 
devised and distributed to stroke physicians and clinicians at professional 
conferences; the first assessed their knowledge of the lateralization of various 
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cognitive impairments after a stroke and the second addressed the respective 
importance they placed on some of the more common physical and cognitive 
symptoms. This chapter was conducted as background research while waiting for 
NHS ethical approval to begin clinical research. As such, it is preliminary to the 
other empirical chapters, which are more classic experimental investigations of 
different facets of unawareness. Yet it also provides an important context; empirical 
findings and theoretical advances in the understanding of anosognosia need to 
influence clinical practice, if they are to be any use in helping patients and caregivers 
understand what can be a bewildering and challenging cognitive disturbance 
(Prigatano & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2010). 
 
1.3 Issues of measurement 
 
It has been suggested that the reported variability in the manifestation of 
unawareness, may be explained partly by differences in measurement instruments 
(Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010; Jehkonen et al., 2006a; Orfei, Caltagirone & Spalletta, 
2009).  In a review of the methods used in the assessment of anosognosia over the 
past 35 years, Nurmi and Jehkonen (2014) identified 41 different diagnostic 
measures. In earlier studies, the most commonly used measure was Bisiach’s scale 
(Bisiach et al., 1986), which is a clinician-rated four point scale, ranging from zero, 
where the patient spontaneously reports a motor deficit in response to general 
questioning, through to 3, where the deficit is completely unacknowledged, even 
after demonstration. While this measure is sensitive to degrees of unawareness, it has 
been criticized for being too liberal; any patient failing to spontaneously report a 
deficit is classified as at least mildly anosognosic, but this may reflect the greater 
salience of other problems, rather than a true expression of unawareness (Baier & 
Karnath, 2005). Another widely used measure is Cutting’s (1978) questionnaire. This 
clinician-rated scale has the advantage of breadth, including questions designed to 
elicit phenomena associated with anosognosia, such as unconcern or hatred towards a 
limb. However it provides only a dichotomous yes/no scoring structure for each 
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question, and does not differentiate degrees of awareness (Jenkinson et al., 2011; 
Orfei et al., 2009).  
The most commonly used measures in the assessment of anosognosia are similar in 
structure and purpose: awareness is probed through a series of questions from the 
clinician to the patient (Cutting, 1978; Bisiach et al., 1986; Feinberg, Roane & Ali, 
2000; Starkstein et al., 1992). These scales have been well validated, and their 
similarity may aid comparison across studies (Orfei, et al., 2009). However, self-
report is not appropriate to reveal all facets of unawareness (Cocchini et al., 2012). 
For example, it has been observed that patients who fail to explicitly acknowledge 
hemiplegia may still show some implicit awareness (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991). 
Cocchini et al. (2010) demonstrated that some hemiplegic patients, who did not 
verbally acknowledge their deficits, adopted appropriate unimanual strategies in the 
execution of bimanual tasks. Intriguingly, tacit knowledge can sometimes be elicited 
if questions are reframed in the third person. Marcel et al. (2004) found that some 
hemiplegic RBD patients rated themselves as having a good ability to carry out 
bimanual tasks in their current state, but gave far lower ratings when asked to assess 
how well the examiner would be able to carry out the actions, if he were in the same 
state as the patient. House and Hodges (1988) report on a patient with chronic 
anosognosia for hemiplegia, who nonetheless identified a person in a wheelchair as 
being most like herself, compared to others with less severe disabilities. In order to 
gain a more comprehensive picture of the degree and expression of AHP, it is 
important to incorporate assessment measures that are sensitive to these more subtle 
manifestations of awareness (Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010; Nurmi & Jehkonen, 
2014; Orfei et al. 2009; Orfei, Caltagirone & Spalletta, 2010) 
Another issue with self-report questionnaires is their dependence upon the integrity 
of language functions in respondents (Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010; Cocchini, et al., 
2012). There is a danger that rates of AHP among left-brain-damaged (LBD) patients 
may be underestimated, showing up less often in routine examinations, if aphasia 
prevents LBD patients from denying impairments verbally. Aphasic patients are also 
more likely to be excluded from formal studies of AHP, being unable to provide 
verbal responses to the standard structured questionnaires. In a review of 
anosognosia studies, aimed at identifying the dimensions that should be targeted by 
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measurement tools, Orfei et al., (2009) reported that 55% of the selected studies 
excluded patients with language disorders and 40% did not report on the issue at all. 
Similarly, Cocchini et al. (2012) report that many seminal studies of anosognosia do 
not mention the rate of exclusion on the basis of language impairment (Baier & 
Karnath, 2005; Berti et al., 1996; Bisiach et al., 1986; Marcel et al., 2004), but 
studies that did report this had exclusion rates of around 40 – 60% (Cutting, 1978; 
Stone, Halligan, & Greenwood, 1993). For these reasons, it could be argued that the 
prevalence of explicit AHP in LBD patients is essentially unknown, and may be 
higher than generally reported. As Cutting (1978) pointed out, the suppression of 
estimated rates of anosognosia in right hemiplegics is compounded by the issue that 
LBD patients with aphasia may be more likely to have anosognosia than those 
without: 
“Gross and Kaltenbiick (1955) found that 91% of right hemiplegics with a field 
defect and sensory loss, features which had predicted anosognosia in their 
counterparts with a left hemiplegia, were totally aphasic in the first week after 
onset. They concluded, therefore, that right hemiplegics at risk for developing 
anosognosia were the very patients in whom aphasia precluded its 
determination.” Cutting (1978, p. 548) 
 
To address the issue of high exclusion rates of LBD patients, Della Sala and 
colleagues devised The Visual Analogue Test of Anosognosia for Motor 
Impairments (VATA-M; Della Sala, Cocchini, Beschin & Cameron, 2009). This 
measure comprises a series of questions about how much difficulty patients would 
have undertaking various actions that require the use of both upper limbs, for 
example ‘opening a bottle’, or both lower limbs, for example ‘riding a bicycle’. The 
items are presented verbally and pictorially, alongside a visual analogue response 
scale, with scores ranging from 0 – no difficulty to 3 – extreme difficulty. The 
overall discrepancy between self-rated and caregiver-rated ability to perform these 
actions provides a measure of anosognosia, and cut-offs are given for different 
grades of severity. In their validation of this scale, Della Sala et al. (2009) were only 
required to exclude 9% of the LBD patients. Importantly, they found that 40% of 
those included showed some degree of unawareness of their motor impairments.  
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Another measurement issue outlined by Orfei et al. (2009) is the fact that most scales 
of AHP maintain a very tight focus on the sensorimotor deficit, rather than its 
broader functional consequences. The authors contrast this with measures developed 
for the assessment of unawareness in dementia or schizophrenia, which tend to have 
a wider scope, addressing issues such as adherence to medical treatment and the 
implications of illness symptoms on the ability to carry out activities of daily living 
(Orfei et al., 2009, 2010). A measure of anosognosia that enquires about functional 
ability may have several advantages over those that focus too tightly on the deficit. 
First, as Cocchini et al. (2012) point out, hemiplegic patients will be told frequently 
that they are paralysed, and so repeated specific questioning may encourage patients 
to learn to provide ‘correct’ responses, without having gained genuine insight into 
their deficit. Secondly, there is some evidence that unawareness of a motor disorder 
can be dissociated from unawareness of its functional consequences (Marcel et al., 
2004). Both issues may have contributed to under-reporting of awareness deficits in 
the chronic stages after a stroke (Cocchini et al., 2012). In support of this, Della Sala 
et al. (2009) observed that the questions that were most effective in predicting 
awareness of deficits in the subacute and chronic stages after a stroke, were those 
that focused on daily activities, such as washing dishes, as opposed to the type of 
questions that are typically included in AHP questionnaires, which ask, for example, 
about the ability to clap hands or walk.  
These issues motivated the study reported in Chapter 3 of this thesis, which describes 
the creation and testing of a tool designed to measure chronic unawareness of 
functional impairments, the Visual Analogue Test of Anosognosia for impairments 
in Activities of Daily Living (VATA-ADL). Like previous VATA measures (VATA-
M: Della Sala et al., 2009; VATA-L: Cocchini et al., 2010), this scale incorporates 
visual depictions of items, as well as verbal descriptions, and a visual analogue 
response sale, in order to facilitate the inclusion of LBD patients. The scale is 
intended to serve both as a measure of ADL status, through the provision of 
caregiver reports, and as a measure of awareness, by calculating the discrepancy 
between self- and informant-rated scores. While the majority of the chapter is 
dedicated to the development and testing the scale, I also present some preliminary 
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findings, and discuss their implications for the prevalence and characteristics of 
chronic unawareness of functional difficulties. 
 
1.4 Unawareness of deficit: global or modality-specific 
monitoring systems? 
 
In addition to the issues discussed above, relating to how anosognosia should be 
measured, questions about the extent and specificity of awareness deficits are 
integral to the conceptualisation of the disorder. For which physical and cognitive 
impairments can anosognosia manifest, and can this occur selectively (Marcel et al., 
2004)? While anosognosia for hemiplegia has received by far the most attention in 
stroke research, unawareness has been reported in relation to other primary physical 
problems such as hemianopia (Bisiach et al., 1986) and hemianaesthesia (Pia et al., 
2014), and to higher cognitive deficits, such as unilateral neglect (Jehkonen et al., 
2000) or aphasia (see Kertesz, 2010 for a review). Unawareness is also observed in 
conditions other than stroke, including traumatic brain injury (Prigatano, 2010a), 
neurodegenerative disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease (Agnew & Morris, 1998), 
and neuropsychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia (Gilleen, Greenwood & David, 
2010).  
Goldberg and Barr (1991) proposed that AHP arises from damage to a central 
monitoring mechanism, responsible for the self-assessment of all aspects of 
cognition, leading to a general awareness impairment. This supposition is 
challenged, however, by the fact that global cognitive impairment is not always 
evident in patients with anosognosia (Orfei et al., 2007). Moreover, several observed 
dissociations between AHP and unawareness of other disorders, suggest that 
anosognosia can be specific to a domain or function. Spinazzola, Pia, Folegatti, 
Marchetti and Berti (2008) describe four patients who were aware of their motor 
impairments but not sensory loss, while Bisiach et al. (1986) report four patients with 
severe anosognosia for hemianopia who were aware of their motor impairments. A 
double dissociation has also been observed for AHP and anosognosia for neglect  
(Jehkonen et al., 2000), while Breier et al. (1995) report a double dissociation 
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between AHP and ansogosnosia for aphasia in patients undergoing the WADA 
procedure. Given these findings, the majority of models of anosognosia consider that 
domain-specific monitoring systems are implicated in unawareness (Berti et al., 
2005; Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert, 2000; Heilman, 1991; Heilman, Barrett & Adair, 
1998), or constitute one component of a multifactorial system of self-monitoring 
(Davies, Davies & Coltheart, 2005; McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Vuilleumier, 2004). 
Several models of anosognosia take a stance midway between global and domain-
specific mechanisms. For example, McGlynn & Schacter (1989), propose that 
awareness arises through the operation of a global Conscious Awareness System 
(CAS) and its interactions with domain-specific modular processors. While 
activation of the latter is sufficient to produce changes in behaviour, activation of the 
CAS is necessary for the conscious experience of awareness. If activity in any one of 
the domain-specific systems is sufficiently weak, this could disconnect that module 
from awareness, resulting in anosognosia for a specific deficit, for example 
hemiplegia. The CAS itself is proposed to operate through two cortical association 
areas where information from different sensory modalities converge, first in the 
inferior parietal lobule and then later in the frontal lobe, with reciprocal connections 
between these. Domain-specific awareness deficits may arise from damage to the 
parietal lobule, while damage to frontal areas may cause deficits in executive 
abilities to process and evaluate information, leading to global unawareness 
(McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Schacter, 1990). The advantage of the CAS model is 
that it can account for dissociations not only between awareness of different deficits, 
but also between implicit and explicit awareness, as disconnection between a module 
and the CAS could lead to explicit denial or a deficit, without changing the implicit 
awareness shown by the patient’s behaviour (Orfei et al., 2010). 
Davies et al. (2005) also propose a model of anosognosia based on both domain 
specific and global deficits. Rather than considering anosognosia in isolation, the 
authors propose that it is one example of delusion of neuropsychological origin that 
can be explained by a generic two-factor theory (the Capgras delusion and mirrored-
self misidentification are also discussed within the same framework). The delusional 
process is hypothesised to require first a neuropsychological anomaly that produces a 
candidate delusional belief, and secondly an impairment in belief evaluation that 
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causes the delusion to be adopted. In the case of anosognosia, the primary 
neuropsychological anomaly could be impaired proprioceptive feedback from the 
affected limb, or unilateral neglect - the exact nature of the deficit may vary across 
patients - leading to the candidate belief that the limb is functioning as normal, while 
the secondary factor is some type of impairment in the ability to critically evaluate 
this candidate belief and reject it as a false inference (Davies et al., 2005). As with 
any model incorporating an element of high-level intellectual impairment, the 
generic two-factor theory is challenged by the observation that many patients with 
anosognosia do not seem to have any general impairment to their critical faculties. 
The authors anticipate this argument, and suggest that other studies may under-report 
levels of cognitive impairment. Even in patients that appear normally oriented and 
unconfused, specific deficits in sustained attention or working memory may be 
sufficient to preclude accurate belief evaluation (Davies et al., 2005).  
The question of domain-specificity of anosognosia is central to Chapter 4 of this 
thesis, which addresses whether discrepancies between ability and self-estimation 
can be observed across multiple functions, in the acute stages after a stroke. Unlike 
the majority of research into unawareness, this study investigates misestimation in 
both directions. The patients are divided into three groups; those who underestimate 
their motor skill levels compared to their caregivers, those whose judgements are 
well calibrated to caregiver assessments and those who overestimate. These groups 
are then examined to assess whether misestimation in both directions has a similar 
profile of cognitive and emotional features, or whether there is something 
qualitatively distinct about overestimation that characterises it as classically 
anosognosic. The study also examines whether the different self-estimation groups, 
defined according to their estimation of motor abilities, show similar over-
/underestimation of their performance on tasks of language, memory and attention 






1.5 AHP as a disorder of motor planning and control 
 
The majority of the models discussed above vary in the relative importance they 
place upon concomitant neuropsychological or somatosensory deficits, such as 
proprioceptive loss, unilateral neglect or general impairment to intellectual capacity. 
However, a growing interest in bodily awareness over the last two decades has 
stimulated a different approach to AHP, rooted within computational models of 
motor cognition (Berti et al., 2005; Frith et al., 2000; Heilman, 1991; Heilman, 
Barrett & Adair, 1998). These models are generally modular in conceptualization 
(though see Fotopoulou 2014 for a more unified account), and based on the premise 
that AHP arises because of a failure in the system responsible for generating and 
monitoring the success of movements. They propose that awareness of movement 
relies upon a forward model of the interaction between the motor system and the 
world (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 2002). Every time a movement is executed, 
copies of the efferent motor command are generated, which predict the actual 
outcome of the movement. The forward model also predicts the sensory outcome of 
the movement, based on the efferent copy, which can then be compared with sensory 
feedback from the actual movement outcome (Frith et al., 2000). Veridical awareness 
of movement is therefore contingent on both the intention to move and the correct 
assessment of whether the executed movement matches that intention. The two major 
models of AHP based on motor control (Frith et al., 2000; Heilman, 1991) differ 
mainly in whether they consider motor intentions to be intact.  
 
1.5.1 The intentional feed-forward hypothesis 
 
The feed-forward model (Heilman, 1991; Heilman et al., 1998) developed from the 
authors’ observations during the WADA procedure that when anaesthetic was 
administered to the right hemisphere, many participants became aware of their 
temporary hemiplegia only when their paretic hand was moved into the right visual 
field and they were specifically instructed to move it (Adair et al., 1997). The authors 
propose that the motor system incorporates a comparator, responsible for matching 
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expected movements with actual movements, and awareness of failure occurs when 
the comparator flags a discrepancy between the two. In cases of AHP there is a 
failure in motor intention, so that no expectation of movement is generated. With no 
expectations, the actual failure to move does not generate a mismatch so the patients 
remain unaware of their weakness. In support of the intentional feed-forward 
hypothesis, Gold, Adair, Jacobs and Heilman (1994) took electrophysiological 
measures of the activation of proximal muscles (pectoralis major), when squeezing a 
dynamometer, from an anosognosic patient, alongside hemiplegic controls, one 
patient with neglect and one with resolved anosognosia. All of the patients 
contracted both pectoral muscles when squeezing with their ipsilesional hand, but the 
anosognosic patient alone showed no contraction in either muscle when asked to 
squeeze with the paretic hand, suggesting a lack of intention to move (Heilman & 
Harciarek, 2010). 
The intentional feed-forward hypothesis is able to account for dissociations between 
anosognosia for different functions, on the presumption that each function operates 
by its own system of intention and comparison. It may also account for the 
predominance of right hemisphere lesions, as there is some evidence that right 
hemisphere motor intention systems can activate the motor systems of both 
hemispheres, whereas the left hemisphere intention system is limited to the left 
motor system (Heilman & Van den Abell, 1979), meaning that the right hemisphere 
could compensate for damage to the left hemisphere system, but not vice versa. 
However, subsequent investigations have not replicated the finding that AHP 
patients lack motor intentions. Hildebrandt & Zieger observed electrodermal activity 
(EDA) and electromyographic responses (EMG) in an anosognosic patient, while 
Berti et al., 2007 report a case study of a patient who showed activation in proximal 
muscles, both the left and right upper trapetius, when attempting to move the left 
arm.  
1.5.2 Discrepancies between intention and outcome  
 
Like the feed-forward model described above, Frith et al. (2000) propose that AHP 
arises from a malfunction in motor intentional systems. The two accounts differ very 
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critically, however, in that Frith and colleagues suggests that anosognosic patients do 
generate motor intentions, and with them predictions about the expected sensory 
outcome of the specified movement. In a properly functioning system, sensory 
feedback can then be used to determine if there is a discrepancy between the actual 
and predicted sensory consequences of a movement. However, we only become 
aware of the actual sensory outcome of a movement when this differs from the 
predicted outcome; where there is no discrepancy, awareness is based upon the 
prediction. Frith et al. (2000) suggest that, in AHP, sensory information is 
unavailable, because of somatosensory deficits or unilateral neglect, and so the 
patient maintains a delusional awareness of movement based upon the predicted 
outcome of their motor commands.  
Support for the Frith et al. (2000) model comes from electrophysiological evidence 
that AHP patients can generate motor commands (Berti et al., 2007; Hildebrandt & 
Zieger, 1995), and also behavioural evidence of intact motor intention in AHP 
patients. For example, the demonstration that anosognosic patients can exhibit 
bimanual and temporal coupling effects suggests that motor plans from a paralysed 
arm can interfere with the execution of movements from the non-plegic arm 
(Garbarini et al. 2012; Pia et al., 2013). Furthermore, there is some evidence that the 
illusory sensation of movement depends upon the intention to move (Fotopoulou et 
al., 2008). However, there are some aspects of the model that seem to require further 
elaboration. The reasons why sensory information is unavailable to update the motor 
system’s controllers are not specified in detail, especially considering that AHP can 
occur in the absence of neglect or somatosensory deficits (Orfei et al., 2007). Both 
the Frith et al. (2000) model and Heilman and colleagues’ intentional feed-forward 
hypothesis (Heilman, 1991; Heilman, et al., 1998), would also need to explain why 
some patients appear able to acknowledge online movement failures, but are unable 
to integrate this knowledge into long-term body awareness (Tsakiris & Fotopoulou, 
2008). 
Other commentators have proposed similar models, based on the failure to notice a 
discrepancy between intended and actual movement outcomes. Berti and colleagues 
(Berti et al., 2005, 2007) suggest that, rather than the absence of feedback, it is the 
malfunctioning of the comparator itself that leads to unawareness of the discrepancy 
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between the intended and actual outcome of a movement (Berti et al., 2007).  
Investigating the lesion distribution of anosognosic patients, compared to neglect 
patients without anosognosia, Berti et al. (2005) found a higher involvement of pre-
motor areas, leading the authors to suggest that the same neural networks responsible 
for generating and controlling movement are also responsible for monitoring it. In 
anosognosia, damage to pre-motor areas could result in distorted efferent copies of 
motor intentions, which leads to the delusion of movement. In support of this 
hypothesis, Jenkinson, Edelstyn and Ellis (2009), found that anosognosic patients 
were able to describe accurately how they would grasp objects with their plegic limb, 
suggesting the integrity of motor representations. Preston, Jenkinson and Newport 
(2010) found evidence that the monitoring of movements of the non-plegic limb may 
also be impaired in anosognosic patients, and suggest that the comparator responsible 
for matching intentions to outcomes may have pathologically relaxed its threshold 
for signalling errors, in order to accommodate increased noise in the motor system. 
These findings suggest that anosognosic patients can generate motor representations, 
but these may be degraded or distorted to a degree that makes veridical movement 
monitoring impossible. 
An interesting feature of the above research is that it provides a model whereby some 
of the awareness failures of anosognosic patients could be considered the extreme 
extension of normal self-monitoring processes; a pathological widening of the degree 
of tolerance for discrepancies between intention and outcome (Jenkinson & 
Fotopoulou, 2010; Preston et al., 2010). Moreover, if increased noise in the motor 
system leads to increased tolerance for discrepancies, it is plausible to hypothesise 
that healthy individuals with less accurate motor programmes will be less able to 
monitor when their actual movements match their intended movements. In Chapter 5 
of this thesis, three experiments are presented that address this question in healthy 
younger and older adults, to see whether a corollary to anosognosia exists in 
neurologically intact populations. I also investigate the hypothesis that participants 
with lower motor skill will be inclined to overestimate their ability, in line with a 
famous observation from cognitive psychology that people who perform worst in a 
given task tend to be unaware of how poorly they are performing (Kruger and 




1.6 Defence, emotional processing and implicit awareness  
 
The theories of anosognosia based on motor planning and control provide a 
compelling account of how the disorder could arise and, compared to many other 
theories, are relatively well supported by empirical evidence. However, they do not 
provide a ready explanation of why some anosognosic patients seem to experience 
negative emotional reactions towards the plegic limb (Critchley, 1973; Marcel et al., 
2004). Similarly, there is a growing body of evidence that some patients, who 
explicitly deny hemiplegia, may demonstrate implicit emotional awareness during 
therapy (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen, 2002) or 
under appropriate experimental conditions. For example, anosognosic patients may 
show increased response latencies to deficit-related words (Fotopoulou, Pernigo, 
Maeda, Rudd & Kopelman, 2010; Nardone, Ward, Fotopoulou & Turnbull, 2008), 
suggesting that some knowledge of hemiplegia has been processed. As mentioned 
previously, there have also been dissociations observed between self-reported denial 
of paralysis and tacit acknowledgement, through the adoption of an appropriate 
unimanual approach to typically bimanual tasks (Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro, 
Pernigo, Zapparoli, Cordioli & Aglioti, 2011). 
The role of emotion in maintaining unawareness is central to the ‘defence 
hypothesis’ of Weinstein and Kahn (1955). Contrary to all of the previously outlined 
models of AHP, this account is unique in positing a psychological, rather than 
neurological, aetiology, whereby unawareness provides a strategy to cope with the 
sudden and catastrophic loss of limb function after a stroke (Weinstein & Kahn, 
1955; Weinstein, 1991). In a study of 22 brain tumour patients, Weinstein and Khan 
(1950) observed that denial always occurred within the context of general changes in 
behaviour, such as disorientation, confabulation and alterations to mood, and was 
frequently observed for multiple problems. The authors subsequently invested the 
premorbid personality features of 28 patients who denied illness, including 
hemiplegia. Informants reported that these patients had previously considered illness 
to be weak or shameful, and denied or minimised its symptoms. The authors 
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conclude that the tendency towards denial did not date from the onset of the lesion 
but was already part of the patients’ premorbid personality, with the lesion producing 
a reorganising of function that caused them to deny any serious impairment 
(Weinstein & Kahn, 1953). 
There have been several arguments given against the proposal that anosognosia is 
motivated by denial (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; McGlynn & Schacter, 1989), and 
the suggestion that it is a largely psychological, rather than neurological, disorder is 
not the current consensus (Vuilleumier, 2004). The partiality of anosognosia, 
whereby patients may deny or minimise one deficit but be fully cognisant of another 
of equal salience (Marcel et al., 2004) is problematic for motivational theories, as is 
the fact that anosognosia is extremely rare in cases of peripheral neuropathies 
(Vuilleumier, Vocat & Saj, 2013); there is no reason why defensiveness should be 
limited to one particular disorder (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989), or disorders arising 
from brain damage.  
The predominance of right hemisphere lesions has also been cited as evidence 
against a motivational account of anosognosia (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991).  
Envisaging this argument, Weinstein and Kahn argued that sampling bias, driven by 
poor representation of left-brain-damaged aphasic patients, may be responsible for 
this association (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). There is likely to be some truth in this 
supposition (Cocchini et al., 2009; Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010), though it is 
unlikely that sampling bias can account entirely for the hemispheric asymmetry 
observed in AHP. Using the WADA procedure, Gilmore et al., (1992) demonstrated 
that the patients were able to report having been paralysed during the procedure 
when the anaesthetisation was administered to their left hemisphere but not their 
right. This finding has been replicated (Durkin, Meador, Nichols, Lee & Loring, 
1994), though not consistently (Dywan, McGlone and Fox, 1995). However, the 
observation of anosognosia after temporary anesthesia does pose other challenges to 
motivational theories; as the paralysis was short-term, and had resolved at the time of 
questioning, there would be no motivation to deny it. Furthermore, as the same 
people participated in both conditions (anaesthetisation of left and right 
hemispheres), it is unlikely that personality factors determined a tendency towards 
denial (Gilmore et al., 1992).  
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Even if the idea of AHP as a psychological defence mechanism is currently out of 
favour, there is an emotional component to the disorder that requires explanation. As 
observed by Weinstein and Kahn (1953), many patients not only explicitly deny 
having hemiplegia but also demonstrate a marked lack of concern about their 
disability. This seeming unconcern – termed anosodiaphoria (Langer & Levine, 
2014) – may persist after the original unawareness seems to have resolved (Heilman 
& Harciarek, 2010). Furthermore, as Orfei et al (2007) point out, it is plausible that 
motivational factors may be involved in maintaining awareness in some patients, in 
addition to, or in place of, neurological damage. Recently, Turnbull, Fotopoulou and 
Solms (2014) have revisited the idea of a motivational component to anosognosia 
that is not purely psychogenic in origin but instead arises from damage to the system 
of emotion regulation that would typically inhibit denial responses. As this system is 
hypothesized to be mediated by the right hemisphere, it would not be incompatible 
with findings that report higher prevalence of anosognosia after right brain damage. 
If emotional processing does play a role in the generation and/or maintenance of 
anosognosia, then this could occur secondarily to the primary sensorimotor deficit, or 
as an integral component of that deficit (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010). Recently, 
Vuilleumier and colleagues have proposed a multi-component ABC (appreciation, 
belief and check) model of anosognosia (Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010). Like the 
general theory of delusions (Davies et al., 2005), this model posits that anosognosia 
may result from failures at different levels of cognitive processing: appreciation 
deficits involve some alteration of subjective experience, through perceptual loss or 
neglect, for example, while belief and check failures arise from a failure to detect and 
respond appropriately to these alterations (Vuilleumier, 2004). A severe impairment 
at any one level may be sufficient to cause anosognosia with only minor impairment 
at another; for example a patient with severe neglect may only require minor 
disruption to check processes in order to become anosognosic (Vocat & Vuilleumier, 
2010). Moreover, this process may be enacted via two separate channels, one 
involving the integration of feedback in different modalities, and the other implicit, 
non-conscious error monitoring. Appropriate evaluation of the information provided 
via the former channel should lead to awareness of motor impairment; however, if 
that channel is degraded or malfunctioning, some information about the deficit may 
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still be processed implicitly via the second, leading to behaviours that seem to 
acknowledge paralysis concomitantly with explicit denial of it (Vocat & 
Vuilleumier, 2010). 
These issues are discussed further in Chapter 6, the final chapter of the thesis. This is 
a theoretical chapter that draws together the findings from Chapters 3 – 5. I discuss 
the cognitive and clinical features that characterised overestimation in the patient 
groups, with a particular focus on global versus domain-specific components, and 
then the aspects of AHP which can and cannot be explained within the context of 
normal variation in self-monitoring. This is followed by a discussion of the 
theoretical interpretation that I believe best represents both the data collected for this 
thesis and the heterogeneous presentation of AHP across several empirical studies, 
and finally the presentation of two experimental designs that could provide 
interesting avenues for future research.  
 
1.7 Thesis structure and terminology 
 
The experiments reported in this thesis address a series of interrelated research 
questions about different aspects of impaired self-awareness. While each chapter 
reports a stand-alone study, together they are intended to challenge to some of the 
methodological assumptions underpinning anosognosia research. Chapter 2 presents 
a study where unusually it is stroke clinicians who constitute the objects of study 
rather than their patients; the chapter investigates their understanding of the 
lateralization of different cognitive stroke symptoms more commonly associated 
with the right hemisphere, and the impact they believe these would have on the lives 
of patients and caregivers. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the development and testing of a 
tool designed to measure chronic unawareness of functional difficulties, the Visual 
Analogue Test of Anosognosia for impairments in Activities of Daily Living 
(VATA-ADL). In addition to the process of developing the measure, this chapter 
reports preliminary data from a group of chronic stroke patients, to address the 
prevalence and characteristics of long-term overestimation of functional ability.  
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Chapter 4 is the central section of the thesis and contains what was intended to be the 
first of two connected studies. This research examines whether acute stage stroke 
patients who under- or overestimate their motor skills, are similarly inclined to 
under- or overestimated performance on cognitive tasks in the domains of language, 
memory and attention and executive function, and asks what profile of cognitive and 
emotional features is associated with misestimation in both positive and negative 
directions. In what would have been Chapter 5, I had intended to address whether 
acute stage under-/overestimation in different domains predicted impairments in the 
ability to carry out activities of daily living, three months after the stroke, and 
investigate dissociations between unawareness of different functions, using various 
measures including the VATA-ADL, devised in Chapter 3. Unfortunately, serious 
setbacks to clinical data collection made it apparent that the longitudinal aspects of 
this study were impossible to carry out within the timeframe of a PhD; these issues 
are outlined in Appendix 1, along with the original aims and methodology. Chapter 
5, as it appears instead, was determined by theoretical and methodological issues 
arising from the clinical study in Chapter 4, and addresses whether a type of 
anosognosia can be observed in neurologically intact individuals, whereby the 
monitoring of movement success and failure depends upon the level of motor skill. 
In Chapter 6, I then discuss the findings from these two studies and in the context of 
a proposed theoretical model of anosognosia for hemiplegia, and outline some 
directions for future research.  
As Vuilleumier (2004) states, there are several terms that have been used to describe 
unawareness of deficit: unawareness, denial, unconcern and anosognosia are 
sometimes used as though they are interchangeable, though it is far from certain that 
they describe the same phenomenon. As this thesis covers issues of self-awareness 
across multiple domains, including in both brain damaged and neurologically intact 
adults, I have chosen to adopt the following terminology. When discussing 
unawareness of paralysis or weakness I use the terms unawareness, anosognosia, 
anosognosia for hemiplegia, or its abbreviation AHP. When discussing problems of 
unawareness of functional impairments in Chapter 3, or cognitive impairments in 
Chapter 4, I have adopted the terminology unawareness or under/overestimation, 
partly because many of the measures used were devised for the studies and so cannot 
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provide a clinical diagnosis, and partly in order to frame the discussion within the 
scope of normal variation in awareness/self-estimation. Finally, the investigation of 
motor self-awareness in neurologically intact adults in Chapter 5, uses the 
terminology ‘self-monitoring’ to refer to online error awareness, and over- 








Listening to the Silent Hemisphere:  Are stroke 
physicians and health professionals unaware of 




Lesions to the right side of the brain can cause diverse cognitive impairments, 
affecting key functions such as attention (Buxbaum et al., 2004), awareness (Orfei et 
al., 2007) and emotional processing (Heilman, 2014). These deficits have been 
consistently associated with poor long-term functional prognosis (Barker-Collo & 
Feigin, 2006, Jehkonen et al., 2001). However, they may be less salient clinically 
than the disorders of speech (aphasia) and sequenced movement (apraxia) commonly 
associated with left hemisphere lesions. For example, impairments to emotion 
regulation systems, such as speech aprosody (Starkstein, Federoff, Price, Leiguarda, 
& Robinson, 1994) or reduced emotional responsiveness (Paradiso, Anderson, Ponto, 
Tranel, & Robinson, 2011), may be mistaken for a lack of engagement with 
rehabilitation tasks. Similarly, unawareness or lack of concern for deficit 
(anosognosia or anosodiaphoria), may lead patients to under-report their symptoms 
(Barrett, 2010). In their milder manifestations, problems of emotion regulation or 
awareness could be mistaken for a dispositional tendency towards optimism, rather 
than neurological symptoms in their own right (Damasio, 2008).  
Misapprehension of right hemisphere cognitive impairments may be exacerbated by 
a lack of adequate screening measures. Currently, there is still no gold standard 
cognitive screen specifically for stroke patients. Instead, cognitive assessment is 
typically undertaken using measures designed for dementia (Stolwyk, O’Neill, 
McKay & Wong, 2014). These include the Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination–
Revised (ACE-R; Mioshi, Dawson, Mitchell, Arnold & Hodges, 2006), the Montreal 
Cognitive Assessment (MOCA; Nasreddine et al., 2005) and the Mini Mental State 
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Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975). These measures are not 
always appropriate for identifying the full spectrum of post-stroke cognitive 
impairments, including the deficits of attention and awareness associated with right 
hemisphere lesions (Demeyere, Riddoch, Slavkova, Bickerton & Humphreys, 2015). 
In particular, the MMSE has been demonstrated to be insensitive to subtle deficits 
because of ceiling effects (Pendlebury, Mariz, Bull, Mehta, & Rothwell, 2012). 
Furthermore, the number of stroke patients receiving specialist cognitive screening 
or support may fall far below the actual need. A 2014 audit by the Sentinel Stroke 
National Audit Programme (SSNAP) for England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
reported that only 5% of stroke patients were designated applicable for psychology. 
The authors emphasise that this finding is “not consistent with published literature on 
the prevalence of cognitive and mood difficulties, or the self-reported, long term, 
unmet needs of stroke survivors” (SSNAP, 2014, p. 91), and warn against conflating 
the availability of specialist neuropsychological support with the need for it.  
The failure to identify and adequately respond to cognitive impairments may 
seriously impede the recovery and long-term quality of life of stroke patients and 
their caregivers. Cognitively impaired patients can find it difficult to engage in 
structured assessments and therapies (Pedersen, Jørgensen, Nakayama, Raaschou & 
Olsen, 1996b), leading to slowed rehabilitation progress (Heruti et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, clinicians have reported treating patients they perceive as unmotivated 
differently to the motivated (Maclean, Pound, Wolfe & Rudd, 2002). Anosognosia or 
indifference can be bewildering and distressing to caregivers, requiring increased 
vigilance and responsibility (Heilman & Harciarek 2010). The absence of 
professional support, or even recognition of the impact of cognitive impairments, can 
only increase caregiver burden, as suggested by this advice from the Stroke 
Association; “Cognitive problems are often missed by doctors and sometimes it can 
be difficult to get them taken seriously. However, you need to trust that you know 
your family member or friend better than they do, so don’t be afraid to keep pushing 
to get the support you need” (Stroke Association, 2015, p. 20).  
The aim of the current research was to investigate whether a lack of recognition or 
concern for cognitive symptoms would be reflected in stroke clinicians’ responses to 
survey questions. Given the lack of appropriate assessment tools and the lower 
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salience of symptoms resulting from right brain damage, we hypothesized that stroke 
clinicians would find right hemisphere impairments less recognisable as symptoms 
of stroke than left hemisphere impairments. We also hypothesised that they would 
place less emphasis on the prevalence and impact of cognitive symptoms than 
physical symptoms. To address these hypotheses, two questionnaires were devised 
and distributed among stroke physicians and health professionals. The first required 
them to ascribe different cognitive symptoms to either left- or right-sided brain 
lesions, while the second asked them to rate the relative frequency of some common 
cognitive and physical symptoms, and the impact these would have on the lives of 
patients and their caregivers. The same questionnaires were also administered to a 
group of neuropsychological professionals. It was anticipated that stroke clinicians 
would show higher recognition accuracy for left than for right hemisphere cognitive 
symptoms, and that they would rate cognitive symptoms as less common and less 









2.2.1.1 Questionnaire development 
 
The ‘Lateralization Questionnaire’ consisted of a list of fourteen lateralized cognitive 
symptoms, intermingled with six non-lateralized cognitive or physical symptoms. To 
select suitable symptoms for inclusion, a comprehensive list of cognitive 
impairments that can result from stroke was compiled from a neuropsychological 
textbook (Darby & Walsh, 2005). Of the impairments that were described as being 
associated specifically with the left or right hemisphere, the neuropsychological 
literature was searched to verify that the reported lateralization of this symptom was 
reflected in the majority of studies.  
Symptoms were selected to differ in terms of how commonly they are observed, to 
allow for variability in the number of correct responses. As far as possible, only 
cognitive impairments having a clear association with either the left or right 
hemisphere were chosen as targets, however the consistency of lateralization 
reported in the literature varied considerably across symptoms. Prosopagnosia and 
auditory verbal agnosia, for example, have both been associated with bilateral lesions 
as well as the lesions to the right and left hemisphere respectively (De Renzi, Perani, 
Carlesimo, Silveri & Fazio 1994; Poeppel, 2001). Therefore, once the list of 
symptoms had been compiled, it was sent to six research neuropsychologists, to 
check whether they agreed with the given hemisphere designation, and also if they 
considered there to be any difference in overall prevalence between the left and right 
hemisphere symptoms. No major changes were made as a result of this enquiry, 
other than the specification of anosognosia as anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP), to 
differentiate it from other types of unawareness.  
The final selected list of cognitive symptoms associated with the right hemisphere 
was prosopagnosia, loss of speech prosody, emotional flatness, anosognosia for 
29 
 
hemiplegia, visuospatial neglect, dressing apraxia and topographical agnosia. The 
final selected list of cognitive symptoms associated with the left hemisphere was 
aphasia, acalculia, oral apraxia, finger agnosia, auditory verbal agnosia, ideomotor 
apraxia and agraphia.  
Four lateralized physical symptoms were used as check questions to ensure that 
respondents complied with the questionnaire instructions and understood that motor, 
somatosensory and higher visual functions are controlled contralaterally in the brain. 
For each symptom, respondents were given four tick-box response options: left 
hemisphere (LH); right hemisphere (RH); Not Applicable (NA), for symptoms that 
were either non-lateralized or not observed after a stroke; and Don’t Know  
(DK). 2.2.1.2 Procedure and respondents 
 
Data from physicians and health professionals (hereafter PHP group) was obtained at 
the 2012 UK Stroke Forum Conference. One hundred and eighty-six complete 
questionnaires were returned; respondents were 125 (67%) physicians, 50 (27%) 
health professionals, two (1%) students, four (2%) other and five (3%) not stated. Of 
these, 165 (89%) reported working directly with stroke patients.  
The questionnaire was also given to group of neuropsychological professionals 
(hereafter NP group) at the British Neuropsychological Society 2013 spring meeting 
and the 2013 International Neuropsychological Society mid-year meeting. Eighty-
nine complete questionnaires were returned; respondents were 21 (24%) clinical 
neuropsychologists, 25 (28%) research neuropsychologists, 7 (8%) clinical and 
research neuropsychologists, 24 (27%) students, 10 (11%) other and 2 (2%) not 













Twenty-eight questionnaires from the PHP group and 17 questionnaires from the NP 
group contained one or more incorrect answers to the check questions and were 
removed from the analysis, leaving 158 PHP and 72 NP questionnaires in total.  
Responses to the lateralized symptoms by the PHP and NP groups are shown overall 
in Figure 2.2 and individually by symptom in Figure 2.3. While the mean accuracy 
rates appear equivalent across groups and hemispheres, the PHP group made many 
more incorrect endorsements of the contralateral hemisphere, especially for the left 
hemisphere symptoms.  
Figure 2.2. PHP and NP overall percentage responses to cognitive symptoms 




Figure 2.3. PHP and NP percentage responses to individual cognitive symptoms 
associated with the left and right hemisphere. 
 
Therefore, in addition to studying 'sensitivity' (correct attribution of symptoms to 
each hemisphere), we also estimated 'specificity' (correct rejection of symptoms 
associated with the contralateral hemisphere), and overall accuracy of performance, 
calculated for the left hemisphere as follows: 
 Accuracy: correct LH responses/(correct LH responses + LH responses to 
right hemisphere symptoms + all RH, NA and DK responses to left 
hemisphere symptoms) 
 Sensitivity: correct LH responses/(correct LH responses + RH, NA and DK 
responses to left hemisphere symptoms) 
 Specificity: all RH, NA and DK responses to right hemisphere symptoms/(all 
RH, NA and DK responses to right hemisphere symptoms + LH responses to 
right hemisphere symptoms)   
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These figures were calculated in the same way for the right hemisphere symptoms, 
with LH and RH switched. The mean sensitivity, specificity and accuracy rates for 
left and right hemisphere symptoms are shown in Table 2.1.  
 
NP Group  Left Hemisphere Right Hemisphere 
 Sensitivity 0.56 (0.22) 0.54 (0.28) 
 Specificity 0.89 (0.12) 0.89 (0.14) 
 Accuracy 0.51 (0.21) 0.49 (0.26) 
PHP Group  Left Hemisphere Right Hemisphere 
 Sensitivity 0.46 (0.24) 0.54 (0.28) 
 Specificity 0.81 (0.17) 0.70 (0.25) 
 Accuracy 0.38 (0.20) 0.41 (0.21) 
 
Table 2.1. Mean (standard deviation) sensitivity, specificity and accuracy of NP and 
PHP groups. 
 
Mixed two-way ANOVAs were conducted on each measure, with profession (PHP 
or NP) as the between-subjects factor and hemisphere as the within-subjects factor. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the accuracy data showed a main effect of profession, with 
the NP group being more accurate overall than the PHP group [F(1,228) = 17.63, p 
<.001]. There was no main effect of hemisphere [F(1,228) = .01, p = ns] and no 
significant interaction [F(1,228) = 1.69, p = ns]. 
For sensitivity, there was no significant main effect of hemisphere [F(1,228) = 1.46, 
p = ns], but there was a marginally significant effect of profession, with the NP 
group having overall higher sensitivity levels [F(1,228) = 4.11, p<.05]. This main 
effect appears to have been driven by an emerging interaction, which however just 
failed to attain significance [F(1,228) = 3.81, p=.052]; specifically, sensitivity levels 
were similar between hemispheres in the NP group, but higher for right- than left-
hemisphere symptoms in the PHP group (0.54 vs. 0.46). Since the interaction term 
was not significant, these patterns were not followed up formally. 
For the specificity measure, there was a main effect of profession, with specificity 
rates being significantly higher for the NP group than for the PHP group [F(1,228) = 
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67.41, p<.001]. There was also a main effect of hemisphere [F(1,228) = 6.64, p<.05], 
qualified by a significant interaction [F(1,228) = 5.62, p<.05]. The pattern of 
interaction was complementary to the trend observed above: the NP group’s 
specificity of responding was similar between hemispheres but the PHP group’s 
specificity was higher for the left than right hemisphere. This suggests that, even 
though the PHP group’s mean accuracy rates for the two hemispheres appear similar, 
these respondents generally endorse the left hemisphere only when certain about a 
symptom; when unsure, they tend to ascribe it to the right-hemisphere.  
It should be noted that the NP group contained a far higher number of student 
participants than the PHP. Equally, it could be argued that the PHP group was more 
heterogeneous, as over a quarter of participants were identified as unspecified ‘other’ 
health professionals. Therefore, to check that the same pattern of results would be 
observed on more homogenous groups, the analyses were re-run only on participants 
identifying as stroke physicians (N = 109) and research and/or clinical 
neuropsychologists (N = 56).  
The accuracy results followed exactly the same pattern; there was significant a main 
effect of profession, with the neuropsychologists group being more accurate overall 
than physicians [F(1,163) = 9.02, p <.01], no main effect of hemisphere [F(1,163) = 
2.98, ns] and no significant interaction [F(1,163) = 2.35, ns]. 
The sensitivity data showed a different pattern of main effects. Unlike the results for 
the full dataset, there was no main effect of profession [F(1,163) = .79, ns], however, 
there was a significant main effect of hemisphere [F(1,163) = 7.52, p < .01]; 
respondents sensitivity’ was higher for the right hemisphere. However, this was 
qualified by a significant interaction with profession [F(1,163) = 5.21, p < .05]. 
Similarly to the full dataset, sensitivity levels were equivalent between hemispheres 
in the neuropsychologists group (RH = .55, LH = .54), but higher for right- than left-
hemisphere symptoms in the physicians group (RH = .59, LH = .45).  
The specificity data followed exactly the same pattern as the full dataset. Specificity 
was significantly higher for the neuropsychologists group than for the physicians 
group [F(1,163) = 54.05, p<.001], and for the left hemisphere [F(1,163) = 14.04, p 
< .001], but these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction [F(1,163) = 
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8.31, p < .01]: neuropsychologists’ specificity was similar between hemispheres (RH 
= .88, LH = .90), but the physicians’ specificity was higher for the left hemisphere 
than the right (RH = .67, LH = .82). Therefore, apart from the switching of the main 
effects in the sensitivity data, the same pattern of responses observed in the full 
dataset was also evident among those who could be considered specialists in their 
field.  
To ascertain whether any of the four response options– LH, RH, NA, DK – for each 
symptom were endorsed at a level higher than chance, the number of positive 
responses to each of these options was evaluated relative to the total number of valid 
responses using a binomial test to examine whether that proportion exceeded the 
0.25 chance level, with the criterion for significance set to p< .001 [p < .05/(16x4)], 
to correct for the total number of comparisons conducted. For the NP group, the 
critical threshold was 32/72, which was exceeded by RH responses to visuospatial 
neglect, loss of speech prosody, topographical agnosia, anosognosia for hemiplegia 
and prosopagnosia, and LH responses for aphasia, agraphia, auditory verbal agnosia 
and oral apraxia. No other response option exceeded the threshold. 
For the PHP group, the critical threshold of 65/158 was exceeded by RH responses to 
the right-hemisphere symptoms of visuospatial neglect, anosognosia for hemiplegia, 
dressing apraxia, prosopagnosia and topographical agnosia, as well as incorrect LH 
responses to loss of speech prosody and NA responses to emotional flatness. For the 
left hemisphere symptoms, the threshold was exceeded by correct LH responses to 
aphasia, agraphia and acalculia. It was also exceeded by incorrect RH responses to 
ideomotor apraxia and finger agnosia.  
These figures demonstrate that, for the PHP group, RH responses were relatively 
common across all symptoms - left and right hemisphere - as reflected in the 
significantly lower specificity for the right hemisphere impairments. It is thus 
unclear, for the moderately-strongly endorsed right hemisphere symptoms (dressing 
apraxia, prosopagnosia, topographical agnosia), whether the elevated sensitivity is 
due to genuine knowledge of the symptom, or to a general tendency to endorse the 








2.3.1.1 Questionnaire development 
 
The ‘Impact Questionnaire’ consisted of a list of six commonly observed cognitive 
symptoms of stroke; unilateral spatial neglect, aphasia, personality change, apraxia, 
anosognosia and memory loss. These impairments were selected on the grounds that 
they are relatively common and salient symptoms, which are reported in the 
literature as having a serious impact on the lives of patients and/or caregivers, and 
which should be familiar to the physicians and health professionals from their 
clinical practice. 
The cognitive symptoms were intermingled with the three physical symptoms of 
upper limb paralysis, facial paralysis and hemianopia. Respondents were required to 
mark, on a scale of 1 -5, first how common they believed each symptom to be and 
secondly, if it was present in a severe form, what impact it would have on the lives of 
patients and caregivers.  It was necessary to specify severity in order to try to obtain 
comparable answers across symptoms, however this may have influenced 
respondents to endorse consistently high impact scores. Two versions of the 
questionnaire were produced, with the symptom order reversed; participants were 
randomly allocated to either order 1 or 2. Version 1 is shown in Figure 2.4. 
 
2.3.1.2 Procedure and respondents 
 
Data from physicians and health professionals (hereafter PHP group) was obtained at 
the 2013 European Stroke Conference. I was positioned at the University of 
Edinburgh stand in the trade fair section, where any delegates approaching the stand 
were asked to complete the questionnaire. One hundred and thirty-seven complete 
questionnaires were returned; respondents were 98 (72%) physicians, 26 (18%) 
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health professionals, 8 (6%) students and 5 (4%) other. 122 (89%) reported that they 
worked directly with stroke patients, 8 (6%) reported that they did not and 7 (5%) did 
not specify.  
The questionnaire was also given to group of neuropsychological professionals 
(hereafter NP group) at the European Society of Neuropsychological Societies’ 2013 
biennial conference. Ninety-one completed questionnaires were returned; 
respondents were 43 (47%) clinical neuropsychologists, 25 (28%) research 
neuropsychologists, 4 (4%) both clinical and research neuropsychologists, 16 (18%) 
students, 2 (2%) other and 1 (1%) not specified. Sixty-five (72%) reported that they 
worked directly with stroke patients, 22 (24%) reported that they did not and 4 (4%) 
did not specify. 
While some of the respondents in the PHP and NP groups may have been the same 
for both Experiments 1 and 2, very few people completing the Impact Questionnaire 
expressed familiarity with the Lateralization Questionnaire and it is likely that the 












To assess group differences in ratings of cognitive and physical symptoms, 
participant ratings for the five cognitive and three physical symptoms were averaged 
to create four separate indices; physical frequency, cognitive frequency, physical 









Mixed analysis of variance on the frequency scores showed a main effect of 
symptom type; physical symptoms (M = 3.59, SE = .04) were rated as significantly 
more frequent in occurrence than cognitive symptoms (M = 3.09, SE = .04) [F(1, 
226) = 103.231, p<.001]. There was also a main effect of profession, with PHP 
average frequency ratings across all symptoms (M = 3.45, SE = .04) being 
significantly higher than NP average frequency ratings, (M = 3.22, SE = .05) 
[F(1,226) = 12.93, p<.001]. This was qualified by a significant interaction [F(1, 226) 
= 25.52, p<.001]. Follow-up t-tests on the physical symptoms revealed that the PHP 
group gave significantly higher frequency ratings (M = 3.83, SE = .05) than the NP 
group (M = 3.35, SE = .07) [t(192.01) = 5.54, p < .001], however t-tests on the 
cognitive symptoms revealed no difference between groups: PHP (M = 3.08, SE 
= .05) NP (M = 3.10, SE = .060 [t = -.26, ns].  
A mixed analysis of variance on the impact scores also revealed a main effect of 
symptom type, however this was in the opposite direction to the frequency data; 
mean impact ratings for cognitive symptoms (M = 4.13, SE = .04) were significantly 
higher than for physical symptoms (M = 3.50, SE = .04) [F(1, 226) = 212.32, p 
< .001]. There was no main effect of profession PHP (M =3.88, SE = .04), NP (M 
=3.76, SE = .05) [F(1, 226) = 3.79, ns], however there was significant interaction, 
[F(1, 226) = 15.39, p < .001]. PHP impact ratings for physical symptoms (M = 3.65, 
SE = .05) were significantly higher than NP Ratings (M = 3.36, SE = .07) [t(226) = 
3.57, p < .001], but there was no difference for cognitive symptoms: PHP (M = 3.08, 
SE = .05) NP (M = 3.10, SE = .060 [t = -.26, ns]. 
Therefore, regardless of profession, cognitive symptoms were rated as being less 
frequent than physical symptoms, but as having a greater impact. And, while there 
were differences between PHP and NP groups in both frequency and impact scores, 
these were driven by the PHP group giving higher ratings for physical symptoms 
than the NP group. Between-group ratings of the cognitive symptoms did not differ.  
NP and PHP group mean scores for the frequency of the selected cognitive 
symptoms are shown in Table 2.2, ordered by the PHP ratings, from highest to 
lowest. Independent t-tests were conducted on this data, with significance levels set 
at p< .001 to correct for multiple comparisons. Of the physical symptoms, PHP 
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frequency ratings were significantly higher for upper limb paralysis [t(226) = 4.37, p 
< .001] and facial paralysis [t(170.76) = 7.14, p < .001]. There were no significant 
differences in ratings for any of the cognitive symptoms, though there was a trend 
towards the NP group giving higher frequency ratings for memory loss, [t(173.71) = 
-3.35, p < .01]. 
 
 PHP NP 
Upper Limb Paralysis 4.26 (.80) *** 3.75 (.95) 
Facial Paralysis 4.12 (.91) *** 3.14 (1.07) 
Aphasia 3.75 (.84) 3.67 (.99) 
Neglect 3.15 (.88) 3.27 (.90) 
Personality Change 3.15 (.97) 2.93 (1.08) 
Hemianopia  3.12 (.92) 3.15 (1.00) 
Memory Loss 3.03 (.96) 3.51 (1.11)** 
Apraxia 2.91 (.88)  2.59 (.99) 
Anosognosia 2.47 (.85) 2.59 (1.00) 
***p<.001, **, p<.01 
Table 2.2: PHP and NP ratings of the frequency of different symptoms, (1-5), means 
(SDs). 
 
PHP and NP mean impact ratings are shown in Table 2.3. Of the physical symptoms, 
only hemianopia was rated as having significantly greater impact by the PHP group 
than the NP group [t(226) = 4.37, p < .001], though there was a trend towards higher 
PHP ratings for upper limb paralysis [t(151.77) = 3.08, p < .01] and apraxia 
[t(176.52) = 3.52, p < .01]. Of the cognitive symptoms, the NP group showed a trend 
towards higher ratings for personality change [t(226) = -2.71, p < .01] and 





 Physicians Neuropsychologists 
Aphasia 4.71 (.58) 4.70 (.53) 
Upper Limb Paralysis 4.39 (.75) ** 4.00 (1.03) 
Memory Loss 4.19 (.84) 4.26 (.77) 
Neglect 4.15 (.88) 4.19 (.93) 
Personality Change 4.07 (.86) 4.37 (.75)** 
Apraxia 3.96 (.87) ** 3.52 (.98) 
Hemianopia  3.91 (.93) *** 3.45 (.85) 
Anosognosia 3.56 (.97) 3.85 (1.14)* 
Facial Paralysis 2.66 (1.09) 2.62 (.97) 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Table 2.3: PHP and NP ratings of the impact of different symptoms, (1-5), means 
(SDs). 
 
Across both frequency and impact scores, the PHP group tended to rate physical 
symptoms higher than the NP group, perhaps reflecting the priority placed on 
physical rehabilitation within an acute care setting. However, the hypothesis that 
physicians would rate the cognitive symptoms as relatively less important was not 
borne out. Overall PHP ratings for the frequency and impact of cognitive symptoms 
were equivalent to the NP group ratings and, for the impact ratings, were actually 






Two questionnaires were devised and distributed at professional stroke and 
neuropsychological conferences, to assess whether stroke physicians and health 
professionals were better able to identify symptoms associated with left than right 
hemisphere lesions, and to obtain an overview of the relative importance they placed 
on various symptoms. The results of the Lateralization Questionnaire seemed, at face 
value, counter to our hypothesis, with equivalent accuracy for left and right 
hemisphere symptoms in both groups. However, a different pattern emerged in the 
PHP group once incorrect endorsements of the opposite hemisphere were taken into 
account. The PHP group identified many more left hemisphere symptoms as being 
associated with the right hemisphere than vice versa. Higher specificity levels for the 
left hemisphere symptoms show that PHP group members had greater certainty in 
their recognition of cognitive symptoms associated with this hemisphere, implying 
that the reduced specificity for right hemisphere symptoms was due to a general 
tendency to endorse the right hemisphere when uncertain. 
Thus, whilst accuracy scores show that stroke clinicians were just as knowledgeable 
about right as about left hemisphere cognitive symptoms, they may nonetheless 
believe themselves to know less about the right hemisphere, presumably because of 
its wide stereotyping as the more mysterious side of the brain (see e.g. Corballis, 
2007). This may be a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: the PHP group made more 
erroneous attributions to the right hemisphere precisely because they expected their 
knowledge of it to be sketchier. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the 
NP group, who have more secure knowledge of the cognitive consequences of stroke 
(albeit far from perfect), were not prone to this bias. 
Examination of responses to individual symptoms highlights a further possible 
heuristic used in completing the questionnaire. For example, the only right 
hemisphere impairment endorsed as a left hemisphere symptom above chance levels 
by the PHP group was loss of speech prosody; very likely because of the ready 
association of speech problems with left-hemisphere lesions, an interpretation 
reinforced by the near-universal (correct) left-hemisphere ascription of aphasia. 
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Another symptom with an idiosyncratic pattern was the right hemisphere symptom 
of ‘emotional flatness’, the only one with an above chance preponderance of ‘not 
applicable’ answers. This indicates a different kind of uncertainty from uncertainty 
over the correct hemispheric association; many PHP respondents apparently did not 
believe ‘emotional flatness’ to be a lateralised consequence of stroke, or perhaps 
even a ‘real’ consequence of stroke. 
There are of course caveats to the methodology employed. A lack of consensus about 
listed cognitive impairments may genuinely reflect a lack of consensus about the 
predominant hemispheric association. For example, acalculia can arise as a result of 
spatial deficits associated with right hemisphere lesions, as well as left hemisphere 
arithmetical deficits (Rosselli & Ardila, 1989); this symptom was attributed to right 
hemisphere lesions by 28% of the NP group. Also, some of the symptoms selected 
are rarely observed and arguably have little clinical impact, making it unlikely that 
they would be recognised. While this may be true, these symptoms were useful to 
gauge how the groups responded to uncertainty, and so highlighted the right 
hemisphere response bias amongst PHP respondents..  
Overall, it is of course unsurprising that stroke clinicians showed less extensive 
knowledge of the cognitive consequences of stroke than did neuropsychologists, for 
whom the questions relate to their specialist field. Knowledge of cognitive 
symptoms, in both groups, was far from perfect, with the exception of the ‘superstar’ 
symptom of aphasia, universally recognised as a left hemisphere sign. This survey, 
however, was specifically designed to probe for asymmetries of knowledge of 
symptoms associated with the two hemispheres. The findings are unique in that they 
highlight how stroke clinicians may be influenced by the presumed obscurity of the 
right hemisphere, and so over-endorse this side when uncertain about the 
hemispheric origin of a symptom. The mysterious nature of the right hemisphere is a 
peculiarly pervasive myth that we should strive to dispel in educating health 
professionals and others about the cognitive consequences of stroke. 
For the Impact questionnaire, ratings were generally high for both PHP and NP 
groups, which may have been driven in part by the instruction to consider the deficits 
in severe form. As anticipated, the PHP group gave generally higher ratings to 
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physical symptoms than the NP group, probably reflecting their clinical focus on the 
physical consequences of stroke. However, contrary to expectations, very few 
differences emerged between the groups in relation to the cognitive symptoms; based 
on this questionnaire, there is no reason to believe that physicians generally 
underestimate the prevalence or importance of cognitive symptoms after stroke. The 
absence of any objective data against which to compare these results is a shortfall of 
the Impact Questionnaire; reports from the literature vary greatly in how detrimental 
these symptoms are in relation to each other. 
At the level of individual symptoms, it is worth noting that anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (AHP) was rated by the physicians as both the least common and least 
detrimental of the cognitive symptoms, even though it was well recognised on the 
Lateralization questionnaire (See Appendix 2: Are Stroke Physicians Unaware of 
Anosognosia?). Anosognosia is a complex and multi-faceted disorder (Orfei et al., 
2007), the prevalence of which may be underestimated, partly because of patient 
under-reporting (Barrett, 2010), and partly because more subtle manifestations of 
unawareness may be missed in clinical observation. However, there is an increasing 
amount of research that suggests unawareness of deficits can profoundly affect a 
patient’s rehabilitation (Jehkonen, Laihosalo & Kettunen, 2006a). Further research 
should be directed towards understanding the impact of anosognosia and associated 








The Visual Analogue Test of Anosognosia for 





3.1.1 Chronic anosognosia and unawareness of functional difficulties 
 
The ability to return to independent living after a stroke is influenced by many 
factors, both physical and cognitive (Barker-Collo & Feigin, 2006). Reports of the 
relative influence of different deficits on functional outcome vary, though the 
severity of motor loss (Lincoln et al., 1989), unilateral neglect (Jehkonen, Laihosalo 
& Kettunen, 2006b), apraxia (Hanna-Pladdy, Heilman and Foundas, 2003) and 
aphasia (Dickey et al., 2010) have all been cited as negative prognostic indicators. 
These physical and cognitive problems may interfere with the ability to carry out 
day-to-day-tasks for different reasons; the ability to wash dishes, for example, 
depends upon the integrity of primary motor skills, higher order movement planning 
and sequencing, and also spatial awareness. Because daily activities involve multiple 
cognitive operations, scales that measure their performance are considered to be 
particularly effective in detecting early cognitive decline (Sikkes, De Lange-de 
Klerk, Pijnenburg & Scheltens, 2009).  
There is increasing evidence that anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) may make a 
significant, independent contribution to worse outcome (Jehkonen et al., 2006a). It 
may interact with other cognitive symptoms, impeding their recovery (Gialanella, et 
al., 2005), or reduce adherence to rehabilitation programmes (Jenkinson et al., 2011). 
However, unawareness of ongoing functional problems has received surprisingly 
little attention in the stroke literature, perhaps because anosognosia is so typically 
considered to resolve in the acute stages after a stroke (Jehkonen et al., 2000; 
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Starkstein et al., 2010). Yet, there have been sufficient cases of chronic anosognosia 
reported in the literature to suggest that anosognosia is not an exclusively acute stage 
phenomenon. Cocchini, Beschin and Della Sala (2002) identified 42 reported cases 
of chronic or subacute anosognosia, while a review by Orfei et al. (2007) highlighted 
that up to one third of stroke patients may still lack awareness of their deficits in the 
chronic stages. It is therefore highly possible that some patients with long-term 
difficulties in performing everyday tasks will have poor awareness of their 
limitations.  
Long-term deficits of awareness may have a more subtle manifestation than in the 
acute stages after a stroke, expressed at a behavioural level, for example through the 
failure to demonstrate any concern for hemiplegia (Critchley, 1953, 1955; Heilman 
and Harciarek, 2010). This phenomenon, termed ‘anosodiaphoria’ by Babinski in 
1914 (Langer & Levine, 2014) is typically described as a milder form of anosognosia 
(Heilman et al., 1998), or as developing from it (Vocat et al., 2010). While various 
accounts of anosodiaphoria have been suggested, incorporating impaired emotional 
communication (Starkstein et al., 1992) or expression (Spaletta et al., 2001), or 
changes to emotional arousal (Ramachandran, Blakeslee & Sacks, 1998), one 
interesting possible explanation for the lack of concern exhibited by these patients is 
that they never truly discover their deficits (Heilman & Harciarek, 2010). Through 
being told repeatedly that they are weak or paralysed, AHP patients learn to answer 
questions appropriately, yet their self-awareness remains superficial. The implication 
of this is that these patients never fully become aware of their paralysis, with this 
unawareness being manifest as anosognosia in the acute stages after a stroke and 
anosodiaphoria in the long term (Heilman & Harciarek, 2010). 
Similarly, it has been observed that anosognosic patients are frequently assessed 
using similar scales, and may have been exposed to the same questions several times; 
they may be asked if anything is wrong with their limbs or whether they can move 
them (Orfei et al., 2009), or asked to estimate their ability to perform certain actions, 
such as walking or clapping hands (Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010). This could lead to 
patients providing learned responses, which do not represent their true state of 
awareness (Cocchini, Beschin, Cameron, Fotopoulou & Della Sala, 2009; Cocchini, 
et al., 2012). In support of this proposal, Della Sala et al. (2009) found that the 
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questions that best predicted anosognosia on their Visual Analogue Scale for Motor 
Impairments (VATA-M) were those such as washing dishes, or opening bottles and 
jars, which are not incorporated in typical anosognosia assessments. This would 
suggest that some of the scales used to assess anosognosia might not ask the right 
questions to identify long-term unawareness.  
Orfei et al. (2009) carried out a review of anosognosia studies in order to identify the 
dimensions that should be considered in the investigation of unawareness. Their 
findings generally concur with the observations above, that the majority of measures 
to assess AHP used in stroke research have too narrow a focus on the specific 
sensorimotor deficit, while disregarding the wider context of the disorder, for 
example its functional implications for activities of daily living or adherence to 
medical treatment. The authors suggest that the tools used to measure anosognosia in 
stroke have not kept pace with the evolution of the concept. This is in marked 
contrast to scales assessing unawareness in traumatic brain injury (TBI) (for example 
Prigatano et al., 1986), which tend to encompass a far wider range of awareness 
deficits, including functional considerations, such as the patient’s adherence to 
treatment and their understanding of the implications of their problems for day-to-
day activities (Orfei et al., 2009, 2010). 
While questions assessing awareness of problems in activities of daily living may not 
feature in typical measures of AHP, there are some observations in the literature that 
awareness of hemiplegia may be dissociated from unawareness of its implications. 
One study that did ask questions about day-to-day activities, for example washing 
and eating, found that unawareness of these problems was more common than 
unawareness of motor deficits (Marcel et al., 2004). Furthermore, some patients who 
seemed aware of hemiplegia overestimated their ability to carry out bimanual 
actions, suggesting that they were unable to make inferences from knowledge of a 
specific deficit to its implications for practical activities (Marcel et al., 2004). 
Similarly, there have been cases reported of patients who verbally acknowledged 
their paralysis but exhibited behaviours that suggested they had not understood its 
consequences, approaching tasks as though they had full use of all of their limbs 
(Cocchini et al., 2010).  
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If stroke patients can acknowledge their motor problems but remain unaware of how 
these affect their performance of daily activities, then asking more directly about 
these activities may elicit chronic overestimation more effectively than anosognosia 
questionnaires that focus on specific deficits. This would be theoretically interesting, 
as it would point towards a form of chronic unawareness that has been 
underrepresented in the stroke literature. Chronic overestimation of functional 
abilities could also have serious practical implications, increasing the likelihood of 
unsafe behaviours in the patients (Hartman-Maeir et al., 2001), and causing stress to 
their caregivers, who may struggle to manage these behaviours (Heilman & 
Harciarek, 2010). This could be particularly difficult to cope with once the patient 
has returned home, away from professional support.   
 
3.1.2 Current ADL scales and the adaptation the VATA format 
 
The earliest measures of ADL, such as the Katz Index of ADL (Katz, Ford, 
Moskowitz, Jackson & Jaffe, 1963) and the Barthel Index (Mahoney, 1965) are still 
widely employed in clinical settings and have well–established validity for 
assessment in the acute stages after stroke (Brorsson & Asberg, 1983; Collin, Wade, 
Davies & Horne, 2009). However, these scales focus exclusively on basic ADL, such 
as feeding, toileting and transfers and, as such, they have limited use in assessing a 
person’s ability to function outside of a clinical setting; this requires the 
incorporation of instrumental activities, sometimes termed extended or advanced 
activities (Chong, 1995), which investigate more complex domestic, leisure, social 
and financial tasks. While some scales are based on actual performance, and may 
therefore be more ecologically valid, the majority of ADL scales used in research are 
based on either self-report or informant-report, which is more practical for large-
scale studies and requires no specialist training (Gold, 2012). Rating scales allow for 
continuous observation over weeks or months, rather than being based on a single 
observation point. Also, performance measures remove the patient from the familiar 
structures or routines that may facilitate their IADL ability, and so provide an 
incomplete picture of their actual ability (Gold, 2012). 
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There are surprisingly few scales designed specifically for use with stroke patients, 
though many measures developed for Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and Mild Cognitive 
Impairment (MCI), have been used in stroke research (for systematic reviews of 
these measures, see Gold (2012) for MCI and Sikkes et al. (2009) for dementia). In a 
review of the use of ADL scales in stroke research, Chong (1995) identified only 
four scales that were designed specifically for use with stroke patients; the 
Nottingham Extended ADL (NEADL: Nouri & Lincoln,1987), the Hamrin Activity 
Index (Hamrin & Wohlin, 1981), the Frenchay Activities Index (Holbrook & 
Skilbeck, 1983), and the Household section of the Rivermead ADL Assessment 
(Whiting & Lincoln, 1980). This latter scale is a performance measure; of the three 
others, the first is based on patient self-report and the other two on patient interviews, 
which is surprising, given the potential for stroke patients to over-estimate their 
ability. In regard to MCI, Farias, Mungas and Jagust (2005) highlighted the 
importance of using informant- rather than self-report; they found that only the 
former was able to predict functional ability, likely because of the impaired insight 
associated with the early stages of this condition.  
Given that informant reports are considered to provide reasonably accurate appraisals 
of functional ability (Gold 2012), one viable method of measuring awareness is to 
calculate the discrepancy between self-rated and informant-rated ability 
(Debettignies, Mahurin & Pirozzolo, 1990; Tabert et al., 2002). This is the principle 
upon which the VATA format was devised; the scales incorporate a series of 
questions about the ability to undertake certain actions or tasks, and responses are 
collected from both the patient and a personal or professional caregiver. The latter 
scores are taken to represent actual ability, so that the discrepancy between self- and 
caregiver-ratings provides a measure of awareness. There are currently two VATA 
scales, one testing anosognosia for motor impairments (VATA-M; Della Sala et al., 
2009) and one for language impairments (VATA-L; Cocchini et al., 2010), and a 
third scale for memory impairments is still in development (see Cocchini et al., 
2012). This chapter proposes a fourth scale, focused on unawareness of problems in 
carrying out day-to-day activities. Like the previous VATAs, the Visual Analogue 
Test of Anosognosia for Impairments in Activities of Daily Living (VATA-ADL) 
includes both verbal and pictorial representations of each item, in order to allow for 
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the testing of LBD patients, who might otherwise be excluded because of language 
impairments (Orfei et al., 2009).  
 
3.1.3 Aims and hypotheses 
 
The aim of this study was to create a scale of unawareness for impairments in 
carrying out activities of daily living, using the VATA format, and administer this to 
a group of patients in the chronic stages after a stroke. To my knowledge, this is the 
first visual analogue ADL scale to be developed, and the first anosognosia measure 
to focus exclusively on unawareness of difficulty in carrying out daily activities that 
may persist in the long-term after a stroke. The requirements of the scale were that it 
should: provide a reliable measure of ADL ability, which is sensitive to a range of 
impairment severity; provide a measure of awareness of functional ability, through 
the discrepancy between self-reports and caregiver reports; be administered in the 
chronic stages after a stroke, once the patients have had the opportunity to attempt 
the activities and discover any deficits (Orfei et al., 2009); be graded such that 
different degrees of severity of anosognosia can be identified; and be suitable for 
administration to patients with language impairments, through the provision of 
pictorial and text representations of each item. It was hypothesized that, in line with 
Orfei et al. (2007), up to one third of the tested patients would show some degree of 
unawareness for their deficits. It was also anticipated that unawareness would be 
present in both left and right brain damaged patients, in line with previous findings 
using the VATA format (Della Sala et al., 2009).  
Cognitive ability was measured by MMSE for the majority of the patients. Chronic 
stage AHP has often been attributed the influence of specific cognitive problems that 
interfere with the ability to update awareness, for example persistent global cognitive 
impairment (Levine et al., 1991, Weinstein & Kahn, 1955) or problems with reality 
monitoring (Venneri & Shanks, 2004). However, seven of the chronic cases of 
anosognosia reported by Cocchini et al. (2002) did not have general intellectual or 
reasoning impairments, suggesting that, even if global intellectual deficit predisposes 
someone to chronic anosognosia, it may not be a necessary condition for the 
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maintenance of unawareness. Therefore, while cognitive impairment was predicted 
to be more prevalent and severe among the anosognosic group, it was not anticipated 
to be present in all patients who were unaware of their functional abilities. 
 
3.2 VATA-ADL Development and image piloting 
 
3.2.1 Item selection 
 
18 activities of daily living were chosen for inclusion, by examining existing ADL 
scales, in particular the Nottingham Extended Activities of Daily Living Scale 
(NEADL: Nouri & Lincoln, 1987), a validated scale, commonly used with stroke 
patients. While the visual analogue format of the VATA-ADL is a unique 
development on previous ADL scales, its main novel aspect is its function as an 
awareness measure, rather than a measure of actual ability. Therefore, the selected 
items represent activities that are frequently included in such scales and have good 
validity in measuring functional status.  
The items were organised a priori into the following groups:   
Self-care activities: 
1. Feeding yourself 
2. Washing your face 
3. Taking a bath or shower 
4. Getting dressed and undressed 
5. Combing your hair 
6. Taking your medication 
Activities inside the home: 
7. Writing letters 
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8. Making hot drinks 
9. Using the telephone 
10. Making a hot snack 
11. Watering plants 
12. Reading the newspaper 
Activities outside of the home: 
13. Getting in and out of the car 
14. Managing money 
15. Crossing the road 
16. Travelling on public transport 
17. Doing the shopping 
18. Going out socially 
These groups were selected to provide roughly increasing levels of difficulty, in 
terms of the complexity of the cognitive functions involved and/or the level of 
mobility required. However, it was anticipated that they may be subject to change 
once the structure of the questionnaire had been examined through principal 
components analysis of the caregiver scores.  
No items related to housework were included, in order to minimise gender bias, with 
the exception of the example question ‘Doing the washing up’, which was used to 
demonstrate the VATA-ADL format.  
A cartoonist was commissioned to draw simple black and white images depicting 
each of these activities.  He was requested to provide each image as a single picture 
and to attempt to convey each action clearly and unambiguously, with as little visual 
detail as possible. The provided images were scrutinised and changes requested 
where there was any perceived ambiguity.  
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Each item was presented, one per page, in the format, ‘Would you have 
difficulty…?’ The question appeared at the top of each page with an image of the 
activity immediately underneath.  Respondents were required to rate themselves on a 
visual analogue response scale, appearing at the bottom of the page. The scale 
contained four points representing increasing levels of difficulty, from 0 ‘No 
Problem’ to 3 ‘Problem’. The extreme ends of the scale were accompanied by 
drawings of smiling and neutral faces. The format of the response scale was based 
upon the VATA-M (Della Sala et al., 2009), as the authors’ piloting of this measure 
demonstrated more reliable responses using the neutral face than a face displaying 
negative emotions such as sadness or frustration.  
In addition to the experimental items, four check questions were included, to ensure 
understanding of and compliance with the measure. Two of these were designed to 
be achievable by the vast majority of people, regardless of post-stroke impairment: 
19. Hearing a smoke alarm 
20. Recognising yourself in the mirror 
Data was excluded from any participants who failed to answer either 0 or 1 to these 
questions. The final two questions were designed to be impossible for the majority of 
people: 
21. Pulling a lorry 
22. Swinging on a trapeze 
Data was excluded from any participants who failed to answer either 2 or 3 to these 
questions. Ratings from the four check questions were not included in the calculation 
of the final score.  
The final version of the 18-item scale, including instructions to researchers and 







3.2.2 Piloting the images 
 
3.2.2.1 Participants  
 
The 24 pictures were piloted with two groups of healthy volunteers, all of whom 
were undergraduate students participating for course credit.  Data was collected 
initially from a group of 39 participants with a mean age of 19.10 years (SD = .86). 
Seven were male, 32 female, and 28 (72%) were native speakers of English. After 
this initial pilot, any desired adjustments were made to the scale or images and it was 
then shown to a second group of 54 participants with a mean age of 18.87 (SD = 




Participants were recruited online though the University of Edinburgh’s subject pool 
website. Interested participants clicked on a link to a webpage containing a 
downloadable version of the VATA-ADL with the verbal descriptions of the 
activities removed, and a numbered answer sheet. They were instructed to write on 
the answer sheet the activity they believed was depicted in the picture with the 
corresponding number. Completed answer sheets were then returned by email.  
 
3.2.2.3 Data handling 
 
For each question, participant responses were divided into four categories: 
A. Descriptions that were identical or near identical to the original item. For 
example, for the question ‘Would you have difficulty doing the 
shopping?’ a response of ‘shopping in the supermarket’ would be 
considered a category A response. 
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B. Descriptions that conveyed the same meaning at a different level of 
specificity. For example, a response of ‘making tea’ to the item ‘making a 
hot drink’ would be considered a category B response. 
C. Minor misapprehensions of meaning that were still related to the item, for 
example a response of ‘baking’ for the item ‘making a hot snack’. 
D. Major misapprehensions of meaning, for example a response of 
‘Accepting yourself’ for the item ‘Recognising yourself in the mirror.’ 
After the first pilot, items with less than a 90% category A or B response were 
amended for the second pilot. 
 
3.2.2.4 Pilot 1 results 
 
There were five images that received less than 90% A or B ratings in pilot 1, 
suggesting that they were not sufficiently clear and unambiguous to provide an 
accurate representation of the activities. The percentage classification scores of these 
images are shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1. Pilot 1: Classification of image responses by category. 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Getting in and out of the car
Hearing a smoke alarm
Recognising yourself
Making a hot snack
Managing money
Category A Category B Category C Category D
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This resulted in changes to the images for the three items ‘Getting in and out of the 
car’, which was too often misinterpreted as ‘driving’, ‘Making a hot snack’, to clarify 
this referred to heating rather than baking food and ‘Managing money’, which was 
misinterpreted as the physical ability to take money from a purse. I also removed the 
check item ‘Hearing a smoke alarm’, which had been frequently misinterpreted as 
‘responding to an alarm’ or ‘getting out of a building quickly’, and replaced it with 
the new item, ‘hearing someone talking into a megaphone’. However, we chose to 
retain the item ‘Recognising yourself in a mirror’, as nearly all the misapprehensions 
of this image presumed it referred to ‘looking into a mirror’ and, as a check question, 
the only requirement of this item was that it should be possible for the majority of 
people.  
 
3.2.2.5 Pilot 2 results 
 
In the second pilot, all of the images received a category A or B endorsement at a 
level of 90% or above, and so this selection of images was incorporated into the final 










3.3. VATA-ADL Pilot with healthy ageing participants 
 
The final version of the VATA-ADL was distributed by post to a group of healthy 
ageing adults, in order to check the suitability of the items selected and the viability 
of postal administration. As this questionnaire was devised to assess functional 
abilities after a stroke, scores were anticipated to be universally high, reflecting the 
fact that the vast majority of healthy ageing adults should be able to carry out these 




79 participant and co-participant pairs completed and returned the VATA-ADL. Four 
were excluded because no co-participant form was returned. Ten pairs were excluded 
because of participant health issues; three reported having had a serious head injury 
with loss of consciousness, four reported a stroke or transient ischemic attack, two 
had Parkinson’s disease and one bipolar depression. Five pairs were excluded 
because the co-participant reported a health issue; four had a history of stroke and 
one reported a serious head injury. This left a total of 61 participant pairs (for one 




Participant recruitment and the administration of the questionnaires was organized by 
a collaborator Dr Joanna Brooks, based at the University of Adelaide. Participants 
were recruited through the University of Adelaide’s volunteer panel and also through 
the Aged Care and Housing group, a not-for-profit organization in South Australia. 
The former group of participants were approached directly by Dr Brooks and the 
latter by an ACH group member, through face-to-face services that are run by ACH 
Group. All interested participants received an information pack, containing the self 
and informant versions of the VATA-ADL, an information sheet and consent form, 
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demographic questionnaire and a stamped-addressed envelope for the return of 
forms. Participants received a $10 chocolate voucher. 
 
3.3.3 Check Questions 
 
Fourteen questionnaires contained incorrect answers to one or more check questions 
and so were excluded. The number of participant and co-participant responses to 
each of the check questions are shown in Table 3.1 below.  
  Answer         Total Exclusions 
  0 1 2 3 Blank   
Hearing someone talking 
into a megaphone 57 3 1 0 0  
Co-participant 54 4 3 0 0 4 
Recognising yourself in a 
mirror 59 1 0 0 1  
Co-participant 58 2 0 0 1 0 
Pulling a lorry 0 0 7 53 1  
Co-participant 1 0 2 56 2 1 
Swinging on a trapeze 2 3 15 40 1  
Co-participant 3 4 9 43 2 12 
 
Table 3.1. Check question responses by healthy ageing participants and co-
participants. 
 
The most problematic item was ‘Swinging on a trapeze’, for which five participants 
and seven co-participants provided ratings of 0 or 1, demonstrating a belief that this 
item could be carried out with little difficulty. This raises the possibility that the item 
was too easy to be included as a check question, especially with physically active 
respondents.  This may also be an issue with postal administration, as it was 
impossible to clarify that the item referred to the ability to perform acrobatics, rather 




3.3.4 VATA-ADL scoring 
 
A total score was calculated by adding together the scores of each of the 18 
experimental items (0-3), yielding possible scores of between 0 – fully independent 
in all activities of daily living, to 54 – total dependency upon caregivers for all 
activities. These scores were calculated separately for both self-ratings and informant 
ratings, and the former then subtracted from the latter to provide a discrepancy score 
of between -54 and + 54. Negative scores demonstrated that the respondent 
underestimated their functional ability compared to their informant’s ratings, positive 





Of the remaining 47 pairs, 16 participants were male, 30 female and one not stated. 
The participants had a mean age of 73.24 years (SD = 9.22). Co-participants were 
mostly partners or close family members except for five who were listed as friends of 
the participant, two who were carers and seven for whom the relationship was not 
stated. Twenty-one co-participants were male and 26 female. Their mean age was 
58.43 (SD = 17.20). 
As anticipated, the responses of the remaining participants were at ceiling level in the 
majority of cases. Thirty-five participants had total self-rated scores of zero, and the 
highest score given was seven. Thirty-two co-participants gave ratings of zero. There 
was one outlier who gave a score of 27, while the next highest score was nine. The 
overall mean self-rating score was .84 out of 54 (SD = .04), the mean co-participant 
rating was 1.51 out of 54 (SD = .05) and the mean discrepancy score was .67 (SD 
= .05).  
These results clearly demonstrate that the activities selected were easily achievable 
by the majority of older adults. This was anticipated, as the scale was designed 
specifically for patients with functional impairments after a stroke. However, it also 
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highlights the inappropriateness of having a healthy ageing control group for the 
subsequent clinical data. As awareness scores on the VATA-ADL are based upon the 
discrepancy between self and informant reports, it is necessary to know what level of 
variation between these ratings could be anticipated by chance. The variation in 
scores, both self- and informant-rated, is likely to be much greater in the clinical 
group than in this healthy ageing sample. The majority of scores on this pilot were so 
close to zero that the average discrepancy was negligible, and so could not be used as 
a baseline discrepancy for a group whose scores were much more variable.   
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Patient data was collected by myself and three collaborators; Silvia Chapman at 
Goldsmith’s College, the University of London, Reiner Kaschel at the University of 
Osnabrück, Germany, and Beata Łukaszewska at the University of Gdansk, Poland. 
The VATA-ADL was translated into German and Polish respectively, for the latter 
two participant groups. Inclusion criteria were: diagnosis of a first ischemic or 
haemorrhagic stroke, and time at testing more than one month since onset. Exclusion 
criteria were comorbidity with another neurological or neurodegenerative disorder, 
such as dementia, Parkinson’s Disease or Multiple Sclerosis, any history of major 
psychiatric disorder, substance abuse, or head injury leading to loss of consciousness. 
The collection of data from multiple sources was driven by necessity, in order to 
obtain a large enough sample size within the timeframe of the PhD. There are 
advantages and disadvantages to this approach. The data were highly variable; while 
this may have reduced power, it also makes it less likely that any observed effects are 
generalizable beyond the context of each individual site. Data from all participants 
was analysed together, however demographic information is provided for each group 
in Table 3.2. For each patient, informant reports were provided by personal 
caregivers, typically partners or close family members of the patients. A one-way 
ANOVA with participant group as the between-subjects factor, demonstrated that the 
groups differed significantly in terms of their age [F(3, 57) = 5.35, p < .01]. Follow-
up Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons revealed that the London participant 
group was significantly older on average than the Osnabrück group,  (p < .01). No 
other groups differed significantly. There was no significant difference between the 




Group Edinburgh London Osnabrück Gdansk Total 
N 5 8 14 36 63 
Gender 3 M, 2 F 6 M, 2 F 5 M, 9 F 18 M, 18 F 32 M, 31 F  













Educational Level:           
Pre-secondary 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (21.4%) 1 (2.8%) 4 (6.3%) 
Secondary  3 (60%) 5 (62.5%) 1 (7.1%) 10 (27.8%) 19 (30.2%) 
College 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 8 (57.1%) 13 (36.1%) 22 (34.9%) 
Undergraduate 1 (20%) 1 (21.5%) 0 (05) 4 (11.1%) 6 (9.5%) 
Postgraduate 0 (0%) 2 (25%) 2 (14.3%) 8 (22.2%) 12 (19.0%) 
Months since 










Side of Lesion           
LBD 0 (0%) 1 (12.5%) 3 (21.4%) 11 (30.6%) 15 (23.8%) 
RBD 4 (80%) 6 (75.0%) 10 (71.4%) 25 (69.4%) 45 (71.4%) 
Bilateral 0 (0%) 1 (12.5%) 1 (7.1%) 0 (0%) 2 (3.2%) 
Missing data 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (1.6%) 














Each researcher recruited patients through clinics or acute stroke care facilities 
associated with their University. The VATA-ADL was added into their protocols for 
other on-going research. For patients recruited in Edinburgh and London, NHS 
ethical approval was obtained. For patients recruited in Osnabrück and Gdansk, local 
ethical approval was obtained according to university requirements.  
To administer the VATA-ADL, the researcher placed the scale on the patient’s 
ipsilesional side, with the practice item “Would you have difficulty doing the 
washing up?” in view. The researcher then read the following instructions: 
“You will be asked to tell me how well you can currently perform day to day 
activities. Each activity will be illustrated by a picture. I will read each question 
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aloud and the question is also written at the top of the sheet. You will be asked to 
rate what you think is, or would be, your ability now in performing each activity. 
Below each picture there is a rating scale. Please state your ability by stating a 
number from 0 (no problem, you can perform this activity without any difficulty) to 3 
(you have such serious difficulty with this activity that you would not be able to 
perform it). You can also provide the responses simply by pointing to the rating scale 
where appropriate. Let's try an example.”  
The researcher then worked through the questionnaire with the patient, placing each 
item on the patient’s ipsilesional side, pointing towards the stimuli or the scale when 
necessary, and reading aloud either the entire question or core action.  
Caregivers completed the VATA-ADL on the same occasion wherever possible. 
Instructions were provided as to how to complete the scale, which they did 
independently once the researcher had checked they understood the format. The 
researcher ensured that patients and caregivers did not discuss their answers with 
each other before completion of the scales.  
 
3.4.1.3 Background measures 
 
The background measures administered varied, as each researcher was working to 
their own protocol. However, in addition to the above demographic information 
about gender, age, side of stroke and educational level, Barthel Activities of Daily 
Living scores (Mahoney, 1965) were collected for 41 patients and Nottingham 
Extended Activities of Daily Living scores (NEADL: Nouri & Lincoln,1987) were 
collected for 13 patients. Both of these measures were completed by a caregiver. 
MMSE scores were collected for 58 patients. 
3.4.1.4 Data handling and analysis 
 
VATA-ADL scores were calculated as described above. The caregiver scores were 
taken as the measure of actual functional ability, while the discrepancy scores were 
considered to be measures of over-estimation or under-estimation, with scores closer 
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to zero representing closer agreement. First, the utility of the scale as an ADL 
measure was examined, along with the relationship between the VATA-ADL 
caregiver scores and demographic and background variables.  
To address how the patients would be classified in terms of their awareness, previous 
research using the VATA format (Della Sala et al., 2009) created cut-offs by 
calculating discrepancy thresholds; the ratings of two caregivers for the same patient 
were compared to obtain a caregiver discrepancy score. The group mean of these 
scores was calculated, and the mean plus two standard deviations taken as the cut-off 
below which any discrepancy between patient and caregiver scores could be 
attributable to normal variation. Two further cut offs were provided; the first 
represented the border between mild and moderate over/under-estimation, and was 
calculated as a score higher than the average of one discrepancy point (out of a 
possible three) for each question. Then, any score exceeding an average of two 
discrepancy points per question was considered to indicate severe over/under-
estimation. For example, the VATA-M contains 12 questions, with a possible total 
score of 36. The cut-offs for degrees of unawareness (over-estimation) are: 0 - 6.2 
(aware), 6.3 - 12 for mild unawareness, 12.1 - 24 for moderate unawareness, and 
24.1 – 36 for severe unawareness. The same scores in a negative direction represent 
the same levels of underestimation.  
The calculation of cut-off scores requires comparison of two caregiver scores for 
each patient, which was not possible for this sample, as ratings were only collected 
from one caregiver. Therefore, provisional cut-offs for the VATA-ADL were 
calculated, based on cut-offs for the VATA-M, designating an average discrepancy 
of 1 point across all items as the border between mild and moderate overestimation, 
i.e. a score of 18. For the VATA-M, the cut-off for mild unawareness was a little 
over half an average discrepancy of 0.5 for each question, so I have selected 10 as a 
suitable equivalent for the VATA-ADL. The complete set of under-/over-estimation 
categories and scores is as follows: 
 Severe underestimation: -37 to -54 
 Moderate underestimation: -19 to -36 
 Mild underestimation: -18 to -11 
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 Aware: -10 to 10 
 Mild overestimation: 11 to 18 
 Moderate overestimation: 19 to 36 
 Severe overestimation: 37 to 54 
The number of patients within each category was calculated, and these groups were 







3.4.2.1 Check questions 
 
Six patients and two caregivers provided incorrect responses to one or more of the 
check questions. Data from these pairs was removed from subsequent analysis, 
leaving a final sample of 55 pairs of patients and caregivers. The patients were 29 
(53%) male and 26 (47%) female, with a mean age of 58.96 (SD = 13.65, Range = 
22 to 87) and mean time since stroke of 27.53 months (SD = 44.49, Range = 1 to 
267). Thirteen (26.3%) had lesions to the left cerebral hemisphere, 39 (70.9%) had 
lesions to the right hemisphere, two (3.6%) had bilateral lesions and data from one 
participant (1.8%) was missing. Three patients (5.5%) left education before the end 
of secondary school, 14 (25.5%) left after secondary school, 22 (40.0%) finished 
college, six (10.9%) completed an undergraduate degree and 10 (18.2%) completed a 
postgraduate degree.  
 
3.4.2.2 The VATA-ADL as a measure of ADL ability 
 
The mean caregiver-rated score was 23.25 (SD = 14.96, Range  = 1 to 52). These 
ratings demonstrate that the sample was heterogeneous in functional ability, as do the 
Barthel scores of the 34 patients for whom this information was collected (M = 
14.41, SD = 4.94, Range = 1 to 20). Unlike the findings from healthy controls, this 
suggests that the VATA-ADL is sensitive to the variation in functional ability that 
could be expected in the chronic stages after a stroke.  
NEADL scores were available for 13 patients, (M = 14.38, SD = 7.03, Range = 6 to 
22). There was a very strong negative correlation between the caregiver total scores 
on the VATA-ADL and scores on the NEADL [r = -.86, p < .001]. The direction of 
correlation would be anticipated, if the two tests were measuring similar constructs; 
on the NEADL higher scores represent better functional ability whereas on the 
VATA-ADL they represent greater levels of impairment. While there are limited 
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inferences that can be drawn from such a small participant sample, this suggests that 
the VATA-ADL has potential as a measure of functional ability after stroke. This 
should be addressed with more in-depth tests of its validity and external consistency.  
The internal consistency of the scale as a test of ADL ability was measured by 
assessing the caregiver scores for each questions with Cronbach’s Alpha test. The 
internal consistency of the scale was high (Cronbach’s Alpha = .951). There were 
only two items the removal of which would contribute to a marginal increase in the 
consistency of the scale. These were ‘taking medication’ (Alpha if item deleted 
= .952) and ‘reading the newspaper’ (Alpha if item deleted = .954). In general, the 
VATA-ADL has strong internal consistency as an ADL measure.  
There was no correlation between caregiver scores on the VATA-ADL and time 
since stroke [r = -.14, ns] or patient age [r = .05, ns]. A substantial number of the 
patients (N = 33, 60%) were tested at least one year after the stroke, suggesting that 
the majority may have reached the maximum possible level of independence. This 
may partly account for the lack of a relationship between time and ADL ability.  
There was a trend towards negative correlation between VATA-ADL caregiver 
scores and patient MMSE scores [r = -.28, p = .53] – patients rated as having lower 
functional ability also had slightly greater cognitive impairment – however this just 
failed to reach significance.  
There was no significant difference in caregiver scores in terms of the gender of the 
patients [t(53) = .33, ns] or hemisphere of stroke [t(50) = -.71, ns] (only left and right 
lesions were analysed because of the small number of bilateral lesions represented), 
or educational level [F(4,50) = 1.03, ns].  
Overall, none of the demographic and background variables were related to the 
severity of functional impairment, as indexed by caregiver VATA-ADL scores, 





3.4.2.3 Questionnaire structure 
 
In order to investigate the structure of latent variables underlying the VATA-ADL, 
principal components analysis was conducted on the caregiver scores for the 18 
items. The items had good factorability; the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy was .88, indicating that the sample size was sufficient for the 
analysis, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was highly significant, [2 (153) = 852.71, p 
< .001], demonstrating high levels of intercorrelation between the items. In addition, 
all diagonals on the anti-image correlation matrix were over .6, and the 
communalities were all above .6, suggesting that all items could be retained in the 
analysis.  
The principal components analysis was conducted on all eighteen items, with 
oblimin rotation of the factor loading matrix. Three factors with eigenvalues 
exceeding 1 were extracted, which together explained 72.9% of the variance. Factor 
1 had an eigenvalue of 10.13 and explained 56.3% of the variance, factor 2, had an 
eigenvalue of 1.68 and explained 9.3%, factor 3 had an eigenvalue of 1.31 and 
explained 7.3% of the variance. The rotated factor loading pattern matrix is shown in 
Table 3.3. 
All items had primary loadings of .56 and above, however two items ‘Travelling on 
public transport’ and ‘taking mediation’ had a cross-loadings above .45, suggesting 
that these items represented more than one latent variable. The first factor 
incorporated all of the self-care items, except for ‘taking medication’, as well as 
household tasks, such as managing money and watering plants, and was therefore 
designated ‘Self-care and domestic’. Three items had primary loading on the second 
factor - ‘reading the paper,’ ‘writing letters’ and ‘using the telephone’ - suggesting 
that this factor reflects language and communication abilities. The three items 
loading on to the third factor were ‘going out socially’, ‘taking medication’ and 
‘doing the shopping’. It is not readily apparent what this factor represents. However, 
considering the cross-loading of ‘travelling on public transport’, it is possible that it 
relates to the ability to function outside of the home, and the loading of ‘taking 
medication’ is an anomaly, reflecting the fact that this item does not fully represent 




 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3  










     
Feeding yourself .978   0.86 
Getting dressed  .902   0.76 
Taking a bath of shower .870   0.84 
Getting into the car .860 -.261  0.75 
Washing your face .845   0.67 
Watering plants .806   0.69 
Making a hot snack .772   0.77 
Crossing the road .744  -.282 0.79 
Combing your hair .730   0.65 
Making a hot drink .694   0.69 
Managing money .677 .254  0.70 
Travelling on public 
transport 
.640  -.466 0.76 
Reading the paper  .782  0.62 
Writing letters .306 .728  0.74 
Using the telephone .389 .569  0.62 
Going out socially   -.900 0.86 
Taking your medication  .493 -.596 0.67 
Doing the shopping .388  -.577 0.68 
 
Table 3.3. Factor loading matrix for VATA-ADL Items. 
Factor loadings < 2.5 are suppressed. 
 
 
3.4.2.4 VATA-ADL as a measure of awareness 
 
The mean self-rated VATA-ADL score was 16.76 (SD = 12.85, Range = 0 to 48) and 
the mean discrepancy score was 6.49 (SD = 13.43, Range = -19 to 35), 
demonstrating that, overall, the patients rated themselves as having higher functional 
ability than their caregivers rated them. 
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Self-rated scores were highly correlated with caregiver-rated scores [r = .54, p 
< .001], suggesting that, on average, the patients agreed with their caregivers about 
their levels of functional ability. There was also a positive association between 
caregiver scores and discrepancy scores [r = -.60, p < .001], shown in Figure 3.3. 
While this may suggest that the degree of awareness depends upon the severity of 
functional impairment, it is important to note the statistical dependency of 
discrepancy scores on caregiver scores; the lower the caregiver scores, the more 
likely it is a patient will be classified as unaware, as the potential discrepancy scores 
are greater (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this issue). 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Correlation between self-ratings and discrepancy scores 
(Higher caregiver scores = greater impairment). 
 
The internal consistency of the VATA-ADL as a measure of awareness was obtained 
by assessing the discrepancy scores for each question with Cronbach’s Alpha test. 
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Again, the scale showed high internal consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = .925). This 
score would not be improved by the removal of any items, suggesting that the 
selection of items was appropriate for the scale.  
The patients were divided into awareness categories according to the cut-offs 
outlined above. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, of the 55 patients, 20 (36%) showed 
some degree of overestimation, split evenly between the mild and moderate 
categories. No patients severely under- or overestimated their ability. Despite being 
tested months or years after the stroke, a substantial proportion of this group 
continued to overestimate their ability to undertake day-to-day activities, in 
comparison with the estimation of their family or friends.  
 
 






Considerably fewer patients underestimated their ability, and only one met the 
criterion for moderate underestimation. Therefore, in order to allow for between-
group comparisons, the groups were reduced into three categories by collapsing the 
moderate and mild forms of overestimation and underestimation into single 
categories. This resulted in three groups; underestimators (six patients), aware (29 
patients) and overestimators (20 patients).  
 
The mean and standard deviation discrepancy scores are shown, by category, in 
Figure 3.5. To address whether the magnitude of discrepancy was greater for the 
overestimation group than for the underestimation group, the discrepancy scores of 
the underestimators were flipped by multiplying by minus one and compared with 
the overestimators by independent t-test: Underestimators M = 15.83, SD = 2.71, 
Overestimators M = 20.80, SD = 7.87, [t(23.21) = -2.39, p < .05, equal variances not 
assumed]. Both the number of overestimators and the degree of discrepancy 
exceeded that of the underestimators. This is not unanticipated; underestimation of 
has not been widely reported in the literature and, where it is, it tends to be attributed 






Figure 3.5. Mean discrepancy scores of patients in each awareness category. 
 
 
A subsequent analysis was run, to address which VATA-ADL items were best able 
to predict unawareness, i.e. had the greatest majority of positive discrepancy scores 
only for patients classified as overestimators. The patients were further divided into 
two group; the overestimators were designated the ‘unaware’ group (n = 20) and the 
underestimators and aware patients were combined into one ‘aware’ group (N = 35). 
For each item, the discrepancy scores were analysed and the percentage of the 20 
unaware patients with positive discrepancies or ‘hits’ (i.e. scores of 1 to 3) was 
calculated, alongside the percentage of the 35 patients classified ‘aware’ with 
negative /no discrepancies or ‘correct rejections (CR)’ on that item (i.e. scores of -3 
to 0) (see Della Sala et al., 2009 for the same analysis on the VATA-M for motor 
impairment). The total percentage of Hits and CRs for each question is shown in 




Would you have difficulty?  % Hits + CR 
Getting dressed  89.09% 
Washing your face 87.27% 
Crossing the road 87.27% 
Watering plants 87.27% 
Getting in and out of the car 81.82% 
Taking a bath of shower 81.82% 
Making a hot snack 80.00% 
Combing your hair 78.18% 
Feeding yourself 76.36% 
Managing money 74.55% 
Travelling on public transport 74.55% 
Going out socially 74.55% 
Taking your medication 74.55% 
Doing the shopping 72.73% 
Using the telephone 70.91% 
Reading the paper 70.91% 
Writing letters 69.09% 
Making a hot drink 61.82% 
 
Table 3.4: Percentage hits and CRs for the eighteen VATA-ADL items. 
 
The majority of the items were reasonably well able to predict the patients’ ADL 
awareness status. Items relating to self-care, such as dressing, feeding and bathing, 
were among the best predictors, while those that had previously loaded on the 
language and communication factor, i.e. ‘using the telephone’ ‘reading the paper’ 
and ‘writing letters’ were relatively less sensitive. It is plausible that positive 
discrepancies on these items could reflect unawareness of language abilities, rather 
than more general ADL impairments.  
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3.4.2.5 VATA-ADL: relationship with demographic and background variables 
 




Underestimation Aware Overestimation 
Total N 6 29 20 
Gender 
 3 M (50.0%), 3 F 
(50.0%) 
13 M (44.8%), 16 F 
(55.2%) 
13 M (65.0%), 7 F 
(35.0%) 
Age, M (SD) 69.80 (13.33), N = 5  56.00 (14.31), N = 28 60.40 (12.23), N = 20 
Educational Level:       
Pre-secondary 0 (0%) 3 (10.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
Secondary  2 (33%) 5 (17.2%) 7 (35.0%) 
College 2 (33%) 12 (41.4%) 8 (40.0%) 
Undergraduate 1 (16.7%) 3 (10.3%) 2 (10%) 
Postgraduate 1 (16.7%) 6 (20.7%) 3 (15%) 
Months since 
stroke, M (SD) 
61.93 (101.47), N = 6 27.66 (39.08), N = 29 17.05 (13.24) N = 20 
Side of Lesion       
LBD (N = 13) 2 (33.3%) 8 (27.6%) 3 (15%) 
RBD (N = 39) 3 (50.0%) 19 (65.5%) 17 (85%) 
Bilateral (N = 2) 0 (0.0%) 2 (6.9%) 0 0.0(%) 
Missing data (N = 1) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
MMSE, M (SD) 21.40 (2.79), N = 5 24.48 (4.81), N = 27 23.22(3.39), N =18 
 
Table 3.5. Demographic information for each awareness group. 
 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted on the three groups to determine whether they 
differed according to age, time since stroke and MMSE score. None of these 
differences were significant: Age: [F(2,50) = 2.48, ns], time since stroke [F(2, 52) = 
2.47, ns], MMSE [F(2, 47) = 1.34, ns]. The lack of a significant difference in MMSE 
scores is interesting, and suggests that, as noted elsewhere in the literature, persistent 
cognitive impairment is not a necessary condition of chronic unawareness of deficit 
(see Cocchini et al., 2002). 
Because of small cell sizes in the underestimation group, differences in the 
distribution of gender were only assessed for the aware and overestimators groups; a 
chi square analysis revealed that the groups did not differ [χ2 (1, N = 49) = 1.93, ns].  
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Similarly, as there were only two patients with bilateral lesions, only left and right-
brain-damaged patients were compared across aware and overestimation groups. As 
with gender, the distribution of lesion side did not differ across groups [χ2 (1, N = 47) 
= 1.37, ns]. This analysis may have been hampered by the fact that over two-thirds of 
the sample had right hemisphere lesions. However it is worth noting that two of the 
patients with left hemisphere lesions fell into the moderately unaware category, and 






A visual analogue test of anosognosia for impairments in activities of daily living, 
the VATA-ADL, was devised and administered to 55 LBD and RBD chronic stage 
stroke patients. Preliminary analyses suggest that the VATA-ADL has the potential 
to be a reliable and effective measure of both long term functional ability, and 
awareness of that ability, in stroke patients: the scale had good internal validity and 
high inter-correlations between caregiver-rated items. The fact that discrepancy 
scores were able to predict whether or not a patient was classified as unaware with at 
least 70% success rate for all questions except two, suggests that the vast majority of 
the items were suitably sensitive to unawareness of ADL impairments. Most 
importantly, initial findings demonstrated that over a third of the patients exhibited 
persistent mild or moderate chronic unawareness; this result contradicts the 
commonly reported observation that long-term anosognosia is rare (Jehkonen et al., 
2001; Orfei et al., 2007; Vocat et al. 2010), but replicates similar proportions from 
previous research using VATA format questionnaires (Cocchini et al., 2010; Della 
Sala et al., 2009). 
There are a few amendments that may improve the reliability of the scale. Following 
the results of the pilot study with healthy ageing participants, the check questions 
‘hearing someone talking into a megaphone’ and ‘swinging on a trapeze’ should be 
replaced with less ambiguous alternatives, in order to minimise loss of data. This is 
particularly important if the questionnaire is being administered by post, or in 
situations where a researcher is not present to provide clarification. Secondly, 
principal components analysis suggested that there were some items that may have 
formed ADL subgroups, most likely relating to the ability to function outside of the 
home and language and communication abilities. This may suggest a revision of he 
a-priori selected categories; rather than ‘Self-care’, ‘Activities inside the home’ and 
‘Activities outside the home’ the items could be re-arranged into ‘Domestic’, 
‘Communication’ and ‘Outdoors’, or similar. The item ‘taking medication’ was a 
little problematic, as it did not load clearly on to any factor. However, caregiver 
scores correlated well with the other items, and discrepancy scores were 75% 
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accurate in classifying participants as aware or not, therefore it may be appropriate to 
retain the item in the questionnaire.  
There are also some limitations to this research that should be highlighted. First, the 
VATA-ADL was administered within studies conducted by colleagues, so the 
majority of other measures were restricted to those already in their protocols. Scores 
on a validated instrumental ADL measure, the NEADL (Nouri & Lincoln, 1987) 
were collected for a subgroup of just 13 patients, which only allowed for a limited 
analysis of the VATA-ADL’s external validity. Secondly, many of the patients 
recruited for this study continued to attend stroke clinics many months, or even years 
after a stroke, which suggests that the group may have had relatively severe or 
debilitating strokes. This could have biased the sample towards higher levels of 
unawareness, as the severity of anosognosia has been associated with larger lesions 
and greater loss of motor function (Orfei et al., 2007).  
Finally, the cut-offs for awareness classification in this study were estimates, based 
on the calculations performed for the VATA-M for motor impairments (Della Sala et 
al., 2009). In order to obtain specific cut-offs for the VATA-ADL, it would be 
necessary to collect ratings from two caregivers for each patient and then perform 
those same calculations on the data. It is plausible that, with these more accurate 
thresholds, some of the patients classified as mildly anosognosic may require 
reclassification as aware, or vice versa. However, given that ten of the patients 
(nearly 20%), met the criterion for moderate overestimation, and that the average 
score of the overestimators group (20.8/55) was above the estimated cut-off for 
moderate overestimation, it is unlikely that more accurate cut-offs would result in a 
substantial drop in the proportion of patients classified as unaware. This is 
potentially an important finding; overestimation of the ability to undertake these 
activities could have serious implications for the day-to-day safety of these patients. 
Informal reports provided by caregivers to one researcher (Reiner Kaschel) suggest 
that, at times, unawareness led to potentially dangerous behaviours, for example 
spilling water all over the floor or inadequate fire safety when cooking. 
The background and demographic information available for the patients comprised 
the MMSE as a measure of cognition, and information about age, gender, 
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educational level and side of lesion. Interestingly, none of these measures differed 
significantly across the three VATA-ADL awareness categories of underestimators, 
aware and overestimators. Regarding side of lesion, 23% of the LBD patients were 
classified as overestimators, compared with 44% of the RBD patients. The 
proportion of LBD patients exhibiting unawareness was less than has been seen in 
previous research using the VATA format (Della Sala et al., 2009), though it may be 
that a larger sample size would reveal differences. Even so, as two of the 13 LBD 
patients showed moderate unawareness of their problems with daily activities, this is 
unlikely to be an exclusively right-hemisphere problem. Unfortunately exclusion 
rates for LBD patients are unavailable for this study, therefore it cannot be 
determined whether the higher proportion of RBD patients was driven by fewer LBD 
patients being approached for the study, or by a greater number declining to 
participate. To address this, future research using the VATA-ADL should record the 
number of patients with left- and right-sided lesions that are approached, the 
proportion that agree to participate, and any necessary exclusions. 
One of the central questions in chronic anosognosia research is whether long-term 
unawareness depends upon the presence of persistent deficits in cognitive ability 
(Cocchini et al., 2002). Preliminary results from this study revealed no difference in 
MMSE scores between the groups of underestimators, aware patients and 
overestimators, suggesting that long-term unawareness of functional difficulties is 
not associated with overall impaired cognitive status. This is an interesting finding 
that warrants further investigation. As a measure of global cognition, the MMSE has 
its limitations; in particular it may not be sensitive to more subtle cognitive deficits 
(Pendlebury et al., 2012). Moreover, it does not differentiate which aspects of 
cognitive functioning are compromised, and, being designed for use with dementia 
patients, may not target the type of impairments more often associated with a stroke, 
such as unilateral neglect. It is highly likely that different, or multiple impairments 
may contribute to problems with carrying out activities. For example, the caregiver 
of one patient gave a rating of three on the item ‘getting dressed and undressed’, 
citing poor motor skills, decision-making problems and difficulty in time estimation 




In addition to any effects on the ability to carry out daily activities, different 
cognitive impairments may have differential relationships with awareness. For 
example, it may be that memory impairments, apraxia or neglect could all interfere 
with the ability to make hot drinks or snacks, but only neglect predicts unawareness 
of those problems. Future research with the VATA-ADL should incorporate a 
comprehensive set of tests, including specific assessments of attention, memory and 
executive function, in order to address which of these are more associated with actual 
ADL impairment and which with unawareness of impairment. Similarly, some 
previous research has suggested that stroke patients who are explicitly aware of 
motor problems cannot infer the likely impact of these on their wider functioning, 
and so overestimate their ability to carry out tasks (Marcel et al., 2004). Because the 
current study did not incorporate any measure of anosognosia for specific problems, 
for example motor impairments or neglect, it cannot be determined how far the 
unawareness of those patients who overestimated their ADL ability would extend to 
unawareness of specific problems. It would therefore be helpful if future research 
incorporated other, preferably validated, measures of anosognosia for specific 
deficits, to address whether some VATA-ADL overestimators were aware of more 
circumscribed deficits, and also whether any specific type of anosognosia (for 
example for hemiplegia, neglect or aphasia) was more likely to predict unawareness 
of ADL problems.  
Overall, the VATA-ADL has good potential as a measure of long-term unawareness 
of functional problems. The simplicity of the scale, in particular its visual analogue 
format, should facilitate research with patients who have difficulty reading or 
responding to verbal instructions. Moreover, these preliminary findings suggest that 
overestimation of the ability to carry out day to day activities may be a chronic 
problem among stroke patients, emphasising the need for greater research in this area 
and the importance of developing appropriate assessment tools to measure this, such 








Do patients who over-/underestimate their 
motor and language skills show similar 
misestimation in the domains of memory, spatial 




The term anosognosia, as coined by Babinski in 1914, designated a specific inability 
to recognise or acknowledge left-sided hemiplegia after lesions to the right 
hemisphere of the brain (Langer & Levine, 2014). Since then, application of the 
concept has expanded to encompass many different facets of unawareness. 
Anosognosia has been observed for a range of post-stroke impairments, both 
physical, such as hemianopia (Bisiach et al., 1986) and hemianaesthesia (Pia et al., 
2014), and cognitive, including aphasia (Cocchini et al., 2010), apraxia (Canzano, 
Scandola, Pernigo, Aglioti & Moro, 2014) and unilateral neglect (Jehkonen et al., 
2000). Since anosognosia can accompany the loss of so many different functions, an 
important consideration in understanding the disorder is the question of how far the 
processes leading to unawareness generalise across these functions. Can anosognosia 
be attributed to domain-specific deficits in self-monitoring, to generally reduced 
awareness across several functions, or to elements of both? The study reported in this 
chapter investigates this question by examining whether stroke patients who under- 
or overestimate their motor and language skills in the acute stages after a stroke are 
also more inclined to under/overestimate their performance in cognitive tasks 





4.1.1 Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) 
 
The varied clinical presentation of AHP, and the models that have been proposed to 
account for it, were discussed in some detail in Chapter 1 of this thesis, and so are 
only reviewed briefly here. To date, no one cognitive process or set of neural 
correlates, has been identified as necessary or sufficient to account for AHP (Orfei at 
al., 2007), leading some researchers to propose that different mechanisms are likely 
to engender unawareness in different patients (Marcel et al., 2004; Vuilleumier, 
2004), or at different points in time (Vocat et al., 2010). Similar patterns of lesion 
distribution or cognitive deficits are reported across many different studies of 
anosognosia but for each element exceptions have also been observed. For example, 
patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia are more likely to have right hemisphere 
lesions (Pedersen, Jørgensen, Nakayama, Raaschou & Olsen, 1996a), though 
anosognosia has also been identified in up to 40% of left-brain damaged patients, 
when appropriate assessment methods were employed (Cocchini et al., 2009). 
Anosognosia is typically expected to resolve within a few weeks after the stroke 
(Jehkonen et al., 2000), but occasionally can persist for years afterwards (Cocchini, 
et al., 2002). 
Considering the role of concomitant cognitive and somatosensory deficits, sensory 
deafferentation is frequently observed in anosognosic patients and is hypothesised to 
be a common, though not essential, precursor to unawareness (Davies et al., 2005; 
Vocat at al., 2010). Similarly, an association between AHP and unilateral neglect is 
well-established (Appelros et al., 2002; Starkstein et al., 1992) though it is debatable 
whether this reflects a functional relationship or the proximity of lesioned areas in 
the two conditions: reports of dissociations between neglect and AHP suggest the 
latter (Bisiach at al., 1986; Orfei et al., 2007). Finally, many neuropsychological 
models of AHP implicate some higher-level aspect of intellectual impairment 
(Goldberg & Barr; 1991; McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Vuilleumier, 2004), though the 
observation of AHP in patients without global cognitive deficits suggests that either 
this is not a necessary component of anosognosia (Orfei et al., 2007; Starkstein et al., 
1992) or that more subtle or selective cognitive deficits may impair awareness in 
patients who are otherwise well-oriented (Davies et al., 2005).  
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Anosognosia has long been recognised as an integral feature of some types of 
aphasia, particularly jargon aphasia and more generally sensory aphasia, (Cocchini & 
Della Sala, 2010; Kertesz, 2010). Patients with these disorders may not only fail to 
correct errors, making their speech unintelligible (Maher, Rothi & Heilman, 1994) 
but may even respond to recordings of their own jargon as if they conveyed 
meaningful speech (Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1963). Anosognosia for aphasia may 
not be limited to receptive aphasias; in a study of speech error awareness, Schlenck 
Huber and Willmes (1987) found no difference between expressive and receptive 
aphasic patients in the distribution of attempts to monitor and correct speech errors, 
either before or after articulation. Anosognosia has also been observed in epileptic 
patients undergoing the WADA procedure after selective anaesthesia of the left 
hemisphere, and was dissociated from AHP (Breier et al., 1994). This finding 
supports previous evidence that anosognosia for aphasia can be observed after 
lesions restricted to the left hemisphere (Kertesz, 2010). 
One of the greatest issues in understanding anosognosia for aphasia is the difficulty 
of finding a suitable testing method. Unlike anosognosia for hemiplegia, which is 
typically measured directly by self-report, anosognosia for aphasia is more often 
inferred through the use of on-line methodologies such as error detection and self-
correction (see Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010). Not only does this presuppose that a 
failure to self-correct signals unawareness (Adair Schwartz & Barrett, 2003), it also 
limits the possibility of comparison between anosognosia for aphasia and other types 
of anosognosia (Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010). The Visual Analogue Test of 
Anosognosia for Language Disorders (VATA-L: Cocchini et al., 2010), the measure 
used in this study, was developed partly in response to these challenges. This self-
report scale uses both verbal and visual depictions of items relating to language 
ability; of the 65 left-brain-damaged patients assessed in validating this instrument, 
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only nine (16.4%) had to be excluded, and 10 (18.9%) showed some evidence of 
anosognosia for their language impairments (Cocchini et al., 2010) 
 
4.1.2.2 Unilateral neglect  
 
Unlike hemiplegia or aphasia, which could be anticipated to have high salience to 
those who experience them, a lack of direct knowledge of the deficit would seem to 
be an integral component of unilateral neglect. It is difficult to envisage how a 
neglect patient could simultaneously fail to attend to one side of space and be aware 
of this inattention, without thereby having the means to correct for the problem. 
However, like anosognosia for hemiplegia, there is a possibility that neglect patients 
may be able to exhibit some implicit awareness of their disability; certainly there 
exists evidence that information presented to the neglected hemifield is processed at 
an implicit level. For example, images presented to the affected field can prime faster 
reaction times to congruent images presented in the unaffected field (Berti & 
Rizzolatti, 1992; McGlinchey-Berroth, Milberg, Verfaellie, Alexander & Kilduff, 
1993). Therefore, just as in anosognosia for hemiplegia or anosognosia for aphasia, 
the method used to elicit awareness is likely to have a considerable effect on the 
estimated prevalence, and manifestation of anosognosia for neglect.  
In a study by Jehkonen et al. (2000), 14 out of 21 patients exhibiting neglect were 
unaware of their inattention to the left side of space. Moreover, anosognosia for 
neglect was doubly dissociated from unawareness of illness and anosognosia for 
hemiplegia. However, in this study, anosognosia for neglect was tested with a single 
question ‘Do you have any difficulties observing any part of space’. Just as overall 
awareness of AHP can dissociate from task-specific awareness (Marcel et al., 2004), 
there is no certainty that this global awareness of neglect would be reflected in self-
monitoring of performance on specific tests. Furthermore, it is possible that those 
patients who were aware of their inability to attend to one side of space, had only 
acquired this knowledge through the assertions of medical professionals or family 
members. Cocchini et al. (2009) make a similar argument in relation to AHP, 
suggesting that overexposure to similar questions about their limb function may lead 
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anosognosic patients to provide ‘correct’ answers without achieving actual 
awareness of impairments. 
Ronchi et al. (2014) investigated anosognosia for different subtypes of neglect by 
comparing patients’ self-evaluations with their actual performance, separately for 
different tasks. The results demonstrated that, on average, the patients were able to 
provide reasonably accurate evaluations of their performance on cancellation, 
reading and complex figure drawing tasks, but overestimated their performance on 
line bisection and drawing from memory tasks. The authors conclude that 
anosognosia for different aspects of neglect can be dissociated, with patients being 
more likely to become aware of difficulties in tasks that require complex visuo-motor 
exploration. While this is a reasonable interpretation, and supported by evidence that 
different subtypes of neglect can be dissociated (Marshall & Halligan, 1995), it could 
also be argued that such tasks are more difficult than line bisection, for example, and 
lower self-evaluations may represent a judgement on the difficulty of the task, rather 
than the quality of their performance.  
In a study of anosognosia for drawing neglect and neglect dyslexia, Berti et al. 
(1996) asked their group of patients, not only if they had performed the tasks 
correctly, but also to describe what they had drawn or read. Eight out of 17 patients 
with drawing neglect were unaware that their drawings were incomplete on the left 
side, claiming either that they were veridical representations of the stimuli, or 
deficient only in minor details. However, the comments of the nine aware patients 
are perhaps equally interesting. For example, one woman reported of her own 
drawing “This butterfly will never fly because it misses the left wing” (Berti et al., 
1996, p. 436). What is striking about this report is that it suggests a dissociation 
between the inability to actively reproduce the left side of space and the preserved 
ability to perceive it and report on it. This has some conceptual similarities to the 
dissociations discussed in the literature for AHP, where patients may explicitly report 






4.1.2.3 Memory  
 
Unawareness of memory impairments after a stroke has received little attention n the 
neuropsychological literature, (Cocchini et al., 2012). An unpublished study 
investigating awareness of memory deficits in brain injured patients of mixed 
aetiology, including stroke patients, using the discrepancy between self- and 
caregiver-rated scores on the Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire 
(PRMQ: Smith, Della Sala, Logie & Maylor, 2000) found that 77% of the patients 
tested had some degree of anosognosia for their global amnesia (described in 
Cocchini et al., 2012). A different methodology was employed by Marcel et al. 
(2004); the authors asked left- and right-brain damaged patients, as well as controls, 
to estimate their performance on a digit span task, before and after completion. They 
found that 29% of LBD and 19% of RBD patients overestimated their performance 
prior to the task, though 83% of the LBD and 50% of the RBD patients adjusted their 
post-test estimates downwards to a degree that suggested the experience of the task 
enabled them to provide more realistic assessments. No other anosognosia measures 
were correlated with overestimation scores, for either digit span or verbal fluency, 
suggesting domain-specific unawareness of these disorders.  
Anosognosia has been much more widely documented in neurodegenerative diseases 
that affect memory functions, such as Alzheimer’s disease, than in stroke (Agnew & 
Morris, 1998). As with unawareness deficits after a stroke, anosognosia in 
Alzheimer’s disease has a complex clinical presentation. While some studies show 
an association between unawareness and the severity of dementia (Mangone et al., 
1991; Starkstein et al., 1996), others have not found such a relationship (Feher, 
Mahurin, Inbody, Crook & Pirozzolo, 1991; Reed, Jagust & Coulter, 1993). 
Similarly, anosognosia has been linked to the severity of memory impairment 
(Migliorelli, Teson, Sabe & Petracchi, 1995), though not consistently (Reed et al., 
1993), leading to the proposition that amnesia may play a role in the maintenance of 
unawareness, but is not an original causative factor (Agnew & Morris, 1998; 
Hannesdottir & Morris, 2007). While studies of anosognosia in Alzheimer’s disease 
tend to investigate unawareness of the disease as a whole, rather than specific 
unawareness of memory deficits (Agnew & Morris, 1998), dissociations have been 
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reported between unawareness of different aspects of dementia (Vasterling, Seltzer, 
Foss & Vanderbrook, 1995).  
The models proposed to account for anosognosia in Alzheimer’s disease, tend to 
consider unawareness of memory deficits as one facet of a multi-component 
syndrome (Hannesdottir & Morris, 2007). For example, Starkstein et al. (1996) 
identified two separate cognitive and behavioural unawareness factors to 
anosognosia in Alzheimer’s disease. While the former was associated with cognitive 
ability, including long term memory, the latter was largely independent of 
performance on cognitive tasks, but correlated with elements of disinhibited 
behaviour, leading the authors to propose that the two factors constitute independent 
awareness phenomena (Starkstein et al., 1996). One of the most comprehensive 
models of anosognosia for Alzheimer’s Disease is the Cognitive Awareness Model 
(CAM) of Morris and Hannesdottir (2004). This is a multilevel model, incorporating 
comparator mechanisms that match current function to knowledge stored in a 
‘personal database’ (PDB). Awareness is generated via a Metacognitive Awareness 
System (MAS), which has access to information from both the PDB and the 
comparators, and a parallel implicit mechanism, which can affect behavioural 
responses without updating conscious awareness (Morris and Hannesdottir, 2004). 
This aspect of the model is conceptually similar to the ‘Appreciation, Belief, Check’ 
(ABC) model of anosognosia after stroke (Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010; Vuilleumier, 
2004), which also allows for the possibility of dissociations between implicit and 
explicit awareness.  
 
4.1.2.4 Executive function 
 
Executive functions incorporate a wide range of high level cognitive operations, 
requiring the ability to switch between tasks, update and monitor information and 
inhibit inappropriate responses (Miyake et al., 2000). Unsurprisingly, considering 
that these operations could be considered essential to self-awareness (Stuss & 
Alexander, 2000), deficits in executive functions have been implicated as causative 
factors in anosognosia in Alzheimer’s disease (Hannesdottir & Morris, 2007) and in 
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psychiatric disorder such as schizophrenia (Gilleen et al., 2010). Executive functions 
also comprise the type of mental operations that are implicated in monitoring and 
evaluating sensory feedback in multicomponent models of anosognosia after a stroke 
(for example Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010). Similarly to unilateral neglect, it would 
seem that unawareness of deficits in executive ability must be an integral component 
of those deficits; if monitoring skills are required to both complete a task and assess 
performance, it is hard to envisage how the former aspect could be compromised 
while the latter remains intact. This is in contrast to other deficits such as hemiplegia 
(Berti et al., 2005), or hemianopia (Bisiach et al., 1986), where domain specific 
monitoring systems may be sufficient to cause anosognosia without impairment to 
general mental flexibility. 
Deficits in executive function are common after traumatic brain injury (TBI) 
(Cicerone, Levin, Malec, Stuss & Whyte, 2006), as are deficits in self-awareness, 
with the reported prevalence of the latter ranging from 45 – 97% (Bach & David, 
2006). However, self-awareness is typically studied in relation to altered behavioural 
and social functioning; there is little evidence that this is related to executive 
dysfunction (Bach & David, 2006), and impaired social awareness has been observed 
in patients with unimpaired performance on tests of executive function (Stuss & 
Levine, 2002). I have been unable to identify any studies of TBI patients that 
measured direct self-assessment on tasks of executive function, and only one study 
with stroke patients: the same Marcel et al. (2004) study that investigated 
performance estimates on a digit span task also asked their group of stroke patients to 
provide pre- and post-performance estimates of how many words they would be 
likely to generate on a phonemic verbal fluency task, which is typically considered to 
measure executive function (Alvarez & Emory, 2006). They found that 36% of both 
left and right brain damaged patients over-estimated their performance prior to the 
task though 38% of the RBD and 50% of the LBD adjusted their post-test estimates 
sufficiently to suggest they were aware of their poor performance on the task. For the 
verbal fluency task, as with the digit span task, there was an association between 
poor performance and overestimation, but no relationship between overestimation of 
cognitive and physical abilities, leading the authors to conclude that overestimation 
can be quite specific to different functions, and that an impairment to general mental 
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flexibility or self-monitoring may not be sufficient to cause anosognosia (Marcel et 
al., 2004). 
 
4.1.3 Anosognosia: Domain-specific or domain-general mechanisms? 
 
The expansion of the concept of anosognosia has necessitated increasingly complex 
models to account for the neuropsychological processes and neurological substrates 
that could engender unawareness across a range of different cognitive functions and 
pathologies. A central question in the formulation of these models is the issue of 
which components of awareness may be domain-specific and which reflect more 
global processes. On the one hand, many commentators have highlighted 
dissociations between AHP and anosognosia for other impairments, including 
hemianaesthesia (Spinazzola et al., 2008), neglect (Jehkonen et al., 2000) and 
aphasia (Breier et al., 1995), suggesting that the processes by which awareness 
breaks down must be specific to different functions. Furthermore, distinct 
neurological regions associated with these different types of unawareness provide 
compelling evidence that these self-monitoring systems are initiated by the same 
neurological structures responsible for that function (Berti el al., 2005; Ronchi et al., 
2014; Vossell et al., 2012).  
On the other hand, there are a striking number of similarities in how anosognosia 
manifests in different domains. The often repeated assertion that anosognosia is 
heterogeneous in presentation has been made in relation to hemiplegia (Orfei et al., 
2007) aphasia (Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010) and neglect (Ronchi et al., 2014). 
Within different domains, there may be dissociations between awareness that is 
observed in behaviour and acknowledged by self-report (Cocchini et al., 2010; 
Rubens & Garrett, 1991). There have even been cases where patients who seem 
unaware of their own issues may acknowledge them when they are presented in the 
third person, as if belonging to somebody else (Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1963; 
Marcel et al., 2004). Also, as Cocchini and Della Sala (2010) point out, there are 
marked similarities in the mechanisms that have been proposed to account for 
unawareness of different deficits. Most strikingly, anosognosia for hemiplegia, for 
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aphasia and for neglect have all been suggested to arise from a failure to notice a 
mismatch been intention and outcome (Frith et al., 2000; Heilman et al., 1998; 
Marshall et al., 1998; Vossell et al., 2012). It is plausible that different awareness 
deficits could arise from the same general mechanism, a failure to detect 
discrepancies between the predictions provided by internal forward models and 
actual inputs (Fotopoulou, 2014). 
It is also important to recognize that cerebral functions, and their neural architecture, 
are not easily parcelled into separate, discrete modules. This point is emphasized by 
Fotopoulou (2014), who suggests that some studies of anosognosia (for example 
Berti et al., 2005; Karnath, Baier & Nägele, 2005) have inherited epistemological 
flaws from the early proponents of cognitive neuropsychology: they lack depth of 
clinical description; place too much emphasis on functional segregation, rather than 
integration; and fail to take account of the wider neuropsychological and neural 
profiles of anosognosic patients, or how these may change over time (Vocat et al., 
2010). Moreover, the fact that it is possible to be selectively unaware of a specific 
deficit does not preclude a role for general intellectual deficits in predisposing 
someone towards anosognosia, or in maintaining unawareness of deficits in some 
patients (Davies et al., 2005; McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Vuilleumier, 2004). 
Finally, it is possible that the very different methods used to assess anosognosia 
across domains may have over-emphasised the selectivity of anosognosia. Measures 
based on explicit self-report are obviously insensitive to residual implicit awareness, 
and may have worked to suppress or marginalise some components of anosognosia 
for hemiplegia. To obtain a better comparison of unawareness across different 
domains it is therefore necessary to assess it with similar measures (Cocchini & 




4.1.4 Aims and hypotheses 
 
The main aim of this study was to investigate whether patients who under- or 
overestimated their motor skills and language skills in the acute stages after a stroke 
also over- or under-estimated their performance on tasks assessing memory and 
attention and executive function. If anosognosia is largely domain specific, then 
there should be little relationship between self-estimation across these different 
domains. However, if there are other predisposing factors, such as global cognitive 
status, mood or personality factors, then it is likely that those patients who 
overestimate their abilities in one domain will equally overestimate in others.  
The inclusion of an underestimators group, in addition to the classically 
‘anosognosic’ overestimators group, is an important novel aspect of this study. Most 
anosognosia research limits participants to those with moderate to severe 
hemiparesis, and compares those who overestimate (anosognosics) to those with a 
more realistic evaluation of their ability (non-anosognosics). Using discrepancy 
scores, it would therefore be statistically impossible to elicit high levels of 
underestimation (see section 4.3.5 for a more in-depth discussion of these issues). 
However, by including patients with a large range of motor ability, it should be 
possible to see whether there are any patients who are physically capable, but rate 
themselves as being substantially worse than their caregivers rate them. This would 
be an important observation, as it would challenge the assumption that non-
anosognosics have an accurate representation of their movement ability that 
corresponds to how informants would rate them. It would suggest the influence of 
baseline differences in response bias towards optimism or pessimism, perhaps 
because of premorbid personality factors, or post-stroke depression. Furthermore, 
analysis of the cognitive and emotional profile of the underestimators, who are 
equally miscalibrated to their actual skill levels as the overestimators, should 
elucidate whether the two groups are similar, or whether the overestimators appear 
qualitatively different to both the underestimators and aware patients.  
Finally, this study aimed to examine whether global and domain specific cognitive 
ability, and self-reported low mood, tiredness and confusion predicted over- or 
96 
 
underestimation in the domains of memory, attention and executive function. 
Cognitive function was assessed using the Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS: 
Humphreys, Bickerton, Samson & Riddoch, 2012), from which overall scores in the 
domains of memory and attention and executive function were derived, along with a 
global measure of cognitive status (which also incorporated tests of language, praxis 
and number skills). Self-estimation of memory, spatial attention and executive 
function were measured by subtracting estimates of performance on BCoS subtests 
in these domains from actual performance, to obtain discrepancy scores. Self-
estimation of motor skill levels and language skill levels was assessed using the 
Visual Analogue Test of Anosognosia for Motor Impairments (VATA-M: Della Sala 
et al., 2009), and the Visual Analogue test of Anosognosia for Language 
Impairments (VATA-L: Cocchini et al., 2010). Functional ability was measured 
using the Barthel Index (Collin et al., 1988). The patients’ emotional state was 
assessed with composite measures of low mood and tiredness/confusion, derived 
from the Visual Analogue Mood Scale (VAMS: Stern, 1997) (see section 4.2.11.4 
for more details). 
 
4.1.4.1 Self-estimation of motor skills: VATA-M scores 
 
Participants were categorised as aware, underestimators or overestimators on the 
VATA-M, according to established cut-offs. The groups were compared according to 
their Barthel score, their cognitive performance, overall and specifically in the 
domains of attention and executive function, and self-reported sadness and 
tiredness/confusion. In addition, the study also investigated whether the distribution 
of right- and left-brain damaged patients differed across the self-estimation groups. It 
was hypothesised, in accordance with the literature and work already conducted for 
this thesis, that both left and right brain damaged patients were likely be represented 
in all groups. While the majority of anosognosia research reports higher rates of 
unawareness in RBD participants, research using the VATAs has not found this 
imbalance (Della Sala et al., 2009), and I am not aware of any precedent to suggest 
whether LBD and RBD patients will be differentially represented in the 
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underestimators group. The distribution of LBD and RBD patients in each of the 
three groups was therefore tested against both others, to see where any potential 
differences lay.  
 
4.1.4.2 Self-estimation of language skills: VATA-L scores 
 
Participants were categorised as aware, underestimators or overestimators on the 
VATA-L, according to established cut-offs, with the aim of assessing whether the 
distribution of these groups differed according to classification on the VATA-M, i.e. 
whether those patients who overestimated their motor skills were similarly inclined 
to overestimate their language skills.  
 
4.1.4.3 Self-estimation of memory, executive function and spatial attention 
 
Unlike the VATA-M and VATA-L, which have a categorical classification structure, 
self-estimation of performance on the memory, spatial attention and executive 
function tasks was measured on a continuous scale. Analyses of variance were first 
conducted on actual scores and secondly on self-estimation discrepancy scores, to 
address whether these differed according to domain and side of lesion. Regression 
analysis was then run to examine whether global cognition, domain-specific 
cognition, and self-reported sadness and tiredness/confusion predicted higher levels 
of overestimation on memory, spatial attention and executive function tasks. Self-
estimation scores were also examined for correlation across these tasks, to address 
whether a tendency towards overestimation generalised across different cognitive 
domains. 
4.1.4.4 Self-estimation across motor and cognitive domains 
 
Analysis of variance was conducted on the self-estimation scores from the tasks of 
memory, spatial attention and executive function, to address whether they differed 
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according to VATA-M awareness group. Given the association between anosognosia 
and neglect, it was predicted that patients classified as overestimators on the VATA-
M were also likely to overestimate their spatial attention scores, though this is less 
certain for the memory and executive function tasks. 
 
4.1.5 Coda to the Introduction 
 
When this study was originally devised, it also incorporated a longitudinal element, 
whereby willing patients would be followed-up three months after the initial testing 
session, in order to address the impact of acute stage unawareness on functional 
outcome. Unfortunately, data collection for this study was subject to complications 
and setbacks, which had a serious impact upon participant numbers, particularly at 
the follow-up stage. It became apparent that the longitudinal aspects of the study 
were far too ambitious to be attempted as within the scope of a PhD. For that 
reasons, the research aims were reformulated into questions that could be addressed 
using data from the acute stage only. The original aims of the second stage of the 
study, the methods, and summary data from the few patients who agreed to be 








Patient recruitment took place on the acute stroke ward at the Royal Infirmary of 
Edinburgh, continuously, between March 2014 and November 2015. The inclusion 
criteria were the presence of a stroke, determined by CT scan and neurological 
examination, and the capacity to consent to medical treatment, as recorded in patient 
notes. This latter criterion was included to ensure the patients had capacity to 
understand the study and give informed consent to participation; consent was only 
taken from the patients themselves, not by proxy.  
Exclusion criteria were: inability to communicate effectively in English, either 
through not speaking English as a first language or through severe aphasia, 
demonstrated in clinical assessment (mild or moderate aphasia was not considered a 
barrier to participation); diagnosis of a concomitant neurological condition (e.g. 
Multiple Sclerosis or Parkinson’s' Disease), dementia or major psychiatric disorder 
(e.g. schizophrenia); or a history of substance abuse or serious head injury causing 
loss of consciousness. 
Eligible patients were approached initially by a member of the clinical team, which 
was a condition of NHS ethical approval. This was typically an occupational 
therapist or research nurse, who briefly described the study and provided a copy of 
the information sheet. The patients were given a minimum of 24 hours before I 
approached them to see if they were interested in taking part. 137 patients were 
approached in total, of whom 55 (40%) agreed to participate. 
 
4.2.2 Information sheets and consent forms 
 
To facilitate the inclusion of patients with mild or moderate aphasia, a modified 
information sheet and consent form was devised, following the guidelines set down 
by Connect – The Communication Disability Network. These included simplified 
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language in the active voice, increased font size and a high ratio of white space to 
text, putting key words in bold and using images where appropriate.  
 
4.2.3 Patient information 
 
Of the 55 stroke patients from whom complete or partial data was collected, two 
were subsequently excluded because it was discovered after testing that they did not 
meet the inclusion criteria; one had a history of drug abuse and the other had a 
diagnosed learning difficulty. Of the 48 patients for whom lesion information was 
available, 13 had lesions to the left hemisphere (LBD group), 32 to the right 
hemisphere (RBD group) and 3 had bilateral lesions, as determined by CT scan. 
Because of the small number of patients with bilateral lesions, between-group 
comparisons were run only on the LBD and RBD groups. Lesion and clinical 
information was missing for an additional five patients, whose notes I was unable to 
obtain. These patients were included in any group analysis where lesion information 
was not required, but not for hemispheric comparisons, as there was insufficient 
information available to draw firm conclusions about the side of the stroke. 
Five of the 53 patients included in this study had been diagnosed with a stroke 
previously, determined by their medical notes or through evidence of previous 
lesions on their CT scan. For one of these, information about the location of the 
current lesion was missing. For the other four, no residual deficits were reported, and 
they were included in the whole group analyses, but excluded from hemispheric 
comparisons (all had current lesions to the right hemisphere). Additionally, two 
patients had been diagnosed previously with a transient ischemic attack, but with no 
evidence of scarring or residual symptoms. These were included in all analyses. 
Fifty-one patients were right handed, one left handed (and possibly right-hemisphere 
dominant, as she was both RBD and aphasic) and one ambidextrous. The RBD left-
handed participant only completed a small proportion of the tasks, none of which 
required manual responses. All of the RBD participants completed the task with their 
right hand. Of the LBD participants, two did not attempt any tasks requiring manual 
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responses, two had no motor problems in their right upper limb and so used their 
dominant hand as usual, five had some weakness but preferred to use their dominant 
hand and four used their non-dominant left hand.  
Basic demographic and clinical information is provided in Table 4.1. Missing data 
(NA) signifies either that I was unable to obtain the patients’ medical records, or that 
the information provided was ambiguous. The LBD and RBD groups did not differ 
in terms of their gender distribution [χ2(45) = .00, ns], their age [t(43) = -.65, ns], 
years of education [t(41) = ,.67 ns], days since stroke [t(35) = -.98, ns], upper limb 
motor power [t(32) = .58, ns], lower limb motor power [t(31) = -.04, ns], or Barthel 
Score  at the time of testing [t(39) = .55, ns]. The groups did not differ in terms of the 
frequency of visual field deficit, but there was a higher rate of contralesional 
somatosensory loss in the RBD group than the LBD [χ2(1, N = 35) = 6.31, p < .05].
 
 









N 13 32 3 5 53 
Gender 
6 M (46%),  
7 F (54%) 
 15 M (47%),  
14 F (53%) 
 2 M (67%),  
1 F (33%) 
4 M (80%), 
 1 F (20%) 
 27 M (51%),  
26 F (49%)  
Age, M (SD) 70.00 (12.23) 72.53 (11.59) 75.00 (11.27) 75.20 (11.84) 72.30 (11.53) 
Years of education, M (SD), 
N 12.85 (3.46) 12.17 (2.89), N = 30 17.00 (1.41), N = 2 11.50 (2.38), N = 4 12.49 (3.08), N = 49 
Days since stroke, M (SD), N 9.50 (7.43), N = 12 12.64 (9.84), N = 25 10.00 (4.24), N = 2 NA 11.26 (9.01), N = 40 
Power (0-5) N = 12 N = 22 N = 2 NA 36 
Right upper limb, M (SD) 3.33 (1.78) 5.00 (.00) 3.50 (2.12) NA 4.36 (1.33) 
Right lower limb, M (SD) 3.17 (1.95) 4.95 (.21) 4.50 (.71) NA 4.33 (1.39) 
Left upper limb, M (SD) 5.00 (.00) 2.95 (1.86) 2.50 (3.54) NA 3.61 (1.86) 
Left lower limb , M (SD) 5.00 (.00) 3.19 (1.72) 3.50 (2.12) NA 3.83 (1.62) 
Somatosensory loss, N/valid 3/12 (25%) 16/23 (70%) 1/2 (50%) NA 20/37 (54%) 
Visual field deficit N/valid 2/12(17%) 7/21 (33%) 1/2 (50%) NA 10/35 (29%) 
Barthel Index (0 - 20), M 
(SD) 
12.50 (6.05), N = 
12 11.31 (6.44), N = 29 14.00 (5.20) 9.60 (.89) 11.59 (5.90), N = 49 
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4.2.4 Functional ability: The Barthel index 
 
The patients’ functional ability was measured using the Barthel index (Collin et al., 
1988), a ten-item scale including measures of continence, personal care and mobility. 
Patients are graded from 0-3 for each item (or 0-1 or 0-2, depending upon the item), 
with higher scores representing better functional status. Total scores can range from 
0, which represents extreme dependency (incontinence of bladder and bowels, 
immobility, no sitting balance) though to 20, which represents independence on all 
items. The Barthel index was completed by an occupational therapist, who was 
involved directly with the patient’s care, as soon as possible after testing.  
The patients in this group had a mean Barthel index score of 11.59 (SD = 5.90), 
encompassing a wide range (2 to 20) of functional ability within the sample. 
 
4.2.5 Cognitive ability: The Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS) 
 
The main measure of cognition used was the Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS: 
Humphreys et al., 2012). The BCoS comprises a broad battery of brief 
neuropsychological assessments, specifically designed for stroke patients. The screen 
contains 22 different subtests, comprising 32 different elements (some tasks, for 
example, have an accuracy and a time component) that assess cognition in five 
different domains: attention and executive function, language, memory, number 
skills and praxis. Tasks not directly assessing language or spatial ability were 
designed to be suitable for administration to patients with aphasia or neglect, 




Figure 4.1. Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCOS) tasks, listed by domain. Reprinted 
from “The BCoS cognitive profile screen: Utility and predictive value for stroke” by 
WL Bickerton et al., 2015, Neuropsychology, 29(4), p. 11. Copyright the American 
Psychological Association. 
 
Rather than providing a global assessment of cognitive status, the BCoS instead 
presents a profile of which domains of cognition have been compromised. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this study, composite scores for each domain and a combined 
global score were derived, as outlined in ‘Data Handling’ below. For more detailed 
information about the BCoS subtests, as well as the design principles and reporting 






4.2.6 BCoS subtests used for self-assessment 
 
The entire BCoS, or as much of it as possible, was administered to all of the patients 
who participated in the study. In addition, four tasks were selected to provide a 
measure of performance self-estimation in the domains of memory (story recall, 
immediate and delayed) and attention and executive function (apple cancellation and 
rule finding and concept switching). These tasks are described individually below, 
while the self-estimation scales are outlined in section 4.2.9. 
 
4.2.6.1 Story immediate recall 
 
The examiner read a story to the patient, consisting of 15 pieces of information to be 
recalled. Patients were instructed immediately before the story was read that they 
should listen carefully because they would be asked to recall as many details as 
possible afterwards. For free recall they were instructed to recount as many details as 
possible, without any specific prompts, unless they were unable to recall anything, in 
which case generic prompts were given, for example ‘How did the story start?’. 
Patients were scored up to maximum of 15 points; half marks were given for 
information close to the desired answer, for example ‘bag’ instead of ‘handbag.’ Cut 
off scores for this task are 6/15 for adults aged up to 74 and 3/15 for adults aged 75 
and over.  
After the free recall, a recognition test was also given, with multiple choice answers. 
On this task the patients were told whether they had answered correctly and, if not, 
informed of the right answer. Both tests were administered, however the patients 
were only asked to evaluate their performance on the recall measure, to avoid ceiling 




4.2.6.2 Story delayed recall 
 
At a later point in the BCoS administration - approximately 20 minutes after the 
initial recall (if the entire screen was administered in one sitting), patients were 
reminded that they had been read a story earlier and asked again to recall as many 
details as possible. The same procedure as for immediate recall was followed. This 
delayed recall condition was included to assess whether the patient had any specific 
problems consolidating information, demonstrated by a substantial drop in 
performance relative to immediate recall. Scores in the delayed recall condition were 
anticipated to be slightly higher than in the immediate recall condition, because the 
examiner provided the correct answer after each item in the immediate recognition 
task. Cut offs are 8/15 for adults aged up to 64, 6/15 for adults aged 5 – 74 and 4/15 
for adults aged over 75.  
 
4.2.6.3 Rule finding and concept switching 
 
This task measured the ability to detect abstract rules and to switch flexibly from one 
rule to another. The task consisted of 19 pages of the BCoS test book, each 
containing a 6 x 6 grid with 32 grey squares, two red squares and two green squares, 
always in the same arrangement. A black dot was also presented; this moved to 
different locations on the grid according to three different rules; 1. One step 
rightwards (four steps including start page), 2. Backwards and forwards between the 
two red squares (7 steps) and backwards and forwards between red square B5 and 
green square E6 (8 steps). Patients were instructed that the dot moved to specific 
locations, that it followed a pattern and that the rule governing the pattern could 
change. They had to look at how the dot moved on each trial, then anticipate and 
show the examiner where it would move next.  
The two scores derived from this task were the total number of correct responses (out 
of a possible 18) and the total number of rules detected out of a possible three, 
assessed by three or more consecutive correct answers per rule. Cut off points for 
impairment are accuracy < 6 for ages up to an including 64, accuracy <5 for ages 65 
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– 74 and accuracy < 4 for ages 75 and above. For all age groups, the cut off for 
number of rules detected is < 1, suggesting that this is quite a difficult task even for 
healthy individuals.  
 
4.2.6.4 Apple cancellation 
 
The apple cancellation task comprises an A4 page in the BCoS test booklet, in 
landscape orientation, containing 50 line drawings of complete apples, 50 distractor 
apples with a gap on the left side and 50 distractor apples with a gap on the right 
side. The apples are organised into ten boxes (invisible to the patient), by bisecting 
the page horizontally and diving it into five columns, one centrally positioned, two to 
the left and two to the right. Each box contains fifteen apples; five complete apples 
and five of each type of distractor. The page was set in front of the patient’s midline, 
and they were instructed to draw a line through only the complete apples. They were 
allowed a maximum of five minutes to complete the task. A practice task of six 
apples, two examples of each type, in central vertical orientation, was presented first. 
Patients were permitted two attempts to complete the practice task; if no attempt to 
undertake the practice task was made, or the patient could not understand the 
instructions, then the experimental task was not attempted.  
The apple cancellation task was scored for accuracy by counting the total number of 
complete apples correctly cancelled. Subtracting the number of correctly cancelled 
apples in the four rightward boxes from the number of correctly cancelled apples in 
the four leftward boxes provides a measure of egocentric (space-based) neglect, and 
subtracting the number of false positives with rightward openings from the number 
of false positives with leftward openings provides a measure of allocentric (object-
based) neglect. The accuracy cut-off score for healthy older adults of all ages is < 
42/50. For egocentric neglect, scores < -2, or > 2 (adults aged up to 64) or 3 (adults 
aged 65 and over), are considered to show left and right neglect, respectively. For 
allocentric neglect, scores < -1, or > 1 are considered to show left and right neglect, 
respectively, for adults of all ages.  
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More details about the apple cancellation task and how it can differentiate neglect 
subtypes are provided in Bickerton, Samson, Williamson and Humphreys (2011). 
 
4.2.7 Digit span 
 
In addition to the BCoS, patients also completed the Digit Span task from the 
Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status (RBANS: 
Randolph, Tierney, Mohr & Chase, 1998). Participants were read strings of numbers, 
beginning with a two-number string and thereafter increasing in increments of one 
number to a maximum nine-number string. The examiner read each string at a rate of 
one number per second, and at the end of the string the patient was asked to repeat 
the numbers back in the same order. If this was achieved successfully, the examiner 
proceeded to read the next length string (one number longer). If not, the patient was 
allowed to attempt a second string of the same length. If the patient was able to recite 
the second string then the examiner proceeded to the next length string, but if both 
strings of the same length were not recalled the task was discontinued. The patient 
was awarded two points for each string length recalled in one attempt and one point 
where two attempts were required, yielding a total score of between zero and 16.  
 
4.2.8 Mood assessment: Visual-Analogue Mood Scale (VAMS) 
 
Current mood was assessed using the Visual-Analogue Mood Scale (VAMS: Stern, 
1997). This is a self-rating scale, on which participants marked the extent to which 
they were feeling eight different emotions: afraid, confused, sad, angry, energetic, 
tired, happy and tense. Each emotion was presented on a separate page, both in 
written format and by a cartoon icon. For each item, participants were instructed to 
mark on a 100mm vertical scale the point which best described how much of that 
emotion they were feeling, with marks further down the page indicating stronger 
emotion. See Figure 4.2 for an example page. 
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Scores for each of the eight emotions were calculated by measuring the distance of 
the mark from the top of the line in mm, and could range from zero to 100. 
Individual item scores were subsequently combined into composite scores (see 
section 4.2.11.4).  
 
 




4.2.9 Experimental self-awareness measures 
 
4.2.9.1 The Visual Analogue tests of Anosognosia for Motor Impairments 
(VATA-M) and Language Impairments (VATA-L) 
 
The VATA-M (Della Sala et al., 2009) and VATA-L (Cocchini et al., 2010) are tests 
of anosognosia for motor and language impairments that calculate the discrepancy 
between self-reported and personal or professional caregiver-reported ability to carry 
out motor or language tasks. Caregiver scores are taken to provide a measure of true 
ability and the discrepancy of self-reported scores from this standard thus provides 
an estimate of self-awareness. The format of the scales includes both verbal and 
pictorial representations of each item, in order to facilitate the inclusion of left-brain-
damaged patients.  
The VATA-M contains 12 test items, which represent bimanual or bipedal actions, 
for example ‘tying a knot’ or ‘walking upstairs’, presented one per page. The 
question is written at the top of the page in the form, ‘Would you have difficulty 
clapping your hands’, with a visual depiction of the action immediately underneath. 
At the bottom of the page is a horizontal scale with marks ranging from 0 ‘No 
Problem’ to 3 ‘Problem’. The examiner read each item aloud to the patient and asked 
them to rate their current ability to carry out the action, highlighting that 0 means no 
difficulty and 3 means such serious difficulty that the action would be impossible for 
them.  
The scale also contains four check questions; items that are designed to be 
achievable by all participants, for example ‘waving your (non-plegic) hand’, or 
impossible for all participants, for example ‘jumping over a lorry.’ Participants not 
providing the anticipated responses to these check questions (0 or 1 for the easy 
items, 2 or 3 for the impossible ones) were excluded on the grounds that they had 
misunderstood the scale or were unable/unwilling to comply with instructions.  
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The VATA-M was scored by summing the patient ratings and the caregiver ratings, 
then subtracting the latter from the former to obtain discrepancy scores (check 
question ratings were not included in these calculations). Discrepancy scores could 
range from -36 to +36, with zero representing total agreement. The cut-offs are 
values above 6.30 for mild anosognosia, 12.1 for moderate anosognosia and 24.1 for 
severe anosognosia. The test’s creators calculated the 6.30 cut-off by obtaining two 
separate caregiver ratings for a subset of the patients, comparing the two ratings to 
obtain a discrepancy score for each patient, averaging these scores to obtain a group 
caregiver discrepancy rating and adding two standard deviations. The cut-offs of 
12.1 and 24.1 were selected as representing an average of 1 point discrepancy and 2 
points discrepancy across the 12 items on the scale. Further information is provided 
in Della Sala et al. (2009). 
Symmetrical cut-offs in the negative direction indicate similar levels of 
underestimation; these ‘underestimation’ discrepancy scores are provided by the 
test’s creators, however, as the VATA-M was devised specifically as a measure of 
anosognosia, underestimation was not investigated as part of the validation study 
(Della Sala et al., 2009). For the purposes of this study, to be consistent with the 
broader theme of self-awareness, the patients who underestimated their performance 
were considered a separate group in their own right. Potentially this group are as 
‘unaware’ as the classically anosognosic group, and it is therefore interesting to 
address whether they have a similar or different cognitive profile to those patients 
who overestimate their motor skills. For this reason, the terms ‘underestimators’ and 
‘overestimators’ were adopted throughout the study, rather than the clinical label of 
anosognosia.  
The VATA-L format is identical to the VATA-M described above. It has 14 
experimental items assessing language production (8 items), comprehension (4 
items), or both (2 items), as well as four check questions. Scores can range from -42 
to +42, with zero representing total agreement. There is only one cut-off for the 
VATA-L; discrepancy scores higher than 13.1 are considered evidence of 
unawareness, while scores between 12.0 and 13.0 are borderline. Cut-offs were 
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calculating using the same method as for the VATA-L; further information is 
provided in Cocchini et al. (2010). 
 
4.2.9.2 BCoS self-estimation scales 
 
For the BCoS subtests outlined above, immediately after administration of each test, 
participants were presented with a scale on which to rate their performance, and the 
following questions: 
 Story recall (immediate and delayed): ‘How much of the story do you think 
you remembered?’ 
 Apple cancellation: ‘How many of the apples do you think you correctly 
crossed out?’ 
 Rule-finding and concept switching: ‘How many right answers do you think 
you gave?’ 
The scale was presented horizontally, numbered from 0 – 100 in intervals of 20, with 
neutral and smiling faces at either end. The examiner read each question out loud and 
asked the patients to provide their answer as a percentage. Patients could either 
answer verbally, or mark the appropriate point on the scale. The examiner then 
repeated their answer back, in the form ‘You think you remembered 80% of the 
story?’ and, upon confirmation, wrote the answer at the bottom of the page. See 








All testing took place on the ward, either at the patient’s bedside, behind a screening 
curtain, or in a private room if the patient requested one or if the ward was noisy. 
Written informed consent was taken at the beginning of each testing session. The 
tasks were always given in the same order; VATA-M, VATA-L, VAMS, digit span, 
BCoS. The subtests within the BCoS are always presented in a set order. Wherever 
possible, the entire set of tasks was completed in one session, lasting approximately 
1¼ hours, with breaks. About halfway through the session, patients were always 
offered the opportunity to halt and resume later. Where they chose to do this, or 
where testing had to be halted because of tiredness but the patient expressed a 
willingness to continue, the session was resumed either the same afternoon or as 
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soon as possible afterwards. In addition to the inevitable data loss where participants 
were unable or unwilling to attempt certain subtests, the necessity of sometimes 
running the study over more than one session led to some further loss of data, 
typically because the patients were discharged or moved to a different hospital before 
testing was completed.  
 
4.2.11 Data handling 
 
4.2.11.1 BCoS: Domains of memory and attention and executive function  
 
Cognitive status in the domains of memory and attention and executive function was 
considered integral to this study, as these were the areas in which the patients’ self-
estimation was measured. These cognitive domain scores were derived by 
calculating the proportion of subtest scores that fell above the cut-off for impairment. 
Cut-offs are provided in the BCoS manual, for three age groups; ≤ 64, 65-74, ≥ 75. 
They are based on the 5th percentile from a normative sample of 100 control 
participants. Proportion scores were calculated for each domain only if the patient 
had attempted at least 50% of the component subtests; if a patient had completed less 
than 50% of the subtests, data was considered missing for that domain. The 
component tests and calculations for each domain are outlined individually below 
(see also Figure 4.1).  
 
Subtests from which the memory domain proportion scores were derived: 
 Orientation (considered failed if either memory for personal information or 
orientation in time and space fell below cut-off) 
 Story immediate recall 
 Story immediate recognition 
 Story delayed recall 
 Story delayed recognition 
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 Task recall 
 
Subtests from which the attention and executive function proportion scores were 
derived: 
 Rule-finding and concept switching  
 Apple cancellation (overall scores below cut-off) 
 Apple cancellation egocentric neglect (either left or right page asymmetry 
score beyond lower or upper cut-off) 
 Apple cancellation allocentric neglect (either left or right object asymmetry 
score beyond lower or upper cut-off) 
 Visual extinction (either left or right bilateral score below cut-off, with 
normal unilateral score) 
 Tactile extinction (either left or right bilateral score below cut-off, with 
normal unilateral score) 
N.B. For extinction scores, where both unilateral and bilateral scores fell below cut-
off, data were considered missing, because extinction could not be differentiated 
from neglect or hemianopia. 
 
4.2.11.2 BCoS: Global cognitive status 
 
Global scores of cognitive status were derived by calculating the proportion of 
subtests passed above cut-off in all five domains of the BCoS and then averaging 
these proportions. No self-estimation measures were used for the domains of 
language, number processing and praxis. However, as they contribute to the global 






Subtests from which the language proportion scores were derived: 
 Instruction comprehension 
 Picture naming 
 Sentence construction 
 Reading sentences (considered failed if either accuracy, time or both fell 
below cut-off) 
 Reading non-words (considered failed if either accuracy, time or both fell 
below cut-off) 
 Writing words 
Subtests from which the number processing proportion scores were derived: 
 Number/price/time reading 
 Number/price writing 
 Calculation 
Subtests from which the praxis proportion scores were derived: 
 Complex figure copy  
 Multistep object use 
 Gesture production 
 Gesture recognition 
 Gesture imitation 
 
4.2.11.3 BCoS self-estimation scores 
 
Scores on the four BCoS subtests of story recall (immediate and delayed), apple 
cancellation and rule finding and concept switching were converted into percentages, 
then subtracted from the patients’ self-estimated percentages for these tasks in order 
to obtain discrepancy scores. These could fall between -100 (100% underestimation) 
to +100 (100% overestimation).  
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Percentage scores on the story immediate recall and delayed recall tasks were highly 
correlated with each other [r (37) = .75, p < .001], as were the patients’ self-
assessments [r (37) = .68, p < .001]. Therefore, the two sets of discrepancy scores 
were averaged to provide composite story recall self-estimation scores for the 
memory domain.  
While apple cancellation and rule finding and concept switching were both drawn 
from the attention and executive function domain, the actual scores of on these tasks 
were only marginally significantly correlated [r (37) = .35, p < .05] and there was no 
association between self-assessment scores [r (33) = -.05, ns]. Therefore the two 
tasks were considered independently; the rule finding and task switching scores 
provided a measure of self-estimation of executive function, and the apple 
cancellation scores a measure of self-estimation of spatial attention. 
 
4.2.11.4 VAMS  
 
Correlation analysis was run on the eight items of the VAMS (shown in Table 4.2). 
In order to simplify the interpretation of the scale, two composite mood scales were 
created. The first was selected as a measure of low mood; symptoms of sadness or 
anger may be prevalent after a stroke, and may also influence self-appraisal. From 
examinations of the below correlations, ratings from the Afraid, Sad, Angry and 
Tense items were averaged to create the ‘Low Mood’ scale. The second subscale was 
created from the averaged scores on the Tired and Confused subscales. Patients who 
were extremely confused or disorientated were excluded from participating, however 
it was helpful to have a subjective measure of whether the patients felt themselves to 
be confused, as confusion could impede self-evaluation. Again, the composite 
Tiredness/Confusion was selected because of the high correlation between these 
items. No items selected for the Low Mood subscale were also included in the 





  Afraid Confused Sad Angry Energetic Tired Happy Tense 
Afraid 1 .23 .52** .16 .16 .19 -.25 .31* 
Confused   1 .04 .20 -.02 .40** -.27 .30* 
Sad     1 .31* -.15 .35* -.27 .46** 
Angry       1 .02 .35* -.30* .33* 
Energetic         1 -.31* .16 -.07 
Tired           1 -.29* .42** 
Happy             1 -.14 
Tense               1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.         
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.         
 








The performance of the patients on the cognitive and mood assessments is shown in 
Table 4.3, for all patients (including those with missing lesion information and a 
history of previous strokes) and then separately for just LBD and RBD groups with 
no history of previous strokes. Number of participants is shown individually for any 
tests where scores were available for fewer than the total number.  
 
  Overall (N = 53) LBD (N = 13) RBD (N = 28) 
BCoS proportion subtests passed 
in each domain M (SD)    
Attention and Executive function .71 (.34), N = 44 .92 (.17), N = 12 .61 (.39), N = 24 
Memory .81 (.27), N = 47 .82 (.20) .85 (.27), N = 25 
Language .73 (.27), N = 51 .75 (.20) .76 (.29), N =27 
Number .84 (.29), N = 37 .73 (.38), N = 10 .93 (.14), N = 19 
Praxis .81 (.23), N = 38 .80 (.22), N = 11 .83 (.19), N = 19 
Global .76 (.23), N = 48 .80 (.16) .76 (.24), N = 26 
VAMS: M (SD) N = 49 N = 13 N = 25 
Low Mood 26.99 (21.91) 21.67 (19.65) 26.19 (24.06) 
Tiredness confusion 38.51 (27.48) 36.69 (24.99) 34.60 (27.27) 
Digit Span: M (SD) 9.91 (3.07), N = 43 9.23 (2.68) 10.71 (3.26), N = 21 
 
Table 4.3. BCoS domain scores, Global cognition, VAMS mood subscales and Digit 
Span. 
 
Independent t-tests comparing LBD and RBD patients on the BCoS domain scores 
revealed that the RBD patients scored significantly lower in the attention and 
executive function domain [t(33.43) = 3.24, p < .01, equal variances not assumed]. 
However, there were no differences in any of the other domains; memory [t(36) = 
-.36, ns], language [t(38) = -.10, ns], number [t(10.28) = -1.59, ns, equal variances 
not assumed], and praxis [t(28) = -.39, ns]; nor did the groups differ in terms of their 
global cognition score [t(37) = .54, ns]. 
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The fact that the RBD group had lower scores than the LBD group on attention tasks 
is unsurprising. Perhaps more surprising is the lack of a difference on the language, 
number and praxis tasks, which it may be anticipated would be more challenging for 
LBD patients. Low numbers of LBD patients and a self-selection bias by patients 
with intact language skills may partly account for this. Also, specific subtests may 
cause problems for different reasons. For example, reading sentences and naming 
pictures are both incorporated within the language domain, but may be as sensitive to 
neglect dyslexia and visual agnosia as to language impairments. Correlation analysis 
revealed a significant association between scores on the language and attention and 
executive function domains [r(39) = .49, p < .01], suggesting that attention deficits 
may have contributed to scores in the language domain.  
For all future analyses, only the domains of memory and attention and executive 
function are considered individually, as the focus of this study is on the evaluation of 
performance in these domains, and how this relates to self-estimation of motor skills. 
However, performance in the language, number and praxis domains does contribute 
to the global cognition score, as outlined in the Methods.  
The LBD and RBD groups did not differ in terms of their digit span [t(35) = -1.29, 
ns], or either of the VAMS mood scales; low mood [t(40) = -.91, ns], 
tiredness/confusion [t(40) = -.15, ns]. 
 
4.3.1 Self-estimation of motor skill: VATA-M scores 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the participants divided into five self-assessment categories 
according to the discrepancy between self-rated and caregiver-rated scores; moderate 
underestimation, mild underestimation, aware, mild overestimation, moderate 






Figure 4.4. Patients by VATA-M cut-off self-assessment groups. 
 
In order to obtain suitable numbers for group-wise comparisons, the underestimation 
groups, and the overestimation groups were combined to provide three groups; 
underestimators (N = 12, M = -12.58, SD = 3.53), aware (N = 24, M = .88, SD = 
3.57), and overestimators (N = 14, M = 12.36, SD = 5.27). BCoS scores and mood 
scores are shown by self-estimation group in Table 4.4. 
A one-way ANOVA, with self-estimation group as the between-subjects factor 
revealed that the groups differed significantly on Barthel score [F(2, 45) = 5.91, p 
< .01]. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests revealed that the overestimators had 
significantly lower functional ability than the aware group (p < .05) and than the 
underestimators (p < .01), but the aware group and underestimators did not differ 






 Underestimators Aware Overestimators 
 N = 12 N = 24 N  =14 
Barthel score 14.80 (4.47),  
N = 10 
12.63 (6.16),  
N = 24 
7.64 (4.53), 
 N = 14 
BCoS    
Memory .93 (.09), N = 10 .82 (.23), N = 23 .68 (.40), N = 12 
Attention and executive function .92 (.16), N = 10 .75 (.27), N = 20 .45 (.44), N = 12 
Global cognition .92 (.08), N = 10 .78 (.19), N = 23 .58 (.27), N = 13 
VAMS    
Low mood 32.60 (17.18) 28.21 (23.58) 23.00 (23.51) 
Tiredness/confusion 50.63 (31.81) 33.04 (20.55) 34.59 (31.83) 
 
Table 4.4 Functional, cognitive and mood status by VATA-M self-estimation group. 
 
In terms of their cognitive status, the groups also differed from each other on their 
global cognition scores [F(2, 43) = 8.15, p < .01]. The overestimators were 
significantly more cognitively impaired that the aware group (p < .05) and the 
underestimators (p < .01), but the aware group and underestimators did not differ. 
There was also a significant difference between the groups in terms of their scores in 
the attention and executive function domain [F(2, 39) = 6.67, p < .01]. Again, the 
overestimators differed from the aware group (p < .05) and the underestimators (p 
< .01) but these latter two groups did not differ from each other. There were no 
significant differences between groups in the memory domain [F(2, 42) = 2.64, ns]. 
There was no difference between the groups on either of the VAMS subscales; low 
mood [F(2, 43) = .54, ns], tiredness/confusion [F(2, 41) = 1.83, ns]. 
The distribution of LBD and RBD patients across the three awareness groups is 
shown in Figure 4.5. Fisher’s exact test revealed no difference in the distribution of 
LBD and RBD patients between overestimators and aware group (N = 29, ns), nor 
between the aware group and the underestimators, though this began to approach 
significance (N = 26, p = .08, 1-tailed). There was a significant difference in the 
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distribution of LBD and RBD patients between the underestimators and 
overestimators (N = 21, p < .01), 1-tailed). As can be seen in Figure 4.5, in general, 
RBD patients were either aware of their motor skill level or overestimated, whereas 




Figure 4.5. Distribution of LBD and RBD patients by VATA-M self-estimation group. 
 
Comparing the over-estimators to the aware group, it appears that they exhibited a 
classically anosognosic profile, associated with lower functional status, greater levels 
of cognitive impairment (overall and specifically in the domain of attention and 
executive function) and a tendency towards a greater frequency of right hemisphere 
lesions. In addition, one of the novel elements to this study was the inclusion of an 
underestimators group as well as an overestimators group. Plausibly, the two groups 
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could be similar in profile, in that they are equivalently ‘unaware’ of their motor 
skill. 
 However, this is not what was observed in the data. Instead, the two groups differed 
on all the same measures, in fact to a greater extent that the aware group and the 
overestimators differed. This suggests that the cognitive and emotional status of 
patients who overestimate their motor ability – i.e. the anosognosic patients – is 
distinct from both those who underestimate and those whose evaluation concurs with 
their caregivers. . 
While the lack of any differences between the aware group and the underestimators 
suggests that these patients are quite similar in profile, looking at the descriptive 
statistics in Table 4.4, it is apparent that the underestimators had fairly consistently 
higher functional and cognitive status than the aware group. Potentially, there may 
have been significant differences between these groups, but because of the relatively 
low numbers and inevitable high variability of this clinical population, the analysis 
lacked power to demonstrate them. There are also some caveats to this result, based 
on issues with using discrepancy scores to compare groups over a wide range of 
performance; these are discussed in section 4.3.5 below.  
 
4.3.2 Self-estimation of language skill: VATA-L scores 
 
The majority of patients (45/50) had discrepancy scores that were well within the 
limits defined as normal awareness (Mean = -2.1, SD = 4.11). Of the remaining 
patients, four fell into the underestimation category (Mean  = -15.50, SD = 1.91) and 
one overestimated (score of 29). This general absence of overestimation may reflect 
the very low levels of language impairment present in the group; the mean caregiver-
rated score was only 2.02 (SD = 4.95). 
The study materials were designed, as far as possible, to be accessible to patients 
with expressive aphasia, yet very few language-impaired patients participated. This 
is probably due to combined issues of recruitment and self-selection. Only patients 
who were considered to have the capacity to consent to medical treatment were 
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recruited for this study. Where medical staff considered patients not to have such 
capacity, this was frequently because of language or communication difficulties, 
which meant that very few patients with moderate to severe aphasia were 
approached. For those who did have capacity, difficulties in communicating may 
have made them less inclined to engage in a cognitively demanding set of tests.  
The overall high level of language function within the group both constrained the 
possible discrepancy scores - the majority of the participants could only diverge form 
caregiver reports in the direction of underestimation, hence the lack absence of much 
overestimation - and precluded any meaningful analysis of unawareness of language 
impairment. Therefore, no analyses were conducted on VATA-L scores.  
 
4.3.3 Self-estimation of memory, executive function and spatial 
attention 
 
In addition to the validated VATA-M scale, this study incorporated three novel 
measures to assess self-estimation of cognitive performance in the domains of 
memory and attention and executive function. Table 4.5 shows the mean actual 
scores (as percentages), self-rated scores and discrepancy scores on the three BCoS 
subtests measuring memory (story recall, immediate and delayed combined) 
executive function (rule finding and concept switching) and spatial attention (apple 










 All LBD RBD 
 N = 53 N = 13 N = 32 
Actual percentage    
Story recall 57.73 (19.97), N = 47 55.51 (19.52), N = 13 66.73(14.45), N = 25 
Rule finding  48.83 (28.39), N = 38 67.68 (14.01), n = 11 45.91 (29.68), N = 19 
Apple cancellation 76.53 (29.50), N = 45 93.17 (10.21), N = 12 70.64 (31.45), N = 25 
Estimated percentage    
Story recall 64.78 (21.16), N = 46 61.35 (25.57), N = 13 69.00 (16.40), N = 25 
Rule finding 55.66 (28.27), N = 35 66.82(20.40), N = 11 51.56 (27.82), N = 18 
Apple cancellation 77.60 (23.27), N = 42 80.42 (21.16), N = 12 77.57 (21.13), N = 23 
Discrepancy score    
Story recall 6.12 (24.47), N = 46 4.68 (25.32), N = 13 5.27 (19.63), N = 25 
Rule finding 3.28 (26.35), N = 35 -.86 (21.09), N = 11 3.41 (26.09), N = 18 
Apple cancellation -2.88 (19.77), N = 42 -12.75 (18.98), N = 12 3.57 (18.90), N = 23 
 
Table 4.5. Average actual percentage score, estimated percentage score and 
discrepancy score on three BCoS subtests. 
 
To examine how actual performance varied according to task and side of lesion, a 
mixed analysis of variance was conducted on the actual percentage scores, with task 
at three levels (story recall, rule finding and concept switching, and apple 
cancellation) as the within-subjects factor, and lesion side at two levels (left or right) 
as the between-subjects factor. This demonstrated a significant main effect of task; 
[F(2, 54) = 19.44, p < .001] . Follow up contrasts demonstrated that scores on the 
apple cancellation task were significantly higher than the other two tasks: story recall 
[F(1, 27) = 22.57, p < .001], rule finding and concept switching [F(1, 27) = 50.15, p 
< .001], but these two did not differ from each other [F(1, 30) = .75, ns].  
There was no main effect of hemisphere,  [F(1, 27) = 1.96, ns], however hemisphere 
did interact significantly with task [F(2, 54) = 4.31, p < .05]. Follow up contrasts 
revealed that the LBD patients scored significantly higher than the RBD patients on 
apple cancellation compared to story recall [F(1, 30) = 4.30, p < .05], and on rule 
finding and concept switching compared to story recall [F(1, 27) = 6.29, p < .05], but 
the distribution of scores of LBD and RBD groups did not differ on apple 
cancellation compared to rule finding and concept switching [F(1, 27) = .60, ns]. As 
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could be anticipated, LBD patients performed better than RBD patients on the two 
tasks drawn from the attention and executive function domain, but not the memory 
tasks (see Figure 4.6).  
 
Figure 4.6. Actual and estimated scores for the three BCoS tasks. 
 
On average, the RBD patients estimated their performance to be better than it was on 
all three tasks. To investigate whether this translated into significant between-group 
differences, a mixed analysis of variance was conducted on the discrepancy scores, 
with task at three levels (story recall, rule finding and concept switching, and apple 
cancellation) as the within-subjects factor, and lesion side at two levels (LBD or 
RBD) as the between-subjects factor. Neither or the main effects was significant; 
task [F(2, 54) = .65, ns], hemisphere [F(1, 27) = .95, ns]. Nor was there any 





4.3.3.1 Memory self-estimation 
 
To investigate the influence of cognitive status on memory self-estimation, scores in 
the memory domain and global cognition scores were entered as predictors into a 
multiple linear regression model (backward stepwise method), along with the VAMS 
tiredness/confusion and low mood subscale scores, to assess any effects of 
disorientation and negative emotional state. The model was significant overall [F(2, 
41) = 9.76, p < .001 , R2= .32]. Of the individual predictors, only global cognition 
and tiredness/confusion significantly predicted memory self-estimation and were 
retained in the model; global cognition [β =  -42.12, t(41) = -3.06, p < .01]; 
tiredness/confusion [β =  -.38, t(41) = -3.50, p < .01]; memory self-estimation = 
(-.38* tiredness/confusion) – (42.12 * global cognition) + 50.97.  
Participants with lower overall cognitive status were more likely to overestimate 
their memory performance, as were participants who rated themselves as having 
lower levels of tiredness and confusion. It is possible that those patients who were 
aware of being tired or confused were more attuned to other difficulties, whereas 
those who were disorientated but unaware of this fact were perhaps also unaware of 
memory problems. Alternatively, awareness of memory problems may have 
contributed to a sense of tiredness or confusion.  
Also of interest was the absence of any impact of performance in the memory 
domain; instead it appeared to be global cognitive status that most influenced 
memory self-estimation, rather than specific memory deficits.  
 
4.3.3.2 Executive function self-estimation 
 
To investigate the impact of cognition and mood on executive function self-
estimation, scores in the attention domain, global cognition scores, and VAMS low 
mood and tiredness/confusion subscales were entered as predictors of rule finding 
and concept switching self-estimation scores, in a multiple linear regression model 
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(backward stepwise method). None of these predictors were retained and all versions 
of the model remained non-significant after the removal of each one.  
4.3.3.3 Spatial attention self-estimation 
 
To investigate the impact of cognition and mood on spatial attention, the same 
measures as above were entered as predictors of apple cancellation self-estimation 
scores in a multiple linear regression model (backward stepwise method). The model 
was significant overall [F(2, 37) = 5.63, p < .01 , R2= .23]. Of the individual 
predictors, attention and executive function domain scores and VAMS 
tiredness/confusion ratings were retained in the model, but not global cognition or 
VAMS low mood ratings. Attention and executive function domain scores were the 
only significant predictor [β = -26.21, t(37) = -2.99, p < .01], with 
tiredness/confusion showing a trend towards significance[β = -.22, t(35) = -1.82, p 
= .08]; apple cancellation self-estimation = (-26.21*attention and executive function 
domain score) - (.22* tiredness/confusion) + 25.53. 
Unlike the memory self-estimation task, which was influenced by global cognitive 
ability, overestimation of spatial attention was more specifically driven by low scores 
in the attention and executive function domain of cognition, suggesting a direct 
relationship between problems in this area and a lack of awareness of those 
problems.  
 
4.3.3.4 Relationship between self-estimation across domains 
 
To address whether patients who overestimated their performance in one cognitive 
domain were likely to overestimate in the others, correlation analysis was run on the 
discrepancy scores for the story recall, rule finding and concept switching, and the 
apple cancellation tasks. There was no significant association between the apple 
cancellation discrepancy scores and either memory [r = .20, ns] or rule finding and 
concept switching [r = .03, ns] discrepancy scores. These latter two were associated 
with each other [r = .47, p < .01]. However, as can be seen in Figure 4.7, this 
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association was largely driven by one case, who severely overestimated both her 
memory score and her rule finding and concept switching score. With this case 
removed, the association between these two variables was no longer significant [r 
= .21, ns]. Overestimation appears to be largely unrelated across different facets of 
cognition.  
Finally, correlation analysis on the actual scores on these tasks revealed a significant 
association between scores on the apple cancellation and rule finding and concept 
switching tasks [r = .48, p < .01]. There was no association between rule finding and 
concept switching and story recall scores [r = .20, ns], or between story recall and 
apple cancellation scores [r = .12, ns]. 
 
 





4.3.4 Self-estimation across motor and cognitive domains 
 
In order to address whether there was any difference in self-estimation on the 
cognitive tasks between patients who over- or underestimated their motor skills on 
the VATA-M, a mixed ANOVA was conducted on discrepancy scores with task at 
three levels (story recall, rule finding and concept switching, and apple cancellation) 
as the within-subjects factor, and VATA-M self-estimation group at three levels 
(underestimators, aware, overestimators) as the between-subjects factor. The main 
effect of VATA-M self-estimation group was significant [F(2, 28) = 8.16, p < .01]; 
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests revealed that the over-estimators (M = 17.86, SD 
= 28.54) were significantly more likely to also over-estimate their cognitive scores 
than the aware group (M = -5.75, SD = 20.81) and the underestimators (M = -4.59, 
SD = 18.49) [both p < .01] but these groups did not differ significantly from each 
other (see Figure 4.8). There was no significant effect of task [F(2, 56) = 2.14, ns] or 
interaction between task and awareness group [F(4, 56) = .49, ns]. The 
overestimators - patients classified as unaware of their motor deficits on this standard 
anosognosia test – were also more likely to overestimate their ability in tasks 
assessing memory, attention and executive function, suggesting a global 





Figure 4.8. BCoS task discrepancy scores by VATA-M self-estimation group. 
 
4.3.5 Relationship between task ability and self-estimation: findings 
and methodological issues 
 
To address whether ability on memory, executive function and attention tasks was 
associated with self-estimation, correlation analysis was run on the actual scores and 
discrepancy scores of the story recall, rule finding and concept switching and apple 
cancellation. For each of these tasks, actual scores were significantly negatively 
correlated with discrepancy scores; memory [r = -.56, p < .001], rule finding and 
concept switching [r = -.43, p < .05], apple cancellation [r = -.48, p < .01]. Similarly, 
VATA-M caregiver scores (which are proxy for actual ability) were significantly 
negatively correlated with discrepancy scores [r = -48, p < .001]. 
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However, there is a methodological issue with these correlations, which may reflect a 
more general flaw in the use of discrepancy scores as a measure of awareness. 
Discrepancy scores are statistically dependent upon performance level; if a patient 
does exceptionally well on a task, they can only misestimate their performance in a 
downwards direction, whereas those at the bottom end of the performance 
distribution can only misestimate upwards. This limits the potential level of 
‘awareness’ than can be elicited at different points on the performance scale. 
Considering the VATA-M, for example, a patient with a caregiver score of 12 (i.e. 
mild motor impairment) can be, at most, classified as mildly anosognosic, but this is 
a measurement constraint imposed by their actual score; they may be as completely 
unaware of their weakness as someone with total hemiparesis and a classification of 
severe anosognosia. They may have the same underlying pathology and the same 
cognitive profile, but their anosognosia classification would be different.  
To illustrate this issue, Figure 4.9 shows the correlation between caregiver ratings on 
the VATA-M and discrepancy scores. Participants with very high levels of 
impairment (high caregiver scores) have a far larger magnitude of potential 
overestimation than underestimation, and vice versa for those with low caregiver 
scores; scores cannot vary to the same level in both directions at all points of the 
scale. Potentially, it is these constraints that are driving the correlation between 
performance and self-estimation, as much as any differences in awareness of motor 
skill. Furthermore, it has been observed that where two variables are imperfectly 
correlated, for example actual and estimated scores, regression to the mean alone can 
explain why people at the high and low extreme ends of performance would 
underestimate and overestimate respectively (Krueger & Mueller, 2002). Greater 
overestimation of performance among the most impaired patients may therefore be 





Figure 4.9. Correlation between VATA-M caregiver scores and discrepancy scores. 
 
Unlike much research into anosognosia, this study did not limit the patient group to 
those exhibiting severe levels of weakness or paralysis. This may account for why 
relatively high levels of underestimation were detected within this patient group, 
unlike other studies using the VATA format (Cocchini et al., 2010; Della Sala et al., 
2009), In fact, the mean discrepancy score of the overestimators was almost identical 
to the mean discrepancy score, in the opposite direction, of the underestimators; 
approximately 12 points, or one point discrepancy per item. The distribution of 
scores across the whole group was reasonably normal and centred on a mean close to 






Figure 4.10. Frequency histogram of VATA-M discrepancy scores distribution. 
 
Restricting the sample to a more homogenous, severely impaired group would have 
reduced the contribution of variation in caregiver scores to the discrepancy scores, 
and so shifted the mean of this distribution to the right. However, this clear 
continuous distribution of scores does raise an important issue; if observed levels of 
underestimation are equivalent in degree to overestimation, then can it be assumed 
that direct correspondence between self- and caregiver-rated evaluations – represents 
a true baseline of awareness? Moreover, does divergence from this baseline towards 
overestimation represent anosognosia, or just equivalent misestimation to 
underestimation, viewed through a different lens of performance?  
One way to address this is to consider whether there is something qualitatively 
different about the cognitive and emotional profile of those who overestimate. On 
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examination of the data, the overestimators, as a group, had lower functional status, 
greater levels of cognitive impairment (overall and specifically in the domain of 
attention and executive function) and a tendency towards a greater frequency of right 
hemisphere lesions. The underestimators, far from being similar, actually fell further 
along a continuum in the opposite direction (i.e. higher function) that the aware 
group, albeit non-significantly. This may suggest that underestimation is associated 
with higher functional and cognitive status. However, the VATA-M scores caregiver 
scores, upon which self-estimation (discrepancy scores) are dependent, are 
associated with the functional and cognitive measures (see Table 6). Therefore, the 
apparent relationship between self-estimation and these measures, may actually be 
driven by the underlying correlation with caregiver scores.  
 
 Barthel Index Attention domain score Global cognition score 
VATA-M caregiver rating -.84** -.43** -.34* 
Barthel Index 1 .35* .27 
Attention domain score  1 .72** 
Global cognition score   1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
 
Table 4.6. Correlations between VATA-M caregiver ratings, Barthel Index scores, 
and BCoS Attention and Executive Function and Global Cognition proportion scores. 
Similar issues arise when attempting to compare discrepancy scores for a task that 
has wide variation in performance, across different levels of another variable. For 
example, when investigating how self-estimation on the apple cancelation task varies 
according to VATA-M classification, a simple ANOVA on the apple cancellation 
discrepancy scores, with awareness group as the between-subjects factor, reveals a 
significant effect of group [F(2, 37) = 3.82, p < .05]; Bonferroni corrected post-hoc 
tests reveal that the patients classed as overestimators on the VATA-M, also 
overestimate their apple cancellation scores (M = 10.18, SD = 16.51), compared to 
the underestimators (M = -10.70, SD = 16.51) [p < .05], but not the aware group (M 
= -6.53 , SD = 21.48). This would seem to support the idea of a generalised deficit of 
awareness that extends to the domains of both motor skill and spatial attention. 
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But if the same analysis is run with type of score (actual or estimated) as a within-
subjects factor, still keeping VATA-M classification as between-subjects factor, 
there is no significant main effect of awareness group [F(2, 37) = 1.77, ns] or type of 
score (actual or estimated) [F(1, 37) = .57, ns]. In this case, it is the interaction that is 
significant [F(2, 37) = 3.82, p < .05]. While Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests did 
not reveal any specific differences between groups, looking at Figure 4.11, it is 
apparent that the estimated scores are very similar across groups, while the actual 
scores decrease; what appeared in the previous analysis to be a deficit of awareness 
might more rightly be described as a deficit in performance. As apple-cancellation 
self-estimation scores are subject to the same regression-to-the-mean effects as 
VATA-M self-ratings, it may be that any between-group differences in discrepancy 
are driven chiefly (or even, in principle, entirely) by variation in actual performance, 
not in self-awareness. To avoid this tricky statistical confound it would be necessary 
to disentangle skill on the task from performance level; for instance, to match all of 
the patients for task performance before investigating differences in self-estimation.  
 





This study investigated whether patients who over- or underestimated their motor 
skills showed similar misestimation of their performance in tasks of memory and 
attention and executive function, in the acute stages after a stroke. In addition, it 
investigated whether global cognition, domain-specific cognition, and self-reported 
low mood or tiredness and confusion were associated with over-/underestimation of 
function in these domains. A group of 53 stroke patients, with diverse levels of 
physical ability, were grouped according to whether they were aware of their levels 
of motor ability, or under- or overestimated this on Visual Analogue Test of 
Anosognosia for Motor Impairments (VATA-M). The groups were compared to each 
other, in terms of their cognitive ability and self-reported emotional state, to address 
whether overestimators appeared similar to underestimators or whether there were 
features that characterised overestimation as uniquely anosognosic.  
The investigation of underestimation as well as overestimation was an important 
aspect of this study that, to my knowledge, has not been considered in previous 
anosognosia research. The observation that, among a stroke sample with diverse 
motor ability, underestimation was just as prevalent as overestimation in both degree 
and magnitude, raises some important questions for stroke research. First, it 
highlights the dependency of discrepancy scores, and the associated anosognosia 
classification, on actual levels of motor ability, which are reflected in caregiver 
ratings. Secondarily to this, as outlined in section 4.3.5, any apparent associations 
between discrepancy scores and other measures of functional ability, cognition and 
mood, may be partly accounted for by underlying associations between these 
measures and caregiver ratings. 
Most research addresses these issues by restricting the patient sample to those with 
moderate to severe motor problems, and comparing those who overestimate 
(anosognosics) to those whose rating agree with their caregivers (non-anosognosics). 
However, the findings of this study challenge this method. In addition to the fact that 
regression to the mean guarantees more severe levels of overestimation at the 
extreme of the performance scale, the fact that some patients who were very able to 
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move rated themselves so much worse than their caregivers, suggests that 
concordance between self- and caregiver-ratings cannot be assumed to be the 
baseline against which overestimation is compared. Moreover, there may be factors 
other than a specific awareness deficit linked the impaired function that contribute to 
any individual’s baseline level of self-estimation. 
What are the candidate factors that would influence whether someone is likely to 
underestimate or overestimate? From this study, the cognitive and emotional profile 
of patients who overestimated their ability consisted of higher levels of functional 
impairment, cognitive impairment and specific deficits in the domains of attention 
and executive function. There was also a higher proportion of right-brain-damaged 
(RBD) patients present in the overestimators group, compared to the 
underestimators. There were no differences in self-reported mood between the 
groups, though it may be that relatively low participant numbers and high variation 
in mood scores meant that this sample lacked power to detect differences. 
Descriptively, the underestimators reported higher levels of tiredness and confusion, 
which proved to be an important predictor of self-estimation on some of the 
cognitive tasks. These results suggest that there may be something qualitatively 
different about misestimation at different ends of the scale of ability, though (as 
discussed above) these results may also reflect the underlying association between 
functional and cognitive status, and motor skill. 
While the data cannot distinguish between these two interpretations, the difference in 
distribution of RBD and LBD patients in the overestimators and underestimators 
group does suggest the differences between the groups are more than statistical 
artefacts. LBD and RBD patients did not differ significantly in their caregiver 
VATA-M caregiver scores; LBD M= 15.67, SD = 9.80, RBD M = 21.69, SD = 
10.97, [t(36) = -1.63, ns]. However, the overestimators group included 92% RBD 
patients, whereas only 33% of the patients in the underestimators group were RBD. 
Therefore, in addition to any statistical influence of performance on misestimation, 
as well as any more global cognitive or emotional differences, it is likely that the 
overestimators group contained a subset of RBD patients with a typically 
anosognosic profile, marked by an impairment to the left side of space and associated 
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unawareness of weakness or paralysis on the left side of the body, that led them to 
overstate their ability to carry out actions.    
In addition to the VATA-M – a standard measure of motor skill awareness – this 
study also incorporated three measures of self-estimation in the domains of memory 
and attention and executive function, by asking the patients to rate their performance 
on subtests of the Birmingham Cognitive Screen (BCoS), and comparing these 
ratings with actual scores. As with the VATA-M, these scores were examined in 
order to see whether global cognition, domain-specific cognition and self-rated mood 
predicted over-/underestimation on each measure. Unlike the VATA-M, which has 
cut-offs that divide the scale into categorical levels of awareness, scores on the 
cognitive self-estimation measures were measured as a continuous variable, and were 
used as outcome measures rather than grouping variables. There were no cognitive or 
mood measures that predicted self-estimation scores on the executive function task. 
For both the memory and spatial attention task, those patients who felt themselves to 
be more tired and confused also tended to underestimate their actual scores. The two 
tasks differed, however, in the profile of cognitive impairments that predicted over- 
or underestimation. For the memory task, lower global cognitive scores overall 
predicted overestimation, but not scores specifically in the memory domain. 
Conversely, for the spatial attention task, it was scores in the attention domain that 
were significant predictors, but not global cognition.  
This pattern may be partly explained by examination of actual and estimated scores 
on the cognitive tasks. While left-brain-damaged (LBD) and right-brain-damaged 
(RBD) patients did not differ on their memory task scores, RBD were worse at the 
attention domain tasks, and had much higher variation within the group. In 
particular, for the apple cancellation task, measuring spatial attention, RBD patients 
scored, on average, over 20% lower than the LBD patients but estimated themselves 
at only approximately 3% worse. This suggests that, within the RBD group, there 
was a sub-group of neglect patients who were quite severely impaired on the spatial 
attention task (probably because of unilateral neglect) and unaware of this fact. It is 
likely that these patients drove the association between attention domain scores and 
overestimation on the apple cancellation task.  
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The last, and perhaps most important, finding was that those patients who 
overestimated their ability on the VATA-M also overestimated on the cognitive tests, 
compared to both the aware group and the underestimators, who did not differ from 
each other. This finding, which is contrary to the dissociations frequently reported in 
the literature, could point towards a more global awareness deficit underlying 
anosognosia. It suggests that, not only is overestimation associated with a 
qualitatively distinct cognitive profile, but it may also extend across both motor and 
cognitive domains. Of course, the same caveat applies as outlined above in relation 
to the VATA-M; discrepancy scores on these cognitive tasks are dependent upon 
actual scores, and it is possible that between-group differences in self-estimation 
actually reflect an underlying association between motor ability and cognitive ability 
across the various domains. In this case, however, VATA-M caregiver scores were 
not significantly correlated with performance on any of these tasks, though there was 
a trend towards significance for the attention and executive function tasks; story 
recall [r = .09, ns], rule-finding and concept switching, [r = -.32, p = .06] apple 
cancellation [r = -.29, p = .06]. This suggests that, while performance factors may 
have contributed to these between group differences, the overestimators also had a 
specific difficulty in providing realistic assessments of their abilities, perhaps linked 
to lower cognitive functioning. The underestimators, conversely, may have retained 
the cognitive skills to assess their ability, and also to be aware of the fatigue and 
disorientation following a stroke, which perhaps depressed their self-ratings below 
their actual performance levels.    
Overall, these tasks provide a snapshot of the cognitive profile associated with over- 
and under-estimation of ability, complicated by differences in actual performance. 
However, the results are fully compatible with an interpretation of self-awareness 
having both domain-specific and global components. On one level, there emerged a 
distinct cognitive profile, much more common among patients with right hemisphere 
lesions, marked by low functional status, specific deficits in attention and executive 
function and anosognosia for hemiplegia. Yet the influence of global cognition and 
self-rated tiredness/confusion on memory self-estimation scores, and the consistency 
of overestimation across motor and cognitive domains where actual performance was 
only marginally related (and where overestimation was not disproportionately high 
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among RBD patients) is suggestive of a second, more global component to the over-
estimation of ability. This may reflect over-optimistic self-appraisal, which could 
have resulted from cognitive changes after a stroke.  
Because of a fairly small sample size, and the variation in performance, the above 
inferences are speculative. Particularly given the potential influence of performance 
level itself upon any estimate of self-awareness, it would be beneficial to standardise 
performance to equivalent levels across participants before addressing issues of self-
awareness. This presents a challenge with clinical data, as each patient’s profile of 
impairments is contingent upon the location and extent of neurological damage. For 
example, it is difficult to envisage how LBD and RBD patients could be matched for 
performance on a task of unilateral neglect. It may be less of a challenge, however, 
when investigating self-awareness in neurologically intact individuals. These issues 
are considered in much greater depth in the next chapter, which investigates how the 
self-monitoring of motor performance varies according to skill level in healthy 




Movement self-monitoring in healthy younger 




5.1.1 Motor intentions and control: from AHP to normal self-
monitoring 
 
Many recent models of AHP are based upon the premise that the disorder stems from 
defective motor intention systems. Foremost among these is the comparator model 
presented by Frith et al. (2000). The authors provide a comprehensive overview of 
different disorders of bodily awareness, and how they can potentially be explained 
within a system of movement control and learning. Central to their theory is the 
supposition that movement self-monitoring depends upon the actions of two types of 
internal model, controllers and predictors. Whenever a movement is initiated, 
controllers select and generate motor commands based on the discrepancy between 
the actual state of the system and the desired state. Using these motor commands, the 
predictors calculate the expected sensory consequences of the movement. Then, once 
the movement has been performed, sensory feedback can be used to estimate the new 
state of the system, while discrepancies between the desired and predicted state can 
be used to modify the actions of the controllers and predictors.  
Crucially for the anosognosia model, much of the motor activity described above 
occurs outside of conscious awareness. Frith et al. (2000) suggest that because the 
actual and predicted outcomes of actions typically correspond closely, the system 
functions most efficiently by emphasising outcomes that are unexpected; only 
sensory feedback that deviates strongly from the system’s predictions reaches 
conscious awareness (see also Blakemore et al., 2002). According to the model, 
patients with anosognosia continue to generate motor commands and predictions 
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about the sensory consequences of movement. However, the discrepancy between 
predicted and actual outcome, which would normally flag movement errors to 
conscious awareness, goes undetected, either because of the unavailability of sensory 
information or neglect of this information. Because there is no awareness of error, 
the functioning of the predictor is not updated; instead it continues to make 
predictions, assuming that movements are executed successfully, and the AHP 
patient retains an erroneous awareness of being able to move based on the efferent 
motor commands, see Figure 5.1 (Frith et al., 2000). 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Model of anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). Movement specification is 
generated as normal, but paralysis prevents the movement occurring. Discrepancies 
between the actual state and predicted state of the limb are ignored, so that it 
appears the predicted state matches the desired state, i.e. the movement has been 
executed successfully. Reprinted from “Abnormalities in the awareness and control 
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of action” by C. D. Frith, S. J. Blakemore and D. M. Wolpert, 2000, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 355(1404), p.  
1781. Copyright The Royal Society. 
 
The Frith et al. (2000) model is not the only explanation for AHP based upon faulty 
motor intention systems. For example, the feed-forward model of Heilman et al. 
(1998) suggests that AHP occurs because anosognosic patients never generate motor 
commands and so are never able to discover that the limb failed to move. These 
competing theories have provided testable predictions that facilitated the adoption of 
a more experimental approach to AHP (Jenkinson & Fotopooulou, 2010). For 
example, if AHP patients do generate motor commands to the paralysed limb, they 
should also exhibit interference from these commands on actions performed by the 
intact limb. In a single case study, Pia et al. (2013) demonstrated temporal coupling 
effects in a patient with AHP. When the patient reached for an easy target with his 
right hand, while simultaneously instructed to attempt to reach for a difficult target 
with his paretic left hand, the right hand reaction times were slowed. The authors 
interpret this as evidence of interference from the motor programme of the paralysed 
limb. The same effect was observed in 20 healthy controls but not in five hemiplegic 
patients without anosognosia, whose awareness of paralysis presumably prevented 
them from generating motor programmes (Pia et al. 2013). 
Similarly, Garbarini et al. (2012) demonstrated that AHP patients show bimanual 
coupling effects analogous to those seen in healthy controls. Three AHP patients, 
five hemiplegic patients without anosognosia and ten age-matched healthy controls 
completed a task requiring them to draw vertical lines with their right hand while 
simultaneously ‘drawing’ circles with their left hand. For the AHP patients and 
healthy controls, the vertical lines showed significant ovalization, suggesting that the 
motor plans for the left hand were interfering with the execution of movements of the 
right hand. Conversely, hemiplegic patients without anosognosia continued to 
produce straight lines, suggesting the absence of motor plans for the paralysed arm 
(Garbarini et al., 2012). Motor intentions in AHP patients have also been evidenced 
by perceptual changes. Using an ambiguously rotating figure, Piedimonte, Garbarini, 
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Pia, Mezzanato and Berti (2016) demonstrated that when AHP patients were 
instructed to press a key with either their left or right hand, they were more likely to 
judge the apparent motion as being in the same direction as the supposed key press, 
similarly to healthy controls. Conversely, hemiplegic patients without AHP showed 
no perceptual bias, similar to the performance of controls when instructed to 
undertake the task only using a right-handed key press.  
Other research has investigated whether AHP is contingent on the intention to move.  
For example, Fotopolou et al. (2008) examined if the ability of AHP patients to 
perceive limb movement, or lack of movement, varied according to whether they 
intended to move the limb. The authors substituted a rubber hand for the plegic real 
hand of four AHP patients and four hemiplegic patients without AHP, and instructed 
them to raise their (rubber) limb, or that the experimenter would raise it, or that no 
movement would occur. On half of the trials the experimenter moved the limb and 
on half they did not. They found that, while the AHP patients were largely correct in 
their responses, they were significantly more likely to perceive movement where 
none had occurred, but only if they had been instructed to raise the arm themselves. 
This appears to mirror the anosognosic state, whereby patients claim to have moved 
a plegic limb even in the absence of visual feedback of movement. Interestingly, 
when subsequently asked who had raised the arm in the self-generated movement 
trials, three of the four hemiplegic patients without AHP claimed to have done so 
themselves. These patients had exhibited full awareness during screening and were 
unable to account for why they were suddenly able to move their previously 
paralysed arm during the experiment (Fotopoulou et al., 2008). This suggests that 
apparent congruence between intended movements and visual feedback may be 
sufficient to override previous knowledge of hemiparesis and instigate a temporary 
anosognosic state. Not only can the motor system fail to notice a discrepancy 
between actual and intended movement outcomes, it can also be tricked into 
perceiving movement as self-generated. 
While investigations into the role of intention in AHP have suggested that motor 
programmes are intact, there is far less consensus on how the motor system’s 
comparator fails to notice a discrepancy between predicted and actual movement 
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outcomes. As outlined above, one possibility is that the necessary sensory feedback 
is unavailable or severely degraded, perhaps by hemianaesthesia, hemianopia or 
unilateral neglect (Frith et al., 2000; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010). In support of 
this idea, the co-occurrence of these conditions, particularly neglect, has been widely 
documented (Appelros et al., 2002; Buxbaum et al., 2004). However, there have also 
been dissociations observed, and neither sensory loss nor inattention could be 
considered sufficient to give rise to AHP (Marcel et al., 2004; Orfei et al., 2007). 
This suggests that the absence of feedback alone cannot explain why some 
hemiplegic patients remain unaware of their movement failures.  
In addition to neglect or somatosensory loss, another mechanism underlying failed 
error monitoring in AHP is suggested by the finding that awareness deficits can 
extend beyond actions performed by the plegic limb. Jenkinson, Edelstyn, Drakeford 
and Ellis (2009) asked a group of hemiplegic patients with and without AHP, as well 
as healthy controls, to perform movements, imagine performing them or watch the 
experimenter perform them. In a subsequent test phase, the authors found that AHP 
patients made significantly more errors in recalling which movements had been 
performed, observed or imagined than patients without AHP and healthy volunteers. 
Interestingly, the patients without AHP also made errors uncharacteristic of the 
controls, particularly a tendency to say they had performed actions that had only 
been observed or imagined. From this, the authors suggest that problems in 
monitoring movements may be one component of a more global deficit in reality 
monitoring, that these problems arise from damage to the motor system and that they 
form a continuum from the neurologically intact controls, through hemiplegic 
patients, to the extreme deficits of AHP patients (Jenkinson et al., 2009). 
Research into motor awareness in healthy individuals provides some evidence of 
limitations in the ability to monitor movements. It has been demonstrated that 
movements can be selected or altered without the involvement of conscious volition 
(Goodale, Pelisson & Prablanc, 1986; Haggard, 2005). Even the subjective 
experience of intending to move has been hypothesised to arise as a consequence of 
initiating an action, rather than an antecedent (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002; 
Libet, 1993; Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983). The perturbed feedback 
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experiments of Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998) have also been instrumental in this 
respect. By putting visual feedback of movement at a discrepancy with actually 
executed movements, the authors demonstrated that most participants were unable to 
judge how their hand movements deviated from the false trajectory shown, so 
highlighting the dominance of visual over proprioceptive information, and/or the 
unavailability of proprioceptive signals to movement monitoring (Fourneret & 
Jeannerod, 1998). However, this experiment involved a level of deception 
uncharacteristic of the anosognosic state. Patients with AHP maintain that they are 
able to move their limb, even in the presence of visual information to the contrary, 
whereas the participants in Fourneret and Jeannerod’s 1998 experiments, like the 
hemiplegic patients who became temporarily anosognosic in Fotopoulou et al. 
(2008), were induced into false belief by the provision of visual feedback that 
matched their intention.  
In an interesting single case study, using a similar experimental set-up to Fourneret 
and Jeannerod (1998), Preston et al., (2010) demonstrated that an anosognosic 
patient was unable to detect large visual perturbations to reaching movements made 
with the unaffected arm; even with perturbations as large as 20°, the patient reported 
that the observed movement trajectory matched the movement he had made. 
Conversely, controls were typically able to detect the perturbations at between 4° and 
8°. To account for this, the authors propose that increased noise in the motor system 
caused it to relax its threshold for error signalling to a pathological extent, so that all 
movements were considered to be self-produced, regardless of how discrepant they 
were from intended movements (Preston et al., 2010). From this it follows that a 
degree of leniency must be incorporated within the motor systems of healthy 
individuals, in order to tolerate the minor discrepancies between the predicted and 
actual consequences of actions that nonetheless do not otherwise interfere with the 
successful execution of movements. Without it, automatic corrective movements 
could all reach conscious awareness, which would be a cumbersome and inefficient 
way for the motor system to function. 
The above research suggests that aspects of the extreme awareness deficits of AHP 
may be the pathological extension of normal self-monitoring processes, as much as a 
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specific neurological impairment, independent of the primary motor deficit. 
Furthermore, if the motor system can tolerate a level of discrepancy between 
intentions and outcomes without our being consciously aware of this, then it is also 
possible that neurologically intact individuals differ in the threshold that must be 
reached in order to become conscious of motor errors. If the error threshold depends 
upon the ‘noise’ inherent within the motor system, as Preston et al. (2010) suggest, 
then the accuracy of motor self-monitoring may depend upon the accuracy of 
movement; people with smaller motor errors may be more sensitive to their own 
mistakes. At the other end of the scale, a type of ‘anosognosia’ may be observed, 
whereby people with larger motor errors struggle to monitor when movements have 
been performed successfully. To my knowledge, there is no research that directly 
addresses this question within the motor domain.  
5.1.2. The Dunning-Kruger effect: ‘The anosognosia of everyday life’ 
 
The question of how ability influences awareness has been investigated extensively 
in the cognitive literature, specifically through the mechanism of the ‘Dunning-
Kruger’ effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger & Kruger, 
2003; Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning & Kruger, 2008). Across a range of 
cognitive and naturalistic tasks, it has been demonstrated that the lowest-skilled 
individuals tend to overestimate their ability relative to their actual performance, 
whereas better more highly skilled participants tend to underestimate it. This 
phenomenon was originally presented by Kruger and Dunning (1999) in relation to 
humour, logical reasoning and English grammar. It has since been replicated for 
several different activities and participant groups, including psychology 
undergraduates’ self-assessments of academic exam performance (Dunning at al., 
2003), firearms knowledge among ‘Trap and Skeet’ competition entrants (Ehrlinger 
et al., 2008), the interpersonal skills of first year medical residents (Hodges, Regehr 
& Martin, 2001), and the professional competence of specimen processing personnel 
(Haun, Zeringue, Leach & Foley, 2000). 
In addition to overestimation and the low end of the performance scale and 
underestimation at the high end, an essential component of the Dunning-Kruger 
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effect is asymmetry of the estimation error, whereby the magnitude of overestimation 
exceeds that of underestimation. It is the poor performers specifically who are 
considered to have a problem appreciating their own lack of ability. To account for 
this, Kruger and Dunning (1999) suggest that for many tasks the skills required to be 
competent are likely to be the same skills required to monitor competence; lacking 
these skills, the worst performers are both unable to do the task and unaware of this 
fact (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Conversely, better performing 
individuals have the skills to judge themselves as competent, however they 
mistakenly presume others to be equivalently competent, and so underestimate their 
own performance in comparison, falling prey to a ‘false consensus’ effect (Ross, 
Greene, & House, 1977). In support of this explanation, Kruger and Dunning (1999) 
found that observing the good performance of others did little to modify the self-
estimation of poor performers, however observing the relative lack of skill among 
their peers encouraged the high-performers to adjust their own relative self-
assessments upwards. Observation of peer performance had no impact on estimates 
of raw scores, only estimates of their percentile ranking compared to others, which 
the authors suggest follows the predictions of a false consensus effect (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999). 
In their original paper, Kruger and Dunning explicitly refer to this overestimation 
among poor performers as a “psychological analogue to anosognosia” (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999, p. 1130). This idea was elaborated further by David Dunning in a 
New York Times interview: 
“You could think of the Dunning-Kruger Effect as a psychological version of this 
physiological problem. If you have, for lack of a better term, damage to your 
expertise or imperfection in your knowledge or skill, you’re left literally not knowing 
that you have that damage.” (Morris, 2010) 
However, this interpretation of the Dunning Kruger effect has not gone 
unchallenged. As Krajč and Ortmann (2007) point out, there are three aspects of the 
Dunning-Kruger effect that require explanation; the overestimation apparent for low 
performers, the underestimation of good performers, and the asymmetry of the error. 
Various commentators have proposed alternative explanations for this pattern of 
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results, based upon statistical mechanisms such as regression to the mean, or 
participants’ responses to tasks of varying difficulty. 
Accounts of the Dunning-Kruger effect based on the regressive nature of self-
assessment have provided some of the most prevalent alternatives to metacognitive 
explanations (Ackerman, Beier & Bowen, 2002; Moore & Healy, 2008; Moore & 
Small, 2007). Krueger and Mueller (2002) present an interpretation of the Dunning-
Kruger effect based on a dual mechanism. First, imperfect correlation between the 
predictor variable (typically performance percentile) and predicted variable 
(estimated performance percentile) leads to overestimation among the worst 
performers and underestimation among the better performers, through regression to 
the mean. Secondly, the ‘better than average’ (BTA) effect  – a phenomenon by 
which the majority of people rate themselves as better than their peers (Alicke & 
Govorun, 2005) - raises the regression line, making the overestimation seem 
comparatively greater than underestimation, and so accounting for the asymmetry of 
the estimation error. To test this, the authors identified several candidate mediator 
variables and conducted partial correlations, controlling for each of these. There was 
little or no reduction in the correlation between estimated and actual performance 
percentiles, suggesting no mediator variables were involved. The authors propose 
that regression to an inflated mean is the most parsimonious explanation, without 
recourse to metacognitive accounts.  
A similar interpretation is provided by Moore and Small (2007). The authors note 
that the BTA effect only arises on easy tasks; on difficult tasks, people tend to rate 
themselves worse than average (see also Kruger, 1999). They argue that a process of 
differential regression can account for this; people possess better information about 
their own performance than about others’ performance, which can only be guessed 
by estimating group base rates. For easy tasks, the base rates are more likely to be 
underestimated, and so one’s own performance will be over-estimated in 
comparison, and vice-versa for difficult tasks. Imperfect information about our own 
performance causes self-ratings to be regressive but less regressive than our ratings 
of others. However, providing better information about the performance of others 
should reverse this effect. To test this hypothesis, the authors ran an experiment, 
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requiring participants to judge the weight of people in photographs; one-third of the 
participants received feedback about their own task performance and one-third 
received feedback about the average performance of a previous group of participants. 
The final third received no feedback and acted as a baseline condition. On the 
difficult version of the task, those participants who received feedback only about 
themselves, rated themselves as worse that average, whereas those who received 
feedback about the (poor) performance of others rated themselves as better. Simply 
having information that someone has performed poorly makes it more likely they 
will be judged worse than others (Moore & Small, 2007).  
If the Dunning-Kruger effect can be explained by regression to the mean combined 
with BTA effects, and if BTA effects depend on the difficulty of the task, then the 
observed asymmetry of estimation error should also be mediated by task difficulty. 
This was investigated by Burson, Larrick and Klayman (2005) who argued, contrary 
to Dunning and Kruger (1999), that all people are equally unable to judge their own 
performance relative to that of their peers. Because all people judge themselves 
better than average on easy tasks, the actual best performers will seem to have better 
insight into their own performance. However, on difficult tasks, all people under-
estimate their relative standing, and so the poor performers should seem better 
calibrated than the good performers. Across three different experiments, the authors 
demonstrated that the asymmetry of overestimation versus underestimation can be 
eradicated or reversed, if the task is sufficiently difficult (Burson et al., 2005).  
 
5.1.3. Aims and hypotheses 
 
The current study examines whether a form of ‘anosognosia’ for performance can be 
observed among the worst performers on a motor task, as well as a more cognitive 
visual memory task. As far as I am aware, this is the first attempt to establish an 
association between motor skill and the quality of self-monitoring in healthy 
individuals. Prior research (for example Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998) has 
demonstrated that people are often unable to evaluate their movements, but such 
studies typically employ perturbed feedback paradigms and do not investigate 
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individual differences in ability. In this study, as far as possible, the methodology 
mirrored clinical confrontation approaches to anosognosia, whereby patients are 
often judged according to whether they claim to have performed specific movements 
to command. In a trial by trial method, participants were required to touch or click on 
a circular target, which was removed from view at the moment they initiated a 
movement, and then judge whether they had hit or missed each target immediately 
afterwards. 
This is a different approach to the typical Dunning-Kruger paradigm, which asks 
participants to provide global estimates of their raw scores, or their performance 
relative to their peers.  This method limits the comparisons that can be made with 
classic cognitive overestimation studies, however it allows for a more detailed 
analysis, capable of separating participants’ accuracy from their bias in self-
monitoring, within a signal-detection framework. In addition to calculating overall 
estimated error, by subtracting the total number of successful trials from the 
estimated number of successful trials, I also used the number of correctly classified 
hits and incorrectly classified misses (false alarms) to calculate participants’ 
sensitivity d’ and criterion scores. The former provides a measure of accuracy, and 
the latter bias towards a liberal or conservative threshold, i.e. over- or under-
estimation. If the results follow a Dunning-Kruger type pattern, then two clear 
predictions emerge; first there should be a positive association between actual 
performance and sensitivity to performance, and secondly criterion should be lower 
(more liberal) at the lower end of the scale, reflecting the asymmetry of over-
estimation among poor performers, relative to the under-estimation of good 
performers.  
As discussed above, the asymmetry of estimation error may be contingent on the 
difficulty of the task, with the magnitude of over-estimation being greater only for 
relatively easy tasks. In all three of the following experiments, different levels of 
difficulty were included in a within-subjects design through the inclusions of radii of 
various sizes. However this measure was manipulated differently in Experiment 1 to 
Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 1, the radii of the five different targets were kept 
at the same sizes across participants, to allow a natural range of performance. In 
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Experiment 2, radius sizes were individually calibrated to each participant in order to 
maintain equivalent performance across participants at five stages of difficultly. The 
main advantage of this methodology was that it allowed participants at different 
levels of skill on the task to be matched on performance, and thereby separate task 
skill from self-monitoring skill. In Experiment 3 I used the same task with a group of 
older adult participants, matching their performance with the young adults in 
Experiment 2, in order to compare how self-monitoring changes with age. While 
Experiment 1 was actually run after Experiments 2 and 3, this order of presentation 
was chosen because it allows for a clearer conceptual progression.  
Finally, while the primary interest of this study was the motor task, a visual memory 
task was included to determine whether any relationship between skill and self-
monitoring is unique to motor performance, or can also be observed in a different, 
more cognitive task. Just as pathological unawareness of deficit may be observed in 
cognitive as well as physical tasks (Marcel et al., 2004), skill-dependent self-
monitoring deficits in neurologically intact populations may also be apparent in 




5.2 Experiment 1 
 




25 participants took part in Experiment 1. All were students at the University of 
Edinburgh, and completed the study either for course credit or for payment of £7. 
Participants were 5 male, 20 female, with a mean age of 21.68 (SD = 3.30), 15.24 
mean (SD = 2.92) years of education and a mean LOT-R score of 13.80 (SD = 5.07). 
Twenty-four participants were classified as right-handed by the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), with a score of ≥ 40 out of 100 (M = 73.73, 
SD = 22.40). One participant was classified as left handed, with a score of -40. All 
participants completed the task with their dominant hand. 
5.2.1.2 Measures and equipment 
 
The experimental measures were divided into two tasks; a motor task, containing 
three stages, and a visual memory task, containing two stages. Both tasks were run 
on an HP Envy Rove touchscreen computer, active display area 423.33 x 238.13mm 
(resolution1600 x 900 pixels). The tasks were created in the Labview programming 
environment (National Instruments) and are described individually below. In all 
cases, targets were white and circular, and presented on a black background. All 
tasks were operated using a custom-made button, shaped like a computer mouse, 
positioned 350mm centrally in front of the screen. 
 
5.2.1.3 Motor task methods 
5.2.1.3.1 General methods 
 
The motor task was completed in three stages. Participants were seated centrally in 
front of the computer and instructed to press down the button, which initiated the 
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appearance of the target. They were then instructed to move their finger to touch the 
target as quickly and accurately as possible. Their time was recorded from the 
moment they released the button. For the motor threshold stage 1 and feedback stage 
2, a successful hit caused the target to turn green, a miss caused it to turn red and 
failure to touch the screen within the allowed time limit caused the entire screen to 
turn red. The screen remained in this state until the participants pressed down the 
button again, to make the white target reappear against a black background. No 
performance feedback was given in the self-monitoring stage 3.  
In all stages of the motor task, an invisible 'penumbra' of 4 pixels (1.06mm) around 
the circumference of the target was included in the hit zone. This was done to 
minimise the instances where a trial was recorded as a miss, even though part of the 
participant’s fingertip appeared to overlap the target, because the pixel at which the 
touch was registered was narrowly outside the target. Without such a penumbra, it 
would be possible to have apparent hits recorded as misses, but never vice versa, 
which could have driven a systematic decrease in confidence, unrelated to task 
performance or metacognitive accuracy. With the penumbra, it was also possible for 
an apparent near miss to be recorded as a hit, so any effect on confidence would not 
be in a specific direction.   
5.2.1.3.2 Stage 1: Motor task threshold 
 
This brief stage was included to ensure participants were able to touch the screen 
reliably within a pre-determined timescale of 709 milliseconds. This threshold was 
selected because it was two standard deviations above the mean movement time of 
the 28 participants in Experiment 2, which was run prior to Experiment 1 but is 
described second for clarity of presentation. The target had a set radius of 20 pixels 
(5.29mm) and appeared in the centre of the screen. The first ten trials were given as 
practice trials, after which the programme quit as soon as the participant completed 
ten consecutive trials with a touch rate – hit or miss status - within the 709ms 




5.2.1.3.3. Stage 2: Motor task with feedback 
 
The feedback stage gave participants practice in performing the task and provided 
them with information about their performance ability. It involved the presentation of 
eight targets, sized at 2, 6, 10, 14, 18, 22, 26 and 30 pixels (0.53mm, 1.59mm, 
2.65mm, 3.70mm, 4.77mm, 5.82mm, 6.88mm, 7.94mm) radius, at random locations 
within an 800-pixel-square centered virtual box. Participants were required to touch 
the target within the allowed time of 709ms. The full set of targets was presented, in 
a randomized order, in 21 epochs of eight trials (20 experimental epochs preceded by 
one practice), thus for a total of 160 experimental trials. The number of hits and 
timeouts were recorded, along with the response time between releasing the button 
and touching the screen. 
5.2.1.3.4 Stage 3: Motor self-monitoring 
 
This was the main experimental measure, where participants competed the task 
without feedback, instead providing their own estimates of success and failure. It 
involved the presentation of five targets, with radii of 2, 9, 16, 23 and 30 pixels 
(0.53mm, 2.38mm, 4.23mm, 6.09mm and 7.94mm), each with a 4-pixel penumbra, 
at random locations within an 800 pixels square centered virtual box. The 
performance of the task and time limit of 709ms was the same as in the previous 
stage. However, in this stage, the moment a movement was initiated the target 
disappeared from the screen. No feedback was provided. Instead, after each touch 
within the time limit, and after 500ms, a response box appeared in the centre of the 
screen, which participants used to indicate their estimation of success from four 
possible options, labelled (top-to-bottom): 1. Definite miss, 2. Probable miss, 3. 
Probable hit, 4. Definite hit. They then confirmed their selection by touching an OK 
button.  
As previously, the sequence of targets was presented 21 times (20 experimental sets 
preceded by one practice set), with the order of presentation randomized within each 
epoch, yielding a total of 100 experimental trials. The programme recorded the same 
information as above, as well as the number (1-4) corresponding to the participants’ 
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self-estimation on each trial. Scores of 1 and 2 were taken as estimated misses and 3 
and 4 as estimated hits.  
 
5.2.1.4 Visual memory task methods 
 
5.2.1.4.1 General methods 
 
The visual memory task was completed in two stages. As in the motor task, 
participants were seated centrally in front of the computer and instructed to press 
down the button, which initiated the appearance of the target. However, rather than 
touching the target, they were instructed to look at it and remember its location on 
the screen. Once they released the button, a 1000ms mask covered the screen, after 
which participants were instructed to click with the mouse, using a crosshairs icon, 
the location where the target had been presented. The targets had no penumbra, as 
this task utilized a mouse click rather than the touchscreen, and were presented at 
random locations within an 800 pixels square centered virtual box. There was no 
time limit for either observing the target or clicking on it once the button was 
released. 
5.2.1.4.2 Stage 1: Visual memory task with feedback 
 
As in the motor task, the feedback stage was included for practice and to provide 
participants with information about their performance levels. The eight different 
targets were sized at 2, 6, 10, 14, 18, 22, 26 and 30 pixels; a successful hit caused the 
target to turn green and a miss caused it to turn red. The screen remained in this state 
until the participants pressed down the button again, to make the white target 
reappear. Each sequence of targets was presented 21 times, in randomized order, 





5.2.1.4.3 Stage 2: Visual memory self-monitoring 
 
As in the motor task, the self-monitoring stage consisted of five targets, sized at 2, 9, 
16, 23 and 30 pixels. The procedure was identical to the previous stage until the 
point where participants clicked on the screen. Then, instead of being provided with 
feedback, participants were presented with the response box and required to estimate 
whether they had successfully clicked on the target by choosing one of the four 
options; 1. Definite miss, 2. Probable miss, 3. Probable hit, 4. Definite hit. The five 
targets were presented 21 times (20 experimental epochs preceded by one practice 
epoch), with order randomized within each epoch, giving a total of 100 experimental 
trials. Hit rates and self-estimation scores were recorded; scores of 1 and 2 were 
categorized as estimated misses and 3 and 4 as estimated hits.  
 
5.2.1.5 Questionnaire measures 
 
In addition to the experimental measures, participants also completed two 
questionnaires.  
5.2.1.5.1 The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI) 
 
The EHI (Oldfield, 1971) was administered to participants to estimate their degree of 
left- or right-handedness. The questionnaire lists 10 tasks, for example ‘Writing’ or 
‘Scissors’; for each of these, participants ticked ‘Left Hand’ or ‘Right Hand’ boxes to 
indicate their preference. Where this preference was so strong that they would only 
ever use the indicated hand, they were instructed to put two ticks. Or, if they were 
indifferent to which hand they use, they were instructed to tick both the left and right 
hand boxes. Scores were calculated by summing the ticks for each hand, subtracting 
the ‘Left Hand’ sum from the ‘Right Hand’ sum, diving this by the total number of 
ticks and multiplying by 100. Scores < -40 were designated left-handed, between -40 
and +40 ambidextrous, and > +40 right-handed.  
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5.2.1.5.2 The Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R) 
 
The LOT-R (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994) is a measure of general life optimism. 
It contains six statements, for example ‘In uncertain times I usually expect the best’ 
and ‘I hardly ever expect things to go my way’ and four filler items, e.g. ‘It’s 
important for me to keep busy.’ For each item, participants indicated the strength of 
their agreement or disagreement with the statement by selecting a number between 0 
- ‘strongly disagree’ to 4 – ‘strongly agree’. Total scores were calculated by 
disregarding the filler items, reverse scoring the negatively phrased items and then 
summing the responses; these could range from 0 – 24, with higher scores indicating 
greater life optimism.  
5.2.1.6 Procedure 
 
The experiment took place in a private testing cubicle at the University of Edinburgh. 
Participants were provided with an Information Sheet and given the opportunity to 
ask questions. They then completed a short data-sheet for demographic information 
and the EHI. The order of the motor and visual memory tasks was counterbalanced 
across participants, however the stages within each block were always given in the 
order described above, i.e. feedback stage preceding self-estimation stage.  
Instructions were provided on an Instruction Sheet, and the experimenter checked 
comprehension of each stage. Progress through the tasks was self-generated and 
participants were instructed to take breaks, as and when required, by pausing before 
pressing the button. The experimenter remained in the room for the motor threshold 
task and recorded scores manually. For all other stages of both tasks, the 
experimenter left the room after the practice trials. Once the experimental measures 
were finished, participants completed the LOT-R and were paid any necessary 
expenses. No formal debriefing was provided, though the experimenter answered 




5.2.1.7 Data screening and extraction 
 
5.2.1.7.1 Motor task 
 
For each participant, the proportion of timed-out trials was registered, and these trials 
were removed from subsequent analyses. After observation of the data, trials where 
the touch exceeded 100 pixels’ (26.46mm) distance from the centre of the target 
were considered errors and removed from the analysis (total 4 trials, .002%). This 
informal criterion was chosen in order to minimise data loss, while ensuring that any 
errors due to lapses in concentration, for example, were removed. The following 
variables were then extracted for each radius: 
 Actual hit rate: the proportion of touches within the target region  
 Estimated hit rate: the proportion of trials the participant judged as being 
either 3. Probable hit, or 4. Definite hit 
 Mean movement time (ms): the interval between the participant releasing the 
button and touching the screen 
 Mean distance, in pixels, from the centre of the target 
 
5.2.1.7.2 Visual memory task 
 
As this task was untimed, there were no timeouts. The same 100 pixels error 
threshold was used as for the motor task, resulting in the removal of 15 trials 
(.006%). The following variables were then extracted for each radius: 
 Actual hit rate: the proportion of touches within the target region 
 Estimated hit rate: the proportion of trials the participant judged as being 
either 3. Probable hit, or 4. Definite hit 
 Mean distance, in pixels, from the centre of the target 
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5.2.1.8 Data analysis 
 
Both the motor task the visual memory task were analysed as follows: 
5.2.1.8.1 Self-monitoring by task skill 
 
For each participant, data for the five different radii were combined and a signal 
detection framework used to calculate the following measures: 
 Proportion of correctly identified hits; p(correct_hit) = correctly identified 
hits/(correctly identified hits+ hits incorrectly identified as misses).  
 Proportion of false alarms; p(FA) = Misses mistakenly identified as 
hits/(misses mistakenly identified as hits + correctly identified misses). 
 Sensitivity d’ = z(p(correct_hit)) – z(p(FA)) 
 Criterion = (z(p(correct_hit))+ z(p(FA)))/2 
Sensitivity d’ scores provided a measure of how accurately participants were able to 
discriminate hits from misses. Criterion scores indexed how liberal or conservative 
the response threshold of each participant was, i.e. whether they were inclined to 
over- or underestimate. 
5.2.1.8.2 Self-monitoring by task difficulty 
 
Because each radius condition consisted of a maximum of 20 trials per participant, 
there were insufficient data to support the above signal detection analysis at each 
radius size. Instead, the quality (accuracy) of self-monitoring from trial-to-trial was 
quantified as the phi coefficient of correlation between hits and estimated hits. This 
was calculated separately for each participant at each radius size, and these 
coefficients were then converted using Fisher’s r – z  transformation and the mean 





5.2.1.8.3 Estimation errors and the Dunning-Kruger effect 
 
Each participant’s estimation error was calculated by subtracting their actual hit rate 
from their estimated hit rate, both averaged across radii. These were scores analysed 
according task performance, to address whether poor performers overestimated and 
good performers underestimated. Finally, to make the data compatible with the 
presentation of Kruger and Dunning (1999), the participants were split into four 
quartiles of performance. The magnitude of estimation error was compared across 
the top and bottom quartiles, to address whether the classic Dunning-Kruger 
asymmetry of error would be observed, whereby the magnitude of estimation error 






5.2.2. Experiment 1 Results 
 
5.2.2.1 Motor task 
 
Mean hit rate, estimated hit rate, timeout rate and movement time are shown for each 
of the five conditions of radius size and averaged across conditions in Table 5.1.  
 
Target radius 
size (pixels) 2 9 16 23 30 Average 
Actual 
proportion hits .09 (.12) .40 (.25) .62 (.25) .81 (.16) .88 (.11) .56 (.15) 
Estimated 
proportion hits .15 (.17) .41 (.26) .62 (.21) .77 (.16) .88 (.11) .56 (.14) 
Proportion 
timeouts .11 (.12) .10 (.12) .10 (.08) .09 (.12) .06 (.07) .09 (.08) 
Movement time 
(ms) 513 (99) 514 (98) 506 (99) 496 (96) 484 (90) 502 (95) 
 
Table 5.1. Motor Task: Mean actual proportion hits, estimated proportion hits, 
proportion timeouts and movement time. 
 
The mean estimated overall hit rate of .56 was identical to the actual overall hit rate, 
and a close correspondence between actual and estimated hits was consistent across 
the five differently sized targets, see Figure 5.2. A within-subjects 2 x 5 ANOVA 
with hit type (actual proportion hits and estimated proportion hits) and radius (2, 9, 
16, 23, 30 pixels) as the two factors revealed a significant main effect of radius 
[F(4,96) = 235.44, p <.001]. Follow up contrasts using the 30 pixel radius (M = .88, 
SE = .02) as a reference revealed that hit rates for all of the other radii were 
significantly lower; 2 pixels (M = .12, SE = .02) [F(1, 24) = 994.40, p < .001], 9 
pixels (M = .41, SE = .04) [F(1, 24) = 287.32, p< .001], 16 pixels (M = .62, SE 
= .04) [F(1, 24) = 95.55, p< .001] and 23 pixels (M = .79, SE = .03) [F(1, 24) = 
20.19, p< .001]. There was no main effect of hits/estimate [F(1,24) = .009, ns] and 
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no interaction [F(4, 96) = .96, ns]. Across all participants, there is no evidence of 
systematic misestimation at any level of task difficulty. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Motor Task: Mean actual and estimated proportion hits at each radius. 
 
5.2.2.1.1 Self-monitoring by performance skill 
 
Participants had an average p(correct-hit) score of .79 (SD  = .13) and an average 
p(FA) of .27 (SD = .18); while they were able to correctly identify 79% of hits, they 
also misidentified 27% of misses as hits. The mean sensitivity d’ score was 1.63 (SD 
= .48) and the mean criterion score was  -.11 (SD = .52). 
Participants’ hit rates were considered the main measure of performance quality. 
However, there was a strong positive a strong positive correlation between hit rate 
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and time [r = .72, p < .001], suggesting a clear speed/accuracy trade-off: participants 
with longer movement times had more success in hitting the target. Therefore, both 
of these measures were entered as predictors in a multiple linear regression model 
(enter model), with sensitivity d’ scores as the outcome measure, to address whether 
task performance predicts the ability to self-monitor. Both hit rate and time 
significantly predicted sensitivity d’: [F(2, 22) = 3.86, p < .05, R2= .26]; hit rate [β 
= .23, t(22) = 2.76, p < .05], time [β = -.003, t(22) = 2.19, p < .05]; sensitivity d’ = 
(.23 x proportion hits) + ( -.003 x time) + 1.801. Both movement time and hit rate are 
thus contributory factors to self-monitoring accuracy. Participants with shorter 
movement times or higher hit rates are better able to judge success and failure at the 
task. This finding supports the hypothesis that accuracy in self-monitoring 
movements is related to the precision of motor plans.  
Possible reasons for the influence of movement time on self-monitoring ability are 
outlined in section 5.2.3 However, because of the speed accuracy trade-off outlined 
above, it is plausible that movement time may have acted to suppress the relationship 
between hit rate and sensitivity d’; correlation analysis did not reveal any significant 
association between hit rate and sensitivity d’ [r = .31, ns], unless movement time 
was held constant in a partial correlation  [r = .51, p <.05]. 
To address whether there was any relationship between task performance and bias 
towards over- or underestimation, hit rate and movement time were entered as 
predictors in a multiple linear regression model (enter method) with criterion scores 
as the outcome measure. The model was not significant overall [F(2,22) = .77, ns], 
and neither hit rate [β = .66, t(22) = .65, ns], nor time[β = .00, t(22) = .26, ns] 
significantly predicted criterion. Contrary to the anticipated pattern of results, there 
was no evidence that worse performing participants were more liberal in their 
response bias. 
Finally, to consider whether a more liberal bias was associated with higher general 
life optimism, correlation analysis was run on participants LOT-R scores and their 
criterion scores. The association was non-significant [r = .31, ns], and so provided no 





5.2.2.1.2 Self-monitoring by task difficulty 
 
The quality of self-monitoring at each radius was analysed through the calculation of 
phi coefficients of correlation between actual and estimated hits, converted using 
Fisher’s r – z  transformation. For the 2-pixel radius, data from 13 participants had to 
be excluded because of floor effects; either an actual hit rate or estimated hit rate of 
zero. Similarly, for the 30-pixel radius, data from eight participants had to be 
excluded because of ceiling effects. For this reason, these two radii were discarded 
from further analysis.  Five participants were excluded from the 23-pixel radius, also 
because of ceiling effects, however this was considered sufficiently low to allow its 
inclusion. Therefore the 9 pixel, 16 pixel and 23 pixel radii were taken as indices of 
difficult, moderate and easy versions of the task.  
The mean averaged phi coefficient was .33(SD = .26). A within-subjects ANOVA on 
the transformed coefficients, with the three radii entered as factors, revealed a 
significant main effect of radius size [F(2, 38) = 4.08, p <.05]. Follow-up contrasts 
showed that the coefficients were higher for the 23 pixel radius than for the 9 pixel 
radius; 9 pixels (M = .25, SD = .26), 23 pixels (M = .44, SD = .31), [F(1, 19) = 7.08, 
p < .05]. There was no difference between the 9 pixel radius and the 16 pixel radius 





Figure 5.3. Motor task: Mean phi correlation coefficients at the three intermediate 
radii. 
From this analysis, it appears that increasing the target size enabled participants to 
judge better when they had hit or missed the target. However, correlation analysis on 
the averaged phi coefficients and movement time revealed a significant negative 
association [r = -.43, p <.05], demonstrating that participants who moved faster, 
tended to have a better correlation between their actual and estimated hit rates. For 
this reason, the above ANOVA was re-run as and ANCOVA, with movement time 
(over all radii) entered as a covariate. The results of this analysis were non-
significant  [F(2, 36) = .15, ns].  Therefore, while initially it appeared that self-
monitoring accuracy was differentially affected by radius size, this may be 






5.2.2.1.3 Estimation errors and the Dunning-Kruger effect 
 
The mean group estimation error (overall proportion hits minus estimated hits) was 
0.00, demonstrating no overall tendency towards over/underestimation, though there 
was wide variation between participants (SD = .17, Range = -.33 to .43). There was a 
strong negative correlation between hit rate and estimation error [r = -.64, p < .01]; 
as can be seen in Figure 5.4., participants with lower hit rates over-estimated, 
whereas those with higher hit rates under-estimated.  
 
 
Figure 5.4. Motor task: Correlation between hit rate and estimation error. 
 
Because of the speed-accuracy trade-off outlined above, the relation between hit rate 
and estimation error was recomputed as a partial correlation, controlling for the 
effect of movement time. This reduced the strength of the association but did not 
eradicate it [r = -.48, p < .05]. A multiple linear regression model (enter method) 
with hit rate and time as predictors of estimation error was significant overall [F(2, 
22) = 7.47, p < .01, R2= .41]. But, of the two predictors, only the effect of hit rate 
was significant [β = -.69, t(22) = -2.54 p < .05], time [β = -.00, t(22) = -.20, ns]; 
estimation error = (-.69 x proportion hits) + .43.  



























The data for the motor task thus show the anticipated association between hit rate 
and estimation error, even when variation in movement time is factored out: the 
lower performers overestimate their own skill, and the higher performers 
underestimate it. This is consistent with a Dunning-Kruger type pattern. However, to 
be fully consistent there should also be evident asymmetry in the degree of 
estimation error, with the magnitude of overestimation exceeding the magnitude of 
underestimation. To address this question, the participants were split into four 
quartiles of performance according to their hit rate, similarly to Kruger and Dunning 
(1999). Mean estimation error is shown for each quartile in Figure 5.5. The direction 
of error in the top quartile was flipped by multiplying by – 1. A t-test comparing the 
error for Q4 (M =.12, SD = .11) with Q1 (M = .10, SD = .07) was non-significant 
[t(11) = -.44, ns]. On this motor task, overestimation at the lowest end of the 








It should be emphasised that the method employed in collecting these estimates 
differs from that typically used in self-estimation studies. Rather than collecting a 
global estimate of percentile position or raw score after the tasks are completed, 
estimated success or failure was collected on a trial-by-trial basis. This limits the 
comparisons that can be drawn between this task and the Kruger and Dunning (1999) 
or Burson et al. (2006) experiments, as there is no guarantee that participants’ online 
estimates would match their overall assessment after the task. However, at least for 
the current task, there is no evidence of estimation error asymmetry, or any reason to 
attribute the over-estimation of poor performers and the under-estimation of high 
performers to different sources (Ehrlinger et al., 2008). Moreover, this pattern of 
errors could be explained by regression to the mean, with the more extreme 
performers at both ends of the scale giving more regressive estimates.  
And so, for the motor task, analysis of estimation errors demonstrates a pattern of 
over-estimation among poor performers and underestimation among high 
performers. But the equivalence in magnitude of this error, and the lack of 
association between hit rate and criterion, suggest that these findings could be 
accounted for by differential regression, contingent on task performance, rather than 
a specific pattern of overconfidence among the low performers. However, regression 
to the mean does not explain the association between hit rate and sensitivity d’ 
scores, which are statistically independent of task performance. This association 
points towards a self-monitoring deficit among the lower performers; a difficulty in 
distinguishing success from failure on a trial-by-trial basis, perhaps driven by a more 




5.2.2.2. Visual memory task 
 
Participants’ mean actual and estimated proportion hits are shown for each of the 
five conditions of radius size and averaged across conditions in Table 5.2.  
Target radius 
(pixels) 2 9 16 23 30 Average 
Actual 
proportion hits .02(.03) .31 (.21) .56 (.26) .72 (.23) .82 (.17) .48 (.16) 
Estimated 
proportion hits .08 .41 (.26) .68 (.27) .78 (.23) .91 (.12) .57 (.17) 
 
Table 5.2. Visual memory task: Actual and estimated proportion hits. 
Unlike in the motor task, participants over-estimated their hit rates at targets of all 
sizes, see Figure 5.6. A within-subjects ANOVA on actual hits and estimated hits at 
the five different radii revealed a significant main effect of radius size [F(2.30, 
55.22) = 191.56, p <.001]. Follow up contrasts using the 30 pixel radius (M = .86, SE 
= .03) as a reference revealed that hit rates for all of the other radii were significantly 
lower; 2 pixels (M = .05, SE = .02) [F(1, 24) = 712.84, p < .001], 9 pixels (M = .36, 
SE = .04) [F(1, 24) = 284.69, p< .001], 16 pixels (M = .62, SE = .05) [F(1, 24) = 
47.29, p< .001] and 23 pixels (M = .75, SE = .04) [F(1, 24) = 22.18, p< .001]. There 
was also a main effect of hit type; the estimated proportion of hits was significantly 
higher than actual proportion of hits [F(1, 24) = 12.17, p < .01]. However, there was 
no interaction [F (2.71, 65.05) = .81, ns], demonstrating that over-estimation was not 






Figure 5.6. Visual memory task: Mean actual and estimated proportion hits at each 
radius. 
5.2.2.2.1 Self-monitoring by performance skill 
 
Participants’ p(correct-hit), p(FA), d’ sensitivity and criterion were calculated for the 
visual memory task as outlined for the motor task. The average p(correct-hit) score 
was .79 (SD = .16) and p(FA) was .33 (SD = .17); participants’ average levels of 
correctly identified hits and misidentified misses were similar to the motor task. The 
average sensitivity d’ was 1.45 (SD = .48) and average criterion -.22 (SD = .48). 
Participants had marginally lower sensitivity d’ on the visual memory task, compared 
to the motor task, and were slightly more liberal in their responses, though the 
differences were non-significant; sensitivity d’ [t(24) = 1.28, ns] and criterion [t(24) 
= .79, ns].  
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Correlation analysis revealed a significant positive association between hit rates and 
sensitivity d’ scores [r = .72, p < .001]. For the visual memory task, as in the motor 
task, participants with higher performance levels were better able to monitor their 
successes and failures. This was even more apparent on the visual memory task, 
where there was no confound of movement time. Simple linear regression confirmed 
that hit rate significantly predicted sensitivity d’ [F(1, 23) = 24.08, p < .001, R2 
= .51]; sensitivity d’ = 2.89 * hit rate + .052, see Figure 5.7. This suggests that the 
relationship between accuracy and self-monitoring precision is not limited to motor 
performance. On this visual memory task, it may be that stronger and more accurate 




Figure 5.7. Visual memory task: Correlation between proportion hits and sensitivity 
d’. 
For the visual memory task, as for the motor task, there was no correlation between 
hit rate and criterion [r = -.22, ns]. A simple linear regression with hit rate as 
predictor and criterion as outcome measure was non-significant; [F(1, 23) = 1.18, 
ns]. Again there was no evidence for an association between poor performance and a 
liberal response threshold. Neither was there any correlation between LOT-R scores 























and criterion  [r = -.09, ns]; liberal thresholds on the visual memory task were 
unrelated to general life optimism.  
 
5.2.2.2.2. Self-monitoring by task difficulty 
 
To investigate whether there was any effect of radius size on self-monitoring 
success, the phi coefficient of correlation between hits and estimated hits at the five 
radii was calculated for each participant and transformed with Fisher’s R-Z 
transformation. As in the motor task, floor and ceiling effects made it impossible to 
perform these calculations for some participants; 20 for the 2-pixel radius and 9 for 
the 30-pixel radius, leading to the removal of these two radii from further analysis. 
For the remaining radii, there was missing data for 3 participants for the 9 and 16 
pixel radii, and 6 participants for the 23-pixel radius. The mean score averaged 
across these three radii was .14 (SD = .35). A repeated measures ANOVA on the 
transformed phi coefficients, with the 9 pixel, 16 pixel and 23 pixel radii entered as 
factors was non-significant: 9 pixels M = .19 (SD = .30), 16 pixels M = .09 (SD 
= .27), 23 pixels M = .08 (SD = .28) [F(2, 30) = .41, ns], see Figure 5.8. The ability 






Figure 5.8. Visual memory task: Mean phi correlation coefficients at the three 
intermediate radii. 
 
5.2.2.2.3 Estimation errors and the Dunning-Kruger effect 
 
As in the motor task, each participant’s estimation error was calculated by 
subtracting their actual overall hit rate from their estimated hit rate. The mean error 
was .09 (SD = .12, Range = -.09 to .34), reflecting the general overestimation 
outlined above. These error scores showed a trend towards negative correlation with 
actual hit rates, but this did not reach significance [r = -.35, p = .09].  
To address whether magnitude of error was asymmetrical, the participants were split 
into four quartiles according to their hit rate, and the direction of error in the top 
quartile flipped by multiplying by – 1. A t-test comparing the error for Q4 with Q1 
was non-significant; (Q4 M = .1, SD = .14, Q1M  = .01, SD = .07) [t(11) = 1.43, ns]. 
From Figure 5.9, it is apparent that the greatest degree of overestimation on this task 
was actually observed for Q3, the lower middle performers, rather than the bottom 
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quartile. With the same caveats about methodological differences as in the motor 




Figure 5.9. Visual memory task: Mean estimation error for each quartile of hit rate. 
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5.2.3 Experiment 1: Discussion 
 
A motor and a visual memory self-monitoring task were administered to 25 adult 
participants, aged 18 - 30. The results of both tasks demonstrated an association 
between task performance and self-monitoring skill, as indexed by sensitivity d’ 
scores. For the motor task, both hit rate and movement time contributed to self-
monitoring success; participants with higher hit rates and faster movement times 
were better able to judge success and failure in hitting the target. In regard to hit rate, 
this finding points towards an interpretation of self-monitoring skill being based 
upon the precision of motor commands; participants with less variable motor plans 
were both more accurate in hitting the target and in judging when this had been 
achieved. Plausibly, the skill of these participants allowed them to apply a lower 
threshold for error signalling, allowing for a more accurate determination of when 
their movement trajectory was likely to result in success or failure. This novel 
finding may be the first demonstration of how mechanisms that contribute to 
anosognosia also operate in healthy individuals.   
The influence of movement time on self-monitoring skill is open to different 
interpretations. Faster movement times have been linked to cognitive ability (Jensen 
& Munro, 1979), perhaps through increased speed of information processing 
(Sheppard & Vernon, 2008). It is possible, therefore, that increased processing speed 
could bestow both a motor and metacognitive benefit. However, it is perhaps more 
likely that faster movements conferred a perceptual advantage. As visually presented 
information decays rapidly and exponentially over the first second after occlusion 
(Hesse & Franz, 2010), faster moving participants would have had a better visual 
memory of the target, potentially making it easier to judge success or failure. In this 
case, movement time may have acted as a suppressor variable in the relationship 
between hit rate and self-monitoring.  
A similar relationship between higher hit rates and better self-monitoring was 
observed on the visual memory task, whereby participants who were more successful 
at remembering and clicking on the location of the target were also better at judging 
when they were correct. This suggests that self-monitoring skill was linked to the 
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strength of the memory trace; when participants had accurately encoded the location 
of the target, they were better able to both remember its location and know that they 
had succeeded in remembering it. The fact a similar pattern of results was observed 
for both the visual memory and motor tasks would be compatible with single 
‘domain-general’ mechanism underlying the association between performance and 
self-monitoring. However, within anosognosia research, it is hypothesised that 
unawareness of physical and sensory problems, for example, can be dissociated 
because domain-specific systems are involved in both the execution of primary 
functions and the monitoring of those functions (Spinazzola et al., 2008). A similar 
pairing of primary functions and self-monitoring processes would equally account 
for the results seen in these healthy participants.  
As Kruger and Dunning (1999) suggested in regards to their own research, these 
findings could provide an analogue to anosognosia, for both physical and cognitive 
tasks, in a neurologically intact sample. However, these results do not fully adhere to 
the Dunning-Kruger type pattern, which emphasises inflated self-estimation at the 
lower end of the performance scale. Analysis of estimation errors revealed, as 
anticipated, that on average poor performers overestimated whereas good performers 
underestimated. However, the magnitude of estimation error was equivalent at either 
end of the scale, and this pattern of findings could therefore be accounted for by 
regression to the mean. While poor performers were less accurate in judging success 
or failure, their tendency to provide over- rather than under-estimates may have been 
driven by their low hit rate, rather than overconfidence. In support of this 
interpretation, there was no association between performance and criterion scores, 
and therefore no evidence for a relationship between poor performance and liberal 
self-evaluation.  
Previous research has suggested that the accuracy of self-monitoring is affected by 
task difficulty. Because all people have a tendency to over-estimate their 
performance on easy tasks and underestimate it on more difficult tasks, good 
performers are therefore better calibrated on easy tasks, and poor performers on more 
difficult tasks (Burson et al., 2006). In this study, all participants were exposed to 
different levels of task difficulty through the use of differently sized radii. Contrary 
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to expectations, radius size did not differentially affect the direction of error on these 
tasks. For the motor task, estimated hit rates were similar to actual hit rates at all 
radii, while for the visual memory task, estimated hit rates were consistently higher 
than actual hit rates, with no influence of radius size. Furthermore, analysis of 
participants’ phi correlation coefficients did not highlight any differential effect of 
radius size on self-monitoring skill for the visual memory task, and the effect for the 
motor task appeared contingent on movement time.  
In general, it appears that manipulating target size had no effect on the ability of the 
participants to monitor their performance, as indexed by phi correlation coefficients. 
However, there is one caveat to this; for the smallest and largest radii, floor and 
ceiling effects for either the actual number of hits or estimated hits made it 
impossible to calculate phi correlation coefficients and so limited the ability to detect 
within-subject differences across different radii. Experiment 2 was devised to 
equalise performance at pre-determined levels by using the feedback stage of each 
task to calculate the parameters of the five target radius sizes for each participant, as 
well as the movement time limit that would elicit approximately consistent hit rates 
on the self-monitoring stage. While the primary aim of this manipulation was to 
allow for comparisons between groups with different skill levels, it also had the 
advantage of addressing some of the issues encountered in Experiment 1, such as 




5.3. Experiment 2 
 
5.3.1 Experiment 2: Aims and hypotheses 
 
For Experiment 2, modified versions of the self-monitoring motor and visual 
memory tasks were devised in order to obtain consistent proportion hit rates 
of .2, .35, .5, .65 and .8, across the five different stages of target size. The same self-
monitoring measures were calculated as in Experiment 1. A positive association 
between hit rates and sensitivity d’ scores was predicted for both tasks, reflecting a 
relationship between task performance and self-monitoring skill. In line with 
previous research, I predicted that task difficulty would influence the relationship 
between hit rate and estimated hit rate, with smaller radii yielding greater levels of 
over-estimation. It was also anticipated that there would be a relationship between hit 
rate and estimation error, with poorer-performing participants having positive 
estimation errors and better performing participants having negative estimation 
errors. As outlined in Experiment 1, I anticipated that the estimation error would be 
greater in magnitude for the poorer performers, who would also show a more liberal 








Twenty-eight participants took part in Experiment 2, none of whom had participated 
in Experiment 1. All were students at the University of Edinburgh, recruited though 
the University website, and completed the study for payment of £7. Participants were 
4 male and 24 female, with a mean age of 24.04 years (SD = 3.29), mean years of 
education 17.86 (SD = 2.45) and mean LOT-R score of 15.00 (SD = 4.46). Twenty-
four participants were classified as right-handed by the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), with a score of ≥ 40 out of 100 (M = 69.41, SD = 29.13) 
and four left handed, with scores of ≤ -40out of -100 (M = - 61.88, SD = 26.72). All 
participants completed the task with their dominant hand. 
5.3.2.2 Measures, equipment and procedure  
 
The experimental equipment and general methods were identical to Experiment 1. 
Changes to the different task stages, designed to obtain a constant level of 
performance across participants, are outlined separately by task below. Participants 
also completed the same questionnaire measures as in Experiment 1; the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (EHI) and the Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R).  
5.3.2.3 Motor task methods 
5.3.2.3.1 Stage 1: Motor task threshold 
 
Unlike Experiment 1, which simply confirmed the participants’ ability to touch the 
screen within a pre-determined timeframe, the motor threshold task in Experiment 2 
calculated an individual timeout threshold for each participant, determined from their 
motor speed, using a simple staircase procedure. As in Experiment 1 the target had a 
radius of 20 pixels (5.29mm) and was presented in the centre of the screen. On the 
first trial participants were given a time limit of 1000ms to touch the screen. 
Thereafter, the programme recorded whether each trial resulted in a hit, in which 
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case 25ms were subtracted from the allowed time limit on the next trial. If a miss or 
timeout were recorded, 25ms were added. Any change between adding or subtracting 
time to the limit was considered a reversal. The task continued until a total of ten 
reversals were counted, at which point the programme quitted. The average interval 
of the preceding five reversals was calculated, and an extra 25% of this averaged 
figure added, to obtain the final movement threshold. This procedure was repeated 
three times, and the smallest final time of the three used as the participant’s time 
limit in stages 2 and 3 of the motor task. 
5.3.2.3.2 Stage 2: Motor task with feedback, and radius calibration 
 
The presentation of this task was identical to the equivalent stage in Experiment 1, 
with the one difference that the participants’ time threshold for completing the task 
was taken from their performance in stage 1, rather than standard across participants. 
After the task was completed, a sigmoid function was fitted to the participants’ data, 
according to their hit or miss/timeout rate, to predict the radius sizes required to yield 
hit rates of .2  and .8. These radii were then used as the upper and lower targets in the 
stage 3 experimental task, along with three intermediate radii, sized at equal 
increments in between, yielding a total of five target sizes. The number of hits and 
timeouts were recorded, along with the response time between releasing the button 
and touching the screen.  
5.3.2.3.3 Stage 3: Motor self-monitoring 
 
The procedure of the self-monitoring stage 3 was the same as in Experiment 1. 
However, rather than using predetermined thresholds and radius sizes, each 
participant’s calculated time threshold in stage 1, and calculated radii in stage 2, 
were used as the parameters for the task. The programme recorded the same 
information as in stage 2, as well as the number (1-4) corresponding to the 
participants’ self-estimation on each trial. Scores of 1 and 2 were taken as estimated 
misses and 3 and 4 as estimated hits. The radius sizes of the five different targets 





5.3.2.4 Visual memory task methods 
5.3.2.4.1 Stage 1: Visual memory task with feedback, and radius calibration 
 
The procedure for this task was identical to Experiment 1. As in the motor task, after 
completion of this stage, a sigmoid function was fitted to the participants’ data, 
according to their hit or miss/timeout rate, to predict the radius sizes required to yield 
hit rates of .2  and .8. These radii were then used for the smallest and largest targets 
in the stage 3 experimental task, along with three intermediate radii, sized at equal 
increments in between, yielding a total of five target sizes. Each sequence of targets 
was presented 21 times, in randomized order, giving a total of 160 experimental 
trials and eight practice trials. 
5.3.2.4.2 Stage 2: Visual memory task self-monitoring 
 
As with stage 3 of the motor task, the visual memory self-monitoring task was 
identical to Experiment 1, only using the individually calibrated radius sizes rather 
than predetermined radii for the five targets.  The same information as in stage 1 was 
recorded, as well as the number (1-4) corresponding to the participants’ self-
estimation on each trial and the radius sizes of the five different targets. 
 
5.3.2.5 Data screening, extraction and analysis 
5.3.2.5.1 Motor task 
 
For each participant, the proportion of timed-out trials was registered, and these trials 
were removed from subsequent analyses. The same threshold of 100 pixels’ 
(26.46mm) distance from the centre of the target was used to identify potential 
errors; trials exceeding this distance were removed from the analysis (total 14 trials, 
< .006%). The following variables were then extracted: 
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 Actual hit rate: the proportion of touches within the target region for each 
radius stage 
 Estimated hit rate: the proportion of trials the participant judged as being 
either 3. Probable hit, or 4. Definite hit for each radius stage 
 Mean movement time (ms): the interval between the participant releasing the 
button and touching the screen for each radius stage 
 Mean distance, in pixels, from the centre of the target for each radius stage 
 Mid-radius size: the mean size, in pixels, of each participant’s five target radii 
 
5.3.2.5.2 Visual memory task 
 
As this task was untimed, no information on timeout rates was collected. The same 
100 pixels error threshold was used as for the motor task, resulting in the removal of 
11 trials (<.005).  
The following variables were then extracted: 
 Actual hit rate: the proportion of touches within the target region for each 
radius 
 Estimated hit rate: the proportion of trials the participant judged as being 
either 3. Probable hit, or 4. Definite hit for each radius 
 Mean distance, in pixels, from the centre of the target for each radius 
 Mid-radius size: the mean size, in pixels, of each participant’s five target radii 
 
For both tasks, the same analytical approach was taken, looking first at the 
association between task performance and sensitivity d’ and criterion scores, 
followed by the influence of task difficulty on self-monitoring, followed by an 




5.3.3 Experiment 2: Results 
 
5.3.3.1 Motor task  
 
The participants’ mean hit rate, estimated hit rate, timeout rate, movement time and 
mid radius size are shown for each radius stage and averaged across radii, in Table 
5.3. The fit function calibrated radii that yielded mean hit rates reasonably close to 
the desired proportions, though the hit rates for the larger radii were a little lower 
than anticipated. 
 
Radius Stage 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Actual 
proportion hits .19 (.16) .35 (.19) .53 (.20) .62 (.17) .73 (.14) .49 (.14) 
Estimated 
proportion hits .26 (.29) .45 (.29) .53 (.28) .65 (.23) .71 (.22) .51 (.24) 
Proportion 
timeouts .16 (.14) .13 (.11) .12 (.12) .12 (.13) .08 (.09) .12 (.12) 
Movement time 
(ms) 490 (103) 484 (110) 483 (114) 479 (114) 470 (114) 481 (110) 















Table 5.3. Motor task: Mean actual proportion hits, estimated proportion hits, 
proportion timeouts, movement time, mid radius size and threshold. 
 
A within-subjects 2 x 5 ANOVA with hit type (actual proportion hits and estimated 
proportion hits) and radius stage as the two factors revealed a significant main effect 
of radius size [F(2.77, 74.89) = 111.78, p <.001] (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). 
Follow up contrasts using the largest radius stage (M = .72, SE = .03) as a reference 
revealed that hit rates for all of the other radius stages were significantly lower; stage 
1 (M = .23, SE = .04) [F(1, 27) = 216.51, p < .001], stage 2 (M = .40, SE = .04) [F(1, 
27) = 115.48, p< .001], stage 3 (M = .53, SE = .04) [F(1, 27) = 38.05, p< .001] and 
stage 4 (M = .63, SE = .03) [F(1, 27) = 18.85, p< .001].  There was no main effect of 
187 
 
effect of type [F(1,27) = .65, ns], however there was a significant interaction 
between the two [F(4, 108) = 2.82, p < .05]. Follow-up simple contrasts, comparing 
all other radius stages to the largest, revealed that the magnitude of 
over/underestimation differed between radius stages 2 and 5 only [F(1, 27) = 5.90, p 
< .05], see Figure 5.10.  
 
 
Figure 5.10. Motor Task: Mean actual and estimated proportion hits at each radius. 
 
In Experiment 1, the parameters of time and radius size were fixed, whereas in 
Experiment 2 they varied by participant, according to performance in the feedback 
stage of the task. Correlation analysis revealed a significant negative association 
between movement time and mid radius size [r = -.50, p < .01]; participants who had 
been calibrated smaller radii on the feedback stage of the task, took longer to hit the 
target on the self-monitoring stage. However applying these constraints did eradicate 
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the relationship between time and hit rate; whereas in Experiment 1 there was a 
strong positive correlation, in Experiment 2 this was non-significant and negative [r 
= -.32, ns].  
 
5.3.3.1.1 Self-monitoring by performance skill 
 
The average p(correct-hit) score was .70 (SD = .21) , p(FA) was .34 (SD = .27), 
sensitivity d’ was 1.15 (SD = .59) and criterion was -.09 (SD = .84). Correlations 
between sensitivity d’ scores, criterion scores, hit rate, movement time and mid 








Size Sensitivity d' Criterion 
Proportion Hits 1 -0.32 0.37 .49** -0.18 
Movement Time  1 -.50** -.44* 0.26 
Mid Radius Size   1 0.07 -.40* 
Sensitivity d'    1 0.21 
Criterion     1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
 
Table 5.4. Motor task: Correlations between proportion hits, movement time, mid 
radius size, sensitivity d’ and criterion. 
 
As anticipated, and consistent with Experiment 1, sensitivity d’ scores were 
correlated with both proportion hits and movement time. Having eliminated the 
trade-off between hit rate and movement time, the influence of both of these 
variables on sensitivity d’ becomes more apparent. A multiple linear regression 
model (enter method), with proportion hits, time and mid radius size as predictors, 
was significant overall [F(3, 24) = 5.45, p < .01, R2= .41]. Of the individual 
predictors, proportion hits and time significantly predicted sensitivity d’; proportion 
hits [β = 1.96, t(24) = 2.70, p < .05] time [β = -.002, t(24) = -2.47, p < .05]. However, 
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mid radius size was not a significant predictor of sensitivity d’ [β = .05, t(24) = -1.75, 
ns], [sensitivity d’ = (1.96 x proportion hits) + ( -.002 x time) + 1.99]. As in 
Experiment 1, participants with faster movement times and higher hit rates were 
more sensitive to successes and failures on the motor task.  The relationship between 
hit rate and sensitivity d’ is shown in Figure 5.11.  
 
 
Figure 5.11. Motor task: Correlation between proportion hits and sensitivity d’. 
 
Proportion hits, movement time and mid radius size were entered as predictors in a 
multiple linear regression model (enter method) with criterion scores as the outcome 
measure. The model was not significant overall [F(3,24) = 1.58, ns], nor were any of 
the predictors; proportion hits[β = -.14t(24) = .-.11, ns], time[β = .00, t(24) = .36, 
ns]and mid radius size [β = -.07, t(24) = -1.58, ns]. As in Experiment 1, the 
performance measures did not predict whether participants had more liberal or 
conservative estimation biases.  
Finally, correlation analysis on criterion scores and LOT-R scores was non-
significant [r = -.01, ns]. As in Experiment 1, there was no association between task-
specific optimism and general dispositional optimism. 





















5.3.3.1.2 Self-monitoring by task difficulty 
 
The phi coefficient of correlation between hits and estimated hits was calculated for 
each participant, at each radius stage, and converted using Fisher’s R – Z  
transformation. After calculation of these coefficients, the smallest radius stage was 
removed from further analysis, because either actual or estimated hits rates of zero 
required the exclusion of 10 participants. The other radius stages were included, 
though each was missing some data; four participants for stages 2 and 3, two 
participants for stage 4 and three participants for stage 5.  
The mean averaged phi coefficient of the four radius stages was .33 (SD = .20). Like 
the sensitivity d’ measure, the transformed scores were positively correlated with hit 
rate  [r = .51, p < .01] and negatively correlated with movement time [r = -.54, p 
< .01]; participants with higher hit rates and faster movement times were better able 
to judge when they had hit the target. However, a repeated measures ANOVA on the 
transformed coefficients at the four different radius stages was non significant; stage 
2 (M = .32, SD = .25), stage 3 (M = .30, SD = .31), stage 4 (M = .30, SD = .30), 
stage 5 (M = .39, SD = .27) [F(3, 57) = 2.22, ns]. In spite of the methodological 





Figure 5.12. Motor task: Mean phi coefficients of correlation between actual and 
estimated proportion hits at radius stages 2 – 5. 
 
5.3.3.1.3 Estimation errors and the Dunning-Kruger effect 
 
The participants’ mean estimation error was .03, with wide variation on either side 
(SD = .23, Range = -.33 to .55). Unlike in Experiment 1, there was no significant 
correlation between hit rate and estimation error [r = -.26, ns], worse performing 
participants were no more inclined to over-estimate than better performing 
participants. A partial correlation controlling for the effects of time and mid radius 
size increased the strength of this correlation, but not to the point of statistical 
significance [r = -.38, ns]. This finding contrasts with the results of Experiment 1, 
where estimation error correlated strongly with hit rate.  
The typical Dunning-Kruger pattern of overestimation among the lower performers 
and underestimation among higher performers was not replicated in this version of 
the task. Splitting the participants into four quartiles according to their proportion 
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hits shows that, with the exception of Q3, the size of the error for each quartile was 
smaller than the equivalent quartile in Experiment 1, see Figure 5.13. A t-test on the 
estimation error at Q4 and Q1 (with Q1 flipped by multiplying by -1) revealed no 
significant difference between Q4 (M = .05, SD = .22) and Q1 (M = .02, SD = .26) 
[t(12) = .27, ns]. On this version of the task, there was no evidence of a relationship 
between either the direction or the magnitude of estimation error.  
 
 




5.3.3.2 Visual memory task 
 
Participants’ mean actual proportion hits, estimated proportion hits and mid radius 
size are shown in Table 5.5, for each radius stage and averaged across stages.  
 
Radius Stage 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Actual 
proportion hits 
.26 (.15) .38 (.16) .52 (.17) .66 (.21) .79 (.17) .52 (.13) 
Estimated 
proportion hits 
.31 (.31) .45 (.29) .60 (.29) .73 (.24) .86 (.18) .59 (.22) 















Table 5.5. Visual memory task: Mean actual proportion hits, estimated proportion 
hits and mid radius size. 
 
The fit function calibrated radii that yielded mean hit rates reasonably close to the 
desired outer limits of .20 and .80, though this was more accurate for the larger sized 
radii, with the smaller sizes yielding slightly higher hit rates than anticipated. There 
was no correlation between mid radius size and hit rate [r = .06, ns], suggesting that 
the calibrated radii adjusted sufficiently for individual differences in skill, so that 
participants with larger radii were no better able to undertake the task than those with 
smaller radii. 
A within-subjects ANOVA on actual proportion hits and estimated proportion hits at 
the five different radius stages revealed a significant main effect of radius stage 
[F(2.20, 59.38) = 86.23 p <.001]. Follow up contrasts using the largest radius stage 
(M = .83, SE = .03) as a reference revealed that hit rates for all of the other radius 
stages were significantly lower; stage 1 (M = .28, SE = .04) [F(1, 27) = 145.50, p 
< .001], stage 2 (M = .41, SE = .04) [F(1, 27) = 138.60, p< .001], stage 3 (M = .56, 
SE = .04) [F(1, 27) = 60.45, p< .001]  and stage 4 (M = .69, SE = .04) [F(1, 27) = 
37.90, p < .001].   There was no main effect of hit type (actual or estimated) [F(1, 27) 
= 3.85, ns] or interaction, [F(4, 108) = .16, ns]. Therefore, while estimated hits were 
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marginally higher than actual hits at all stages, this difference was not significant 
and, on average, participants were reasonably well calibrated to their performance 
levels, see Figure 5.14.  
 
 
Figure 5.14. Visual memory task: Mean actual and estimated proportion hits at each 
radius stage. 
 
5.3.3.2.1 Self-monitoring by performance skill 
 
Data from three participants was removed from subsequent analyses, because these 
participants had a 100% false alarm rate, precluding the calculation of sensitivity d’ 
and criterion scores. The average p(correct-hit) score of the remaining 25 participants 
was .68 (SD = .18) and p(FA) was .38 (SD = .18).The false alarm rate was 
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significantly higher for the visual memory task than the motor task [t(24) = -2.10, p 
< .05], though p(correct_hit) rates did not differ [t(24) = -.51, ns].  
The average sensitivity d’ was .91 (SD = .47) and average criterion -.12 (SD = .53). 
Participants sensitivity d’ scores were lower for this visual memory task than for the 
motor task [t(24) = 2.25, p <.05] though they did not differ on criterion [t(24) = 1.53, 
ns]. This suggests that it was easier to discriminate hits from misses on the motor 
task than on the visual memory task, but that this did not affect participants’ bias 
towards a liberal or conservative threshold. Correlation analysis revealed a 
significant association between hit rate and sensitivity d’ [r = .41, p < .05], shown in 
Figure 5.15. In a simple linear regression model, hit rate significantly predicted 




Figure 5.15. Visual memory task: Correlation between proportion hits and 
sensitivity d’. 
 
While participants with higher hit rates tended to have lower criterion scores, this 
association was non-significant [r = -.35, ns]. A simple linear regression with hit rate 





















as predictor and criterion as outcome was non significant [F(1,23) = 3.18, ns]; hit 
rate did not significantly predict whether participants had a more liberal or 
conservative response bias. Nor was there any relationship between criterion and 
LOT-R scores [r = -.18, ns]; again, general life optimism was unrelated to optimistic 
biases on the task. 
5.3.3.2.2 Self-monitoring by task difficulty 
 
Phi coefficients of correlation between hits and estimated hits at the five radii were 
calculated for each participant and transformed with Fisher’s R-Z transformation. 
Ceiling effects for the largest radius stage required the removal of 11 participants, 
and so this stage was excluded from further analysis. For the remaining radius stages, 
there were missing data for seven participants for stage 1, five participants for stages 
2 and 4, and three participants for stage 3. The mean phi correlation average across 
these four radius stages was .14 (SD = .15). In contrast to the motor task, there was 
no relationship between the transformed coefficients and hit rate [r = .05, ns]. A 
repeated measures ANOVA on the transformed phi coefficients, with radius stages 1, 
2, 3, and 4 entered as factors was non-significant: stage 1 (M = .09, SD = .29), stage 
2 (M = .09, SD = .22), stage 3 (M = .13, SD = .20), stage 4 (M = .24, SD = .31) [F(3, 
54) = 2.22, ns]. As in the motor task, the ability to monitor performance on the visual 





Figure 5.16. Visual memory task: Mean phi coefficients of correlation between 
actual and estimated proportion hits at radius stages 1 – 4. 
 
5.3.3.2.3 Estimation errors and the Dunning-Kruger effect 
 
The participants’ mean estimation error was .07 (SD = .18, Range = -.31 to .50). 
There was no correlation between hit rate and error [r = -.06, ns]; as in the motor task 
above, there was no association between poor performance and over-estimation.  
Figure 5.17 shows estimation error at the four quartiles of performance, split by hit 
rate. On this version of the visual memory task, participants at all four quartiles 
overestimated. A t-test comparing Q4 with Q1 was non-significant; (Q4 M = .06, SD 
= .12, Q1M  =.05, SD = .19) [t(12) = .15, ns]. As in Experiment 1, overestimation 









5.3.4 Experiment 2: Discussion 
 
Modified versions of the motor and visual memory tasks used in Experiment 1 were 
devised for Experiment 2; performance on the feedback stages of the task was used 
to calibrate time limits and radius sizes that would constrain performance across 
participants. First, and perhaps most importantly, the positive association between 
task skill and self-monitoring was apparent on both the motor and visual memory 
tasks. Even though performance was constrained to similar levels across participants, 
there was still sufficient variation for the effect demonstrated in Experiment 1 to be 
replicated in Experiment 2, suggesting that this is a robust finding. For the motor 
task, the association was perhaps even more apparent; without the confound of a 
speed accuracy trade-off, both hit rate and time correlated with sensitivity d’, unlike 
in Experiment 1, where time suppressed the influence of hit rate. The results of 
Experiment 2 further support the proposal that, for the motor and visual memory 
tasks respectively, the precision of the motor plan or strength of the memory trace 
contributes to awareness of success and failure in carrying out the task.  
Even in this modified task, there was no effect of radius stage on self-monitoring 
skill, as measured by phi correlation coefficients between actual and estimated hits, 
on either the motor or visual memory task. The ability to self-monitor did not appear 
to depend upon the difficult of the task. Regarding estimation errors, on the visual 
memory task, difficulty had no effect, while on the motor task, these scores were 
marginally higher at radius stage 2 than radius stage 5, suggesting that participants 
failed to set their expectations low enough for the moderately difficult version of the 
task. As the same participants contributed data to both stages, this effect was not 
contingent upon individual differences in skill. Rather, it could be seen as a more 
general overconfidence when faced with a more challenging task. This pattern could 
also be attributable to regression to the mean; just as worse performing participants 
may give more regressive estimates compared to their peers, so all participants may 
give more regressive estimates of their worst compared to their best scores. 
However, according to this account, it could be expected that participants would 
underestimate their performance on the easier versions of the task, which was not 
observed in these experiments.  
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The relationship between performance and over-/under-estimation was not consistent 
across Experiments 1 and 2. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated a clear 
relationship between performance and error direction on the motor task, which was 
not replicated in Experiment 2. On the visual memory task, neither Experiment 1 nor 
Experiment 2 demonstrated any association between performance and estimation 
error. Unlike the relationship between performance and self-monitoring sensitivity, 
which remained apparent even after the methodological changes, it is plausible that 
constraining the hit rates of participants to similar levels reduced the potential for 
more regressive estimates at the extreme ends of the performance scale, so reducing 
the estimations errors and their association with performance.   
On none of the tasks were there any significant differences in the magnitude of the 
estimation error between the best and worst performers, nor was there any 
association between performance and criterion for a more liberal or conservative 
response bias. Together, the results from these two experiments demonstrate that the 
method of collecting trial-by-trial estimates on motor and visual memory tasks did 
not evince a Dunning-Kruger type pattern, whereby asymmetrical estimated errors 
were driven by overconfidence among the worse performers. Yet there was a clear 
relationship between task ability and self-monitoring skill. Participants who were 
better at performing the tasks, were also better and distinguishing their successes 




5.4 Experiment 3 
 
5.4.1 Experiment 3: Aims and hypotheses 
 
The preceding two experiments have demonstrated that, in younger adults, skill in 
undertaking a motor and visual memory task is related to the ability to self-monitor 
performance. For Experiment 3, I addressed the question of whether this same 
pattern would be observed in a sample of older adults. As outlined previously, one of 
the difficulties of comparing groups on metacognitive measures is that these scores 
may be confounded by actual differences in performance. Therefore, to compare 
younger and older adults in their motor self-monitoring, it is necessary to 
compensate for the age related deficits in motor skill, such as general slowing and 
increased variability (see Ketcham & Stelmach, 2004, for a review). However, the 
calibration approach adopted in Experiment 2 should provide an opportunity to 
match performance across these groups, using the feedback stage to determine the 
five radius sizes for each participant that would yield roughly consistent hit rates, 
across the older adults group and in comparison with the younger adults in 
Experiment 2.   
To date, there have been very few studies looking specifically at motor-skill 
awareness among older adults. Lafargue, Noël and Luyat (2013) conducted an 
experiment requiring older and younger participants to estimate their ability to stand 
on an inclined plane and step over objects. They found that older adults over-
estimated their ability more than younger adults, and that this effect was driven by 
differences in actual performance; while older adults estimated their ability 
equivalently to the younger adults, their actual performance was worse. The authors 
attribute this to older adults failing to update their internal performance models to 
take account of the effects of ageing. Similar results have been found in studies 
assessing perceptions of driving ability; the self-assessments of older adults often 
have little correspondence with objective performance, suggesting overconfidence 
and unawareness of potential age-related skill loss (Horswill, Sullivan, Lurie-Beck & 
Smith, 2013; Ross, Dodson, Edwards, Ackerman & Ball, 2012). In a study of 270 
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older drivers, Wood, Lacherez and Anstey (2012) found that, of the 17% who were 
rated as potentially unsafe to drive, 66% rated their driving as good to excellent, 
while those who made critical errors (requiring a driving instructor to take control of 
the vehicle) rated their ability no lower than the rest of the sample. Freund, Colgrove, 
Burke and McLeod (2005) found a significant positive association between older 
drivers’ risk of unsafe driving and their self-evaluation of their driving skill.  
Evidence from cognitive laboratory tasks suggests that older adults may over-
estimate their ability across a variety of domains, including memory (Dodson, Bawa 
& Krueger, 2007), general knowledge (Hansson, Rönnlund, Juslin, & Nilsson, 2008) 
and visual perception (Palmer, David & Fleming, 2014). This effect was apparent 
even though actual performance was held constant across age groups, so as to avoid 
confounding metacognitive ability with cognitive ability. Harty, O’Connell, Hester & 
Robertson (2013) conducted a multi-domain assessment of self-awareness in older 
and younger adults, including both online error-monitoring and self versus informant 
questionnaires about memory and attention control. For the questionnaire measures, 
they found different patterns of performance across groups; older adults tended to 
over-estimate their ability compared to informants, whereas younger adults tended to 
under-estimate. Older adults were also less aware of errors, even though their 
performance was constrained to match that of the younger adults, and there was an 
association between awareness of errors and self-informant discrepancies on the 
questionnaire measures. The authors suggest that older adults fail to notice errors, 
and so do not update their self-concept appropriately to their level of skill loss.  
In both physical and cognitive domains, therefore, there is evidence that older adults 
may overestimate their ability, either failing to take into account age-related 
reduction in performance, or failing to monitor online errors. This was investigated 
in Experiment 3, for the motor and visual self-monitoring tasks. The within-group 
performance of older adults was analysed in the same way as the younger adults, 
looking first at how performance affects self-monitoring skill, secondly at the 
influence of task difficulty, and finally at estimation errors and issues of over-
confidence. Given the findings of Experiment 2, it was predicted that individual 
differences in performance would relate to sensitivity d’ scores, with the better 
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performers having higher scores, reflecting their ability to better monitor successes 
and failures on both tasks. I also predicted that older adults would be overconfident 
in their ability, reflected in positive estimation errors, though this would not 
necessarily relate to performance levels.  
Following the within-group analysis, the older adults were then compared to the 
younger adults from Experiment 2, in terms of self-monitoring ability and 
over/underestimation. It was predicted that older adults would show reduced self-
monitoring ability, demonstrated by lower sensitivity d’ scores. I also anticipated that 
they would have higher estimation errors and criterion scores, reflecting the greater 








28 older adults were recruited through the University of Edinburgh’s volunteer panel, 
for payment of £7 per hour. Participants were 11 male and 17 female, with a mean 
age of 71.04 (SD = 6.51), mean 15.92 (SD = 3.04) years of education and mean 
LOT-R score of 17.00 (SD = 4.29). All participants were right handed, with scores of 
≥40 out of 100, as classified by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 
1971) (M = 82.83, SD = 21.56), and completed the task with their right hand. 
 
5.4.2.2 Measures, equipment and procedure 
 
The experimental equipment, general methods and procedure were identical to 
Experiment 2, with one slight adjustment to the motor task. Having calculated the 
participants’ motor threshold as described in Experiment 2, it became apparent 
during the feedback stage 2 that some participants were unable to touch the screen 
within the time limit. The change from a central target of fixed radius to a randomly 
located target of varying radii placed additional pressure on the older participants, 
slowing their performance to a degree unanticipated by the performance of the 
younger adults in Experiments 1 and 2. To avoid substantial loss of data though 
timeouts, after participant 8 a new strategy was adopted; for any participant with a 
timeout rate on stage 2 of between 25% and 50% an additional 200ms was added to 
their threshold for stage 3 (N = 5), and 500ms was added for participants with 
timeout rates exceeding 50% (N = 5). 
 
5.4.2.3 Data screening and extraction 
 
For each motor task, the proportion of timed-out trials was registered and removed 
from any subsequent analysis. The same 100 pixels error threshold was used as in the 
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previous experiments, which resulted in the removal of 15 trials (<.006%) for the 
motor task and 34 (< .013) trials for the visual memory task.  
The same variables were extracted as in Experiment 2. 
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5.4.3 Experiment 3 Results 
 
5.4.3.1 Motor task 
 
The participants’ mean hit rate, estimated hit rate, timeout rate, movement time and 
mid radius size are shown for each radius stage and averaged across radii, in Table 
5.6. As with the younger adults in Experiment 1, the individually calibrated radii 
yielded mean hit rates close to the desired outer limits of .20 and .80, but a little 
lower than anticipated, particularly for the larger radii.  
 
Radius Stage 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Actual 
proportion hits 
.19 (.15) .31 (.19) .49 (.21) .54 (.22) .68 (.22) .44 (.15) 
Estimated 
proportion hits 
.51 (.31) .54 (.29) .63 (.27) .64 (.26) .70 (.27) .60 (.26) 
Proportion 
timeouts 
.23 (.18) .25 (.20) .21 (.19) .21 (.19) .24 (.20) .23 (.18) 
Movement time 
(ms) 
703 (172) 718 (182) 712 (183) 709 (187) 709 (180) 710 (180) 















Table 5.6. Motor task: Mean actual proportion hits, estimated proportion hits, 
proportion timeouts, movement time, mid radius size and threshold. 
 
A within-subjects ANOVA on actual proportion hits and estimated proportion hits at 
the five different radius stages revealed a significant main effect of radius stage [F(4, 
108) = 45.94, p <.001]. Follow up contrasts using the largest radius stage (M = .69, 
SE = .04) as a reference revealed that hit rates for all of the other radius stages were 
significantly lower; stage 1 (M = .35, SE = .04) [F(1, 27) = 110.34, p < .001], stage 2 
(M = .43, SE = .03) [F(1, 27) = 72.45, p< .001], stage 3 (M = .56, SE = .04) [F(1, 27) 
= 27.85, p< .001] and stage 4 (M = .59, SE = .04) [F(1, 27) = 19.15, p< .001]. There 
was also a main effect of hit type (actual or estimated) [F(1,27) = 11.43, p < .001]; 
207 
 
across all levels of performance, estimated hits were higher than actual hits, however 
this was qualified by a significant interaction; [F(4, 108) = 11.27, p < .001]. Follow-
up simple contrasts revealed that the magnitude of the difference between actual and 
estimated hits was greater at radius stage 1 than at all other radius stages: stage 2 
[F(1, 27) =  5.01, p < .05], stage 3 [F(1, 27) =  17.35, p < .001], stage 4 [F(1, 27) =  
14.23, p < .01] and stage 5 [F(1, 27) =  33.59, p < .001]. Unlike the younger groups 
of participants, older adults barely adjusted their estimates to account for the 




Figure 5.18. Motor task: Actual and estimated hits at the five different radius stages. 
 
There was no association between hit rate and movement time [r = -.03, ns], 
therefore no apparent speed accuracy trade-off. However, as in Experiment 2, 
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participants’ mid radius size was negatively correlated with movement time [r = -.53, 
p < .01]; participants with smaller radii maintained equivalent hit rates by making 
slower movements. There was also a positive correlation between mid-radius size 
and hit rate [r = .38, p < .05]. This suggests that the radii calculated by the fit 
function were slightly too large to maintain consistent performance across all 
participants.  
5.4.3.1.1 Self-monitoring by performance skill 
 
Data from one participant was not included in this analysis, because a p(correct_hit) 
rate of 0 made it impossible to calculate sensitivity d’ and criterion scores. 
Participants’ mean p(correct-hit) score was .75 (SD = .24) and their mean p(FA) 
was .51 (SD = .27); on average, approximately half of their misses were 
misclassified as hits. Mean sensitivity d’ was .84 (SD = .60) and mean criterion was 
-.46 (SD = .80). Correlations between these measures and the performance measures 








Size Sensitivity d' Criterion 
Proportion Hits 1 -.12 .42* .46* -.10 
Movement Time  1 -.54** -.43* .21 
Mid Radius Size   1 .66** -.05 
Sensitivity d'    1 -.13 
Criterion     1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
 
Table 5.7. Motor task: Correlations between proportion hits, movement time, mid 
radius size, sensitivity d’ and criterion. 
 
As in Experiment 2, participants with faster movement times and higher hit rates had 
higher sensitivity d’ scores. In this older group, however, there was also a strong 
positive correlation between mid radius size and sensitivity d’ scores; participants 
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with larger radii were more sensitive to their performance. In a multiple linear 
regression model (enter method) with hit rate, time and mid radius size entered as 
predictors, only mid radius size significantly predicted sensitivity d’ [F(3, 23) = 7.26, 
p < .01, R2= .49], mid radius size [β = .07, t(24) = -2.45, p < .05]. If the influence of 
mid-radius size was held constant in a partial correlation, there was no association 
between hit rate and sensitivity d’ [r = .27, ns] or time and sensitivity d’ [r = -.11, 
ns], suggesting that, for this older participant group, it was radius size that most 
influenced self-monitoring success.  
There was no correlation between criterion and hit rate. Proportion hits, movement 
time and mid radius size were entered as predictors in a multiple linear regression 
model (enter method) with criterion scores as the outcome measure. The model was 
not significant overall [F(3,23) = .56, ns], nor were any of the predictors; proportion 
hits [β = -.76t(23) = -.61, ns], time[β = .00, t(23) = 1.19, ns] and mid radius size [β 
= .03, t(23) = .63, ns]. For the older adults, as in the previous experiments, there was 
no association between task performance and a liberal response threshold. Nor was 
there any association between criterion and LOT-R scores [r = -.21, ns]; performance 
optimism was not related general life optimism.  
5.4.3.1.2 Self-monitoring by task difficulty 
 
Because of floor and ceiling effects, there were missing data for 6 participants for 
stages 1 and 5, three participants for stages 2 and 4, and five participants for stage 3. 
The mean phi correlation coefficient, averaged across all five radius stages, was .24 
(SD = .21). The transformed scores were slightly, but non-significantly, correlated 
with hit rate [r = .38, ns], significantly correlated with mid radius size [r = .69, P 
< .001] and negatively correlated with movement time [r = -.51, p < .01]. A repeated 
measures ANOVA on the transformed phi coefficients, with radius stage at 5 levels, 
was non-significant: stage 1 (M = .19, SD = .21), stage 2 (M = .27, SD = .26), stage 3 
(M = .33, SD = .33), stage 4 (M = .24, SD = .29) stage 5 (M = .24, SD = .27), 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected [F(2.29, 36.59) = 2.44, ns]. As in the previous 





Figure 5.19. Motor task: Mean phi coefficients of correlation between actual and 
estimated proportion hits at radius stages 1 – 5. 
5.4.3.1.3 Estimation errors and the Dunning-Kruger effect 
 
The participants’ mean overall error was .16 (SD = .26, Range = -.30 to .52). As in 
Experiment 2, there was no association between hit rate and estimation error [r = 
-.29, ns], nor any partial correlation, controlling for the effects of time and mid radius 
size [r = -.21, ns].  
Figure 5.20 shows estimation error split into four quartiles of performance according 
to hit rate. A t-test on the estimation error at Q4 and Q1 revealed no significant 
difference; Q4 M = .21 (SD = .30), Q1 M = .05. (SD = .27) [t(12) = 1.04, ns]. While 
older adults over-estimated their performance, and particularly so when the task was 





Figure 5.20. Motor task: Mean estimation error for each quartile of hit rate. 
 
5.4.3.2 Visual memory task 
 
Table 5.8 shows the participants’ mean actual proportion hits, estimated proportion 
hits and mid radius size. As in the motor task, the calibrated radii yielded mean hit 
rates slightly lower than anticipated. There was no correlation between hit rate and 
mid-radius size [r = .18, ns], suggesting that the calibrated radii were suitably 










Radius Stage 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
Actual 
proportion hits 
.16 (.09) .34 (.15) .46 (.19) .60 (.21) .70 (.18) .45 (.12) 
Estimated 
proportion hits 
.35 (.26) .52 (.27) .66 (.23) .73 (.26) .78 (.24) .61 (.22) 















Table 5.8. Visual memory task: Mean actual proportion hits, estimated proportion 
hits and mid radius size. 
 
A within-subjects ANOVA on actual proportion hits and estimated proportion hits at 
the five different radius stages revealed a significant main effect of radius stage 
[F(1.97, 53.21) = 80.67 p <.001]. Follow up contrasts using the largest radius stage 
(M = .74, SE = .04) as a reference revealed that hit rates for all of the other radius 
stages were significantly lower; stage 1 (M = .25, SE = .03) [F(1, 27) = 133.68, p 
< .001], stage 2 (M = .43, SE = .03) [F(1, 27) = 68.93, p < .001], stage 3 (M = .56, 
SE = .03) [F(1, 27) = 58.47, p < .001] and stage 4 (M = .67, SE = .04) [F(1, 27) = 
11.96, p < .01]. There was also a main effect of hit type; across all radii, estimated 
hits were higher than actual hits [F(1, 27) = 12.91]. The interaction between the two 
just failed to reach significance [F(4, 108) = 2.45, p = .51]. On the visual memory 
task, older adults tended to over-estimate their performance across all levels of task 






Figure 5.21. Visual memory task: Actual and estimated hits at the five different 
radius stages. 
5.4.3.2.1 Self-monitoring by performance skill 
 
Data from one participant was removed from subsequent analyses, because of a 
100% false alarm rate. The average p(correct-hit) score of the remaining 27 
participants was .74 (SD = .21) and false alarm rate was .48 (SD = .22). As in the 
motor task, almost half of the misses were misclassified as hits. Participants’ mean 
sensitivity d’ score was .81 (SD = .35) and mean criterion -.33 (SD = .70). None of 
these measures were significantly different to scores on the motor task [ts≤ 1]. 
Correlation analysis on hit rate and sensitivity d’ revealed no significant association 
[r = .09, ns]. Nor was there any relationship between criterion and hit rate [r = -.11, 
ns], or between criterion and LOT-R scores [r = -.18, ns]. For older adults on the 
visual memory task, performance level was unrelated to self-monitoring skill or self-
estimation bias.  
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5.4.3.2.2 Self-monitoring by task difficulty 
 
Because of floor and ceiling effects, there was missing data for four participants from 
radius stage 1, three participants from stages 2 and 5, two participants from stage 3 
and five participants from stage 4. The mean phi correlation average across these five 
radius stages was .14 (SD = .13). As with the younger adults in Experiment 2, there 
was no association between the transformed coefficients and hit rate [r = -.18, ns], 
nor any effect of radius size from a repeated measures ANOVA on these scores; 
stage 1 (M = .12, SD = .24), stage 2 (M = .09, SD = .21), stage 3 (M = .15, SD 
= .26), stage 4 (M = .21, SD = .23) and stage 5 (M = .14, SD = .24), [F(4, 76) = .74, 
ns], see Figure 5.22. According to this, and all previous analyses, task difficulty did 
not differentially affect the ability to monitor motor or visual memory performance.  
 
 
Figure 5.22. Perceptual task: Mean phi coefficients of correlation between actual 




5.4.3.2.3 Estimation errors and the Dunning-Kruger effect 
 
The participants’ mean estimation error was .16 (SD = .23, Range = .31 to .57). 
There was no correlation between hit rate and error scores [r = -.36, ns], suggesting 
that over-estimation was not associated with poorer performance.   
Estimation error is shown by the four quartiles of hit rate in Figure 5.23. At every 
quartile, some degree of overestimation was apparent. A t-test on the estimation 
errors of Q1 and Q4 was non-significant; Q4 M = .22 (SD = .31), Q1M  = .02, (SD 
= .16) [t(12) = 1.48, ns]  
 
 
Figure 5.23. Visual memory task: Mean estimation error for each quartile of hit rate. 
 
For both the motor and visual memory tasks, self-monitoring among this older adult 
group appears to follow a different pattern to the younger adults in Experiment 2. 
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Most markedly, older adults consistently over-estimated their performance. This 
overestimation was not associated with skill level, though for the motor task it was 
more extreme at the more difficult levels of performance. For the visual memory 
task, there was also no association between skill and self-monitoring, in contrast with 
the results of Experiments 1 and 2. For the motor task, it is difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions about this, as the calibrated radii did not yield equivalent performance 
levels across participants, and the contribution of hit rate to sensitivity d’ scores was 
non-significant if the influence of radius size was held constant.  
5.5 Comparison of older and younger adults from 
Experiments 2 and 3 
 
5.5.1 Motor task 
 
Although attempts were made to keep the groups as homogenous as possible, apart 
from age, there were some other between-group differences. Considering the 
demographic measures, there were significantly more males than females in the older 
adults’ group compared to the younger adults [χ(1) = 4.46, p < .05]. There were also 
significant differences between the two groups on EHI scores, reflecting a greater 
degree of left-handedness in the younger adults group; younger adults M = 50.65 
(SD = 54.69), older adults M = 82.83 (SD = 21.56), [t(35.20) = -2.90, p <.01]. On 
average, younger adults had spent slightly longer in education than the older adults; 
younger adults M =17.86 (SD = 2.45), older adults M = 15.93 (SD = 3.04) [t(54) = 
2.62, p < .05].  
Considering the performance measures, there was no difference in hit rates between 
the two groups, suggesting that the fit function calculated radii that yielded 
equivalent levels of performance; younger adults (M = .49, SD = .14), older adults 
(M = .44, SD = .15) [t(54) = 1.29, ns]. Older adults had a significantly higher time-
out rate; younger adults M = .13 (SD = .09), older adults M = .23 (SD = .18) 
[t(41.28) = -2.73, p< .01]. Younger adults had significantly shorter movement times 
than older adults; younger adults M = 481 (SD = 110), older adults M = 710 (SD 
= .180) [t(54) = -5.76, p <.001]. Conversely, older adults has a significantly smaller 
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average mid radius size than younger adults; younger adults M = 13.80 (SD = 4.26), 
older adults M = 10.09 (SD = 4.29) [t(54) = 3.25, p < .01]. As previously described 
in the literature on ageing (Salthouse, 1979), the older adult participants were 
reluctant to sacrifice accuracy in order to increase their speed, even when confronted 
with frequent timeouts. Substantially slower movements by the older adults during 
the feedback stage led the programme to calibrate smaller radii, in order to maintain 
comparable accuracy levels with the younger adults, 
 
5.5.1.1 Self-monitoring by performance skill 
 
To compare the relationship between motor performance and self-monitoring skill 
across younger and older adults, a 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on sensitivity d’ 
scores with group (younger or older) and quartile by hits as between-subjects factors. 
Data from one older participant was not included in this analysis, because of an 
estimated hit rate of 0. There was an overall main effect of quartile [F(3, 47) = 5.44, 
p<.01]; Bonferroni corrected comparisons revealed that sensitivity was higher in Q2 
(M = 1.36, SD  = .54) than Q3 (M = .78, SD  = .62) [p < .05], and Q2 than Q4 (M 
= .64, SD  = .59) [p < .01]. No other comparisons were significant. There was also a 
main effect of group; younger adults had higher sensitivity d’ scores than older 
adults; younger adults (M = 1.15, SD = .59), older adults (M = .84, SD = .60)  [F(1, 






Figure 5.24. Motor task: younger and older adults’ sensitivity d’ scores at each 
quartile of hit rate. 
 
Because both movement time and mid radius size were associated with sensitivity d’ 
in the different groups, the ANOVA was re-run as an ANCOVA, with movement 
time and mid-radius size entered as covariates. This revealed a significant effect of 
quartile; [F(3, 45) = 3.24, p < .05]. However, in comparison to the ANOVA above, 
there was no effect of group; [F(1, 45) = .02, ns]. Once the effect of radius size and 
movement time were factored out, there was no difference between younger and 
older adults in their self-monitoring sensitivity. This suggests that the self-
monitoring difference between younger and older adults was attributable to 
differences in task skill, rather than age-related metacognitive changes. However, 
even with the covariates, the ability to self-monitor was greater for participants with 
higher hit rates. Across younger and older adults, participants with better motor 





5.5.1.2 Estimation errors and performance skill 
 
There was no age difference in estimated hits; younger adults M = .52 (SD = .24), 
older adults M = .60 (SD = .26) [t(54) = -1.29, ns]. However, older adults had higher 
estimation errors; younger adults M = .03 (SD = .23), older adults M = .16 (SD 
= .26) [t(54) = -2.09, p < .05]. To compare the relationship between motor 
performance and estimation errors across younger and older adults, the participants 
were split into quartiles according to their hit rate, and estimation error scores 
analysed in a 2 x 4 between-participants’ ANOVA. This confirmed a significant 
main effect of group [F(1, 48) = 4.22 , p < .05]. However there was no main effect of 
quartile [F(3 ,48) = 1.34, ns] or interaction between group and quartile[F(3, 48) 
= .12, ns]. These data suggest that older adults over-estimated their performance to a 
greater degree than younger adults, regardless of differences in actual performance, 






Figure 5.25. Motor task: younger and older adults’ estimation errors for each 
quartile of hit rate. 
 
5.5.1.3 Estimation errors and task difficulty 
 
As no previous experiments had demonstrated any influence of radius size on self-
monitoring indexed by phi coefficients, between-group differences for this measure 
were not addressed. However, there had been some influence of radius size on 
estimation error, most evidently for the older adults, who were far more likely to 
overestimate at the smaller radii. Therefore, to compare the impact of task difficulty 
on estimation errors across older and younger adults, a mixed ANOVA was 
performed on error scores, with radius (5 levels) as the within-subjects factor and 
group (younger and older adults) as the between-subjects factor. 
There was a significant main effect of radius; Greenhouse-Geisser corrected [F(3.30, 
179.83) = 12.12,  P < .001]. Follow up simple contrasts using the smallest radius 
stage as a baseline showed no difference between radius stages 1 and 2; stage 1 M 
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= .20 (SD = .32), stage 2 M = .16 (SD = .32) [F(1, 54) = 1.34, ns]. All other radius 
stages had substantially smaller estimation errors than stage 1; stage 3 M = .07 (SD 
= .31) [F(1, 54) = 15.22, p < .001], stage 4 M= .06 (SD = .24) [F(1, 54) = 13.65, p 
< .01] and stage 5 M = .01 (SD = .24) [F(1, 54) = 29.08, p <M .001].  
The effect of group just failed to reach significance; younger adults M = .03 (SD 
= .23) older adults M = .16 (SD = .26) [F(1,54) = 3.97, p= .051. However group did 
interact significantly with radius stage; Greenhouse-Geisser corrected [F(3.33, 
179.83) = 2.95, p < .05]. The magnitude of overestimation in older adults, compared 
to younger adults, was significantly greater at radius stage 1, compared with radius 
stage 2 [F(1,54) = 4.98, p < .05], stage 4 [F(1,54) = 5.16, p < .05], and stage 5 
[F(1,54) = 8.20, p < .01], but did not differ from stage 3 [F(1,54) = 2.77, ns]. This 
pattern of result suggests that, while older adults generally overestimated to a greater 
degree than younger adults, the extent of overestimation was greater when the radii 
were smaller. Older adults failed to adjust their performance expectations to account 






Figure 5.26. Motor task: Younger and older adults’ estimation errors at the five 
radius stages. 
 
5.5.2 Visual memory task 
 
On the visual memory task, younger adults had a significantly higher proportion of 
hits than older adults; younger adults M = .52 (SD = .13), older adults M = .45 (SD 
= .12) [t(54) = 2.10, p <.05]; the programme calibrated a task that was slightly more 
difficult for older adults than younger adults. In contrast to the motor task, the radius 
midpoint on the visual memory task was larger for older adults than younger adults; 
younger adults M = 16.59 (SD = 6.50), older adults M = 21.36 (SD = 8.32) [t(54) = -
2.39, p <.05]. These results suggest that the visual memory task was particularly 
difficult for older adults; unlike the motor task, there was no option to slow 




5.5.2.1 Self-monitoring by performance skill 
 
To compare the relationship between performance and self-monitoring skill across 
younger and older adults, a 2 x 4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on 
sensitivity d’ scores with group (younger or older adults) and quartile (by hit rate) as 
between-subjects factors. Data from the three younger adult participants and one 
older adult participant with a false alarm rate of 100% were not included in this 
analysis. No significant differences were found; quartile [F(3, 44) = 1.57, ns], group 
[F(1, 44) = .80, ns] and the interaction [F(3, 44) = 2.50, ns]. In contrast with the 
regression analysis on the younger adults scores in Experiment 2, which showed that 
hit rate predicted sensitivity d’, this analysis on the sensitivity d’ scores of both 
younger and older adults, with performance binned into quartiles, found no 
difference in self-monitoring skill across younger or older adults, or across levels of 
performance, see Figure 5.27. 
 
Figure 5.27. Visual memory task: younger and older adults’ sensitivity d’ scores at 




5.5.2.2 Estimation errors and performance skill 
 
As in the motor task, estimated hits did not differ between groups; younger adults M 
= .59 (SD = .22) older adults M = .61 (SD = .22) [t(54) = -.40, ns]. There was also no 
difference in estimation error; younger adults M = .07 (SD = .18) older adults M 
= .16 (SD = .23) [t(54) = -1.71, ns]. Although, considering the groups individually, 
older adults overestimated whereas younger adults did not, this did not translate into 
a between group difference for the visual memory task.  
To compare the relationship between performance and estimation error across 
younger and older adults, the participants were split into quartiles according to their 
hit rate, and error scores were analysed in a 2 x 4 between-participants ANOVA. 
None of these comparisons revealed any significant differences; Quartile [F(3, 48) 
= .90, ns], Group [F(1, 48) = 2.88, ns] and the interaction [F(3, 48)= .87, ns]. 
Looking at Figure 5.28, it is apparent that, on average, participants at all levels of 
performance and both age groups, overestimated to a degree, but with substantial 




Figure 5.28. Visual memory task: younger and older adults’ estimation errors for 
each quartile of hit rate. 
 
5.5.2.3 Estimation errors and task difficulty 
 
To address the impact of task difficulty on estimation errors across older and 
younger adults, a mixed ANOVA was performed on estimation error scores, with 
radius (5 levels) as the within-subjects factor and group (younger vs older adults) as 
the between-subjects factor. Again, none of the comparisons revealed any significant 
differences; Radius [F(4, 216) = 1.20, ns], Group [F(1, 54) = 2.63, ns] and the 





Figure 5.29. Visual memory task: Younger and older adults’ estimation errors at the 





The self-monitoring skills of a group of older adults were assessed on a motor and 
visual memory task. In two previous experiments with younger adults, it had been 
demonstrated that performance skill significantly predicted the ability to monitor 
successes and failures; participants with higher hit rates were better able to judge 
whether or not they had hit the target. This was not replicated for the older adults on 
the visual memory task. For the motor task, there appeared to be a relationship 
between task skill and self-monitoring success, however this was no longer apparent 
once the influence of radius size was taken into account. It is possible that the 
positive relationship between mid-radius size and self-monitoring sensitivity was an 
artefact of the task calibration processes; those participants who had privileged 
accuracy over speed during the stage 1 time limit calculation were given longer 
subsequently to hit the target during the feedback stage 2, leading the programme to 
calibrate smaller radii for the self-monitoring stage 3. This set them at a disadvantage 
compared to their faster-moving peers, which is reflected in the positive correlation 
between mid-radius size and hit rate. It may be, therefore, that the improved self-
monitoring of participants with larger radii represents the advantage of a faster, more 
ballistic approach (see below) rather than anything inherently beneficial about having 
a larger target to aim for.  
In comparing sensitivity d’ scores across older and younger adults, the higher scores 
of the younger group were not significantly different to the older adults once the 
effects of radius size and movement time were controlled. It appears that the lower 
sensitivity observed in older adults was mediated by performance factors rather than 
metacognitive factors. One of the major challenges for this study was how to 
homogenize performance across older and younger participants. Simply maintaining 
equivalent hit rates does not address age-related changes to motor performance, or 
the different strategies that older and younger adults may use to undertake the task. 
Physically, the ability to generate and regulate the appropriate force to perform 
reaching movements declines with age (Walker, Philbin & Fisk, 1997). Strategically, 
older adults are more error averse, and less willing to sacrifice accuracy for speed 
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(Salthouse, 1979, Ratcliff, Thapar & McKoon, 2001). In Experiment 3, the older 
adults had substantially slower movement times than younger adults. Regardless of 
whether this difference was physical or strategic, it has implications for the older 
adults’ ability to monitor successes and failures, as greater decay of the memory 
trace likely put them at a perceptual disadvantage.  
Furthermore, it is highly likely that differences in the performance of reaching 
movements would impact upon older adults’ ability to monitor success and failure in 
hitting a target. Such movements typically incorporate both an initial acceleration 
and subsequent deceleration (Ketcham & Stelmach, 2004); various studies have 
shown that older adults spend longer in the deceleration phase of the movement, 
compared to younger adults (Ketcham, Seidler, Van Gemmert & Stelmach, 2002; 
Pratt, Chasteen & Abrams, 1994). This likely reflects an increased reliance on 
corrective submovements, using visual feedback and error correction to accurately 
reach the target (Goggin & Meeuwsen, 1992; Seidler & Stelmach, 1995). 
Conversely, younger adults tend to use a one-shot ballistic strategy, whereby the 
entire movement is planned in advance, unless the task is sufficiently difficult to 
make this impossible (Poletti, Sleimen-Malkoun, Temprado & Lemaire, 2015). In 
support of this proposal, it has been demonstrated that older adults are affected to a 
greater extent when visual feedback is masked during the execution of movement, 
particularly for movements of longer amplitude (Haaland et al., 1993).  
These differences in movement execution, which limit the comparability of older and 
younger adults, may also have implications for the ability of older adults to monitor 
their performance. If, as outlined in the Introduction, awareness of movement 
accuracy is based upon motor plans rather than feedback, then the ballistic strategies 
of younger adults should provide more accurate information about the likely success 
of a movement, especially if (as in these experiments) the target has been removed 
from view. It has also been suggested that older adults have a greater ratio of noise to 
force in generating movements (Welford, 1984), and that older adults’ reliance on 
feedback may be a method of compensating for increased variability in movement 
outcome (Goggin & Meeuwsen, 1992; Poletti et al., 2015, Walker et al., 1997). All 
of these performance factors that are reportedly characteristic of older adults – longer 
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movement times, greater reliance on feedback, increased variability of movement – 
may also be the sequelae of imprecision in motor planning. An age-related decline in 
movement self-monitoring may therefore be mediated by differences in motor skill 
rather than metacognitive skill. Future research could perhaps investigate whether 
the accuracy of motor self-monitoring is affected by the type and duration of 
movement subcomponents.  
One of the benefits of the design of the two latter experiments was the inclusion of a 
within-subjects manipulation of task difficulty, through the provision of five stages 
of target size, individually calibrated so that each stage would yield roughly 
equivalent hit rates across participants. While there were too few trials to assess 
sensitivity d’ scores at each radius size, I was able to investigate the impact of task 
difficulty on self-monitoring skill by calculating the phi coefficient of correlation 
between actual and estimated hits for each participant and examining how these 
differed by radius stage. For the older adults, as for the younger adults, there was no 
effect of difficulty on these coefficients, for either the motor or the visual memory 
task. While individual differences in skill levels affected the ability to self-monitor, 
task-based differences in difficulty did not.  
In addition to the signal-detection investigation, I also considered whether poorer 
performance or more difficult task demands were associated with over-confidence, 
through examination of participants’ estimation errors (their actual proportion of hits 
minus their estimated proportion). I found that older adults consistently 
overestimated their performance, and for the motor task this was significantly 
different to younger adults, who had no systematic tendency towards over-
estimation. For the visual memory task, older adults estimated their hit rates to be 
significantly higher than their actual hit rates, but their estimation error was not 
significantly different to the younger adults, who also marginally (non-significantly) 
over-estimated. Moreover, difficulty had a significant effect upon participants’ 
estimation errors on the motor task. For the younger adults, estimated hits were 
significantly higher than actual hits for the second radius stage only. For the older 
adults, there was a marked impact of radius stage; the difference between estimated 
and actual hits was greater for all radius stages compared to the largest. In fact, older 
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adults barely adjusted their expectations to take into account changes to the difficulty 
of the task, no matter that their actual performance was markedly different across 
stages. In comparison with younger adults, the magnitude of overestimation was 
greater at the smallest radius stage than all others except stage 3. Not only did older 
adults overestimate more than younger adults, but they did so excessively when the 
task was hard.  
Unlike the association between hit rate and sensitivity to performance, there was no 
correlation between hit rate and estimation error in either the older adult participant 
group of Experiment 3 or the younger adult group in Experiment 2. The individual 
calibration method worked to reduce the association between performance and the 
underlying skill level, by positioning participants of all skill level closer together in 
performance. This manipulation reduced the magnitude of the estimation errors 
among the less skilled participants so the correlation between hit rate and estimation 
error, which had been strong under a natural range of performance in Experiment 1, 
was no longer evident. This further suggests that the correlation in Experiment 1 was 
driven by performance factors, i.e. more extreme performers giving more regressive 
estimates, than underlying skill on the task. Conversely, the sensitivity d’ measure, a 
more powerful index of self-monitoring ability than estimation error, was associated 
with hit rate, even when performance was more constrained. This correlation, I 
suggest is driven by underlying skill, rather than level of performance.  
If Dunning and Kruger (1999) found a “psychological analogue to anosognosia” 
(Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1130), then perhaps these experiments take this one 
step further, by suggesting a more direct analogue, demonstrating how lower skill in 
performing movements may be associated with reduced motor awareness in healthy 
individuals. Crucially, the findings from these experiments point towards a different 
interpretation than the classic Dunning-Kruger effect of over-confidence among the 
worst performers. In the younger adult groups, any overestimation effects among the 
worst performers could be attributable to the more regressive estimates driven by 
more extreme scores. Instead, it appears that poor performance was associated with 
worse online error-monitoring, possibly because the motor plans or memory traces 
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upon which awareness is based are more variable, increasing the threshold for error 
signalling and making it harder to determine success from failure. 
This important novel finding may contribute to our understanding of some of the 
mechanisms underlying anosognosia. Unlike the catastrophic failures of movement 
and awareness that inflict AHP patients, the deficits of the poor-performers in these 
experiments were both subtle and lay on a continuum of normal performance. But 
like their neuropsychological counterparts, these participants lacked the self-
monitoring skills to provide optimal awareness of their movement failures. On this 
basis, it is conceivable that the unawareness of anosognosia represents the extreme 
end of a continuum of association between motor planning and motor awareness. 
The crucial component is the continued generation of severely degraded motor plans 
and efferent copies of the anticipated outcome of movement. Increased noise in the 
motor system raises the threshold for a discrepancy between these two internal 
models to a degree that errors rarely reach awareness. The motor system continues to 
believe it is functioning normally, even in the face of seemingly overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary.  
For the older adult participants, some degree of overestimation was apparent. 
However, as with the younger adults, this was not significantly greater for the worst 
performers than the best performers. Rather than being driven by differences in skill, 
overestimation appeared to be an age-related phenomenon, whereby older adults 
were unable to adequately adjust their expectations in line with the changing 
demands of the task or their lower performance levels. This also has parallels with 
anosognosia; Vocat, Saj and Vuilleumier (2013) have suggested that AHP patients 
may be unaware of their deficits because they fail to update their beliefs in line with 
the changes wrought by a stroke. Perhaps a similar failure to update self-estimates in 
line with the decreased motor performance of older age underlies the overconfidence 
of the older adult participants in Experiment 3; they based their estimates on an out-
dated version of their skill level.  
Of course, the conditions under which AHP arises are far from normal, and there are 
many aspects of the disorder that have no parallel for individuals without paralysis. 
The lack of concern or undue optimism frequently associated with anosognosia 
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cannot be explained purely by damage to motor intention systems, unless these 
systems typically involve an emotional component, for example in the signalling of 
errors, that is also damaged in AHP. It is also necessary to account for the variability 
of the disorder, and the fact that it is so often associated with the acute stages after a 
stroke, seeming to resolve over subsequent weeks or months. These caveats aside, 
the findings from these experiments suggest that it is possible to observe a type of 
anosognosia for movement failures in neurologically intact individuals, and 





Conclusions and future directions 
 
At its outset, the main aims of this thesis were: to devise a measure of anosognosia 
for impairments in activities of daily living, and trial this with a group of chronic 
stage stroke patients; to investigate whether over/underestimation of abilities in the 
acute stages after a stroke generalised across motor and cognitive tasks; and to 
investigate whether such over/underestimation predicted functional ability three 
months after a stroke. However, after serous setbacks to data collection, outlined in 
Appendix 1, it became apparent that the longitudinal aspects of the study were far 
too ambitious for the timeframe of a PhD. Instead, the questions were reformulated 
in response to some theoretical questions and methodological issues that had arisen 
during the research conducted for Chapter 4. Following the recommendation of 
Vuilleumier (2004) that it is necessary to address the neuropsychological 
mechanisms underlying normal awareness of success and failure, I asked if a 
corollary to anosognosia could be identified in neurologically intact populations. 
More fundamentally, if there is an association between poor motor skills and 
inaccurate self-monitoring, could the pathological unawareness of anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (AHP) plausibly represent the extreme end of this continuum? 
This final chapter of the thesis draws together the main findings from the empirical 
chapters. Rather than providing a recapitulation of the experiments, I have chosen to 
present the findings first within a wider discussion of which cognitive and clinical 
features characterised overestimation in the patient groups, with a particular focus on 
global versus domain-specific components, and then secondly according to which 
aspects of AHP can and cannot be explained within the context of normal variation 
in self-monitoring. Finally, these considerations lead into the discussion of a 
proposed multi-level model of AHP, in which somatic warning signals form a 
component of the motor error monitoring system, and may be crucial in generating 
awareness of movement failures. While the foundations of this theory have been laid 
down previously (Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010), a possible role for somatic warnings 
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has not been elaborated to any great extent. The thesis ends with the presentation of 
two proposed experiments that could provide interesting directions for future 
research. 
 
6.1 The characteristics of overestimation  
 
One of the novel aspects of the research conducted for both Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
thesis was the inclusion of a group of underestimators, as well as the classically 
anosognosic overestimators, in the measurement of awareness of ADL ability 
(Chapter 3) and motor skill (Chapter 4). This approach allowed for an investigation 
into the cognitive and emotional features that were associated specifically with 
overestimation, and which could point towards the processes that characterise 
anosognosia. However, it also highlighted a methodological issue, relating to the use 
of discrepancy scores as awareness measures when performance levels vary across a 
wide range. This issue is outlined at length in Section 4.3.5 of this thesis. Briefly, the 
sometimes extreme levels of underestimation of motor skills observed in the 
experiments conducted for Chapter 4 highlighted how much of the variation in 
awareness could be explained by variation in actual performance. This has 
implications for any comparison conducted on discrepancy scores, where the 
underlying actual performance measure (whether task-based or caregiver-rated) 
correlates with the measure to which the discrepancies are being compared. For this 
reason, it is difficult to disentangle how far some of the features that characterised 
the overestimators group, such as lower functional and cognitive ability, were 
indicators of unawareness, or indicators of lower levels of motor skill. 
Methodological issues aside, the finding that there was a significant difference in 
distribution of RBD and LBD patients across the underestimators and overestimators 
groups, with RBD patients far more likely to overestimate and LBD patients more 
likely to underestimate, points towards a qualitatively distinct, perhaps classically 
‘anosognosic’ profile for the overestimators. As well as being differentiated from the 
underestimators by their lower Barthel scores of functional ability and global 
cognitive ability, the overestimators were also more impaired within the domain of 
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attention and executive function. The results are therefore consistent with the 
proposal that at least some of patients in the overestimators group were characterised 
by a right-hemisphere mediated set of impairments of attention, executive function 
and motor awareness, which could be linked by either a functional relationship or the 
anatomical proximity of brain damage.  
Interestingly, although the exact same approach of classifying patients as 
underestimators or overestimators was taken in Chapter 3, which investigated 
chronic unawareness of ADL ability, a different pattern of findings emerged. There 
was considerable variation in caregiver scores, demonstrating that the group was 
heterogeneous in their functional ability. However levels of overestimation exceeded 
underestimation, in terms of both the number of patients in each group and the 
magnitude of discrepancy scores. Furthermore, unlike the findings from Chapter 4, 
there was no difference between the groups in their levels of cognitive impairments, 
measured by the MMSE. No differences were observed in lesion distribution either, 
though this comparison was restricted by small cell sizes, and it may be that a larger 
sample would reveal a higher proportion of RBD patients in the overestimators 
group. While the difference in measures used limits the comparisons that can be 
made across the two studies, it is possible that the skills required to evaluate long-
term functional ability are different from those involved in assessing specific motor 
impairments, or that the characteristics associated with overestimation differ between 
the acute and chronic stages after a stroke.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding from Chapter 4 was the observation that the 
group of patients who overestimated their motor skills also overestimated their 
performance on the cognitive tasks assessing memory, spatial attention and executive 
function. This suggests that at least some aspects of the tendency towards over-
estimation of motor skills also generalised to cognitive tasks, perhaps suggesting a 
more global component difficulty in evaluating ability. Together, the results 
presented in Chapter 4 are consistent with a multi-component model of anosognosia, 
whereby specific deficits in spatial attention or motor skill monitoring, likely 
associated with right hemisphere lesions, may contribute to domain-specific deficits 
in awareness, while more global deficits in cognition generally impede the evaluation 
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of current ability, and predispose patients towards overestimation across multiple 
tasks or functions.  
 
6.2 AHP and self-monitoring in healthy individuals 
 
As Marková and Berrios (2014) point out, the concept of ‘anosognosia’ depends 
upon the conceptualisation of consciousness as an independent entity, separable from 
the primary function; even the language in which anosognosia is framed - 
‘anosognosia for hemiplegia’, ‘anosognosia for neglect’ – emphasises the idea of a 
phenomenon that is secondary and additional to the primary disorder. This 
conceptualisation has perhaps not been challenged as often or as explicitly as it 
should (though see Vocat et al., 2010 for an exception), especially if the monitoring 
of a process is instigated, partly or entirely, by the same neural network that controls 
it (Berti et al., 2005; Vossel et al., 2012). If this is the case, it follows that monitoring 
failures, or deficits in awareness, could arise as a consequence of failures at the 
control level, provided these processes were sufficiently intact that the system 
continued to attempt to generate commands and monitor their output. In the case of 
AHP, for example, distorted motor commands may still be generated, but their 
failure is not detected, because of damage to the ‘comparator’, which should detect 
the mismatch between intention and outcome (Berti et al., 2007), or because the 
parameters for error signalling become pathologically relaxed with the sudden 
increase of noise in the motor system (Jenkinson and Fotopoulou, 2010; Preston et 
al., 2010).  
If the accuracy of movement monitoring depends partly on the level of noise in the 
motor system, then it may be that healthy individuals with ‘noisier’ systems are less 
aware of successes and failure in planned movements. This was the main hypothesis 
behind the research conducted for Chapter 5, which tested whether younger and 
older adults who were more skilled in reaching for a target, were also better able to 
judge when they had succeeded in hitting it than the less skilled, in the absence of 
visual feedback. Surprisingly I was unable to find any previous research addressing 
this question, though Dunning and Kruger had proposed a counterpart, a 
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“psychological analogue to anosognosia” (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, p. 1130) within 
cognitive domains, whereby the ability to recognise success or failure in a tasks may 
depend upon the same processes required to perform skilfully. This followed from 
the authors’ observations that participants with lower skill levels tended to 
considerably overestimate their ability (Dunning et al., 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 
1999). The results largely followed the first hypothesis but not the second; 
participants with higher overall hit rates and faster movement times were, on a trial 
by trial basis, better able to judge when they had hit or missed the target. However, 
any over-estimation effects were largely attributable to variation in actual 
performance. 
The experiments conducted in Chapter 5 provide some evidence that, even in healthy 
individuals, the ability to monitor movements depends upon the accuracy of motor 
plans. This is consistent with a model of motor awareness whereby less accurate 
motor programmes produce more variable efferent copies and a greater tolerance for 
discrepancies in the signalling of errors. When applied to pathological unawareness, 
these findings provide a plausible means by which some aspects of AHP could arise 
from similar mechanisms to those that underlie normal variation in self-monitoring. 
There is no additional ‘awareness’ deficit required for this process; the inability to 
appreciate movement failure could arises as a consequence of extreme noise in the 
motor system coupled with the damaged brain’s continued attempts to produce and 
monitor movements. In comparison, where paralysis arises as a result of peripheral 
nerve damage, both motor intentions and monitoring processes may still be 
functioning normally, so that the discrepancy between intention and outcome is 
signalled immediately, leading to awareness of movement failures.  
While the findings above provide some clues as to how failures in domain-specific 
self-monitoring processes can contribute to anosognosia, this cannot be the whole 
picture. In particular, motor self-monitoring failures do not explain the predominance 
of AHP in RBD patients; a finding that has been frequently reported in the stroke 
literature (Orfei et al., 2007) and replicated in the results of the study reported in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, looking at motor skill overestimation in the acute stages after 
a stroke. Specific damage to lateralised neurological structures involved in 
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generating specific functions may impair self-monitoring of those function, for 
example the left hemisphere auditory association area in Wernicke’s aphasia 
(Kertesz & Benson, 1970) or the right angular and right superior temporal gyrus in 
unilateral neglect (Vossel et al., 2012). But for movement, the contralateral control of 
which is equivalent across both hemispheres, the predominance of right-hemisphere 
lesions requires explanation. If AHP were purely contingent upon degraded motor 
plans (Berti et al., 2005) and pathologically relaxed thresholds for error motor 
signalling (Preston et al., 2010) then there is no reason why it should be more 
common in right hemisphere patients. Therefore, to account for this lateralization, 
there must be either some low-level aspect of the error signalling system that are 
preferentially processed by the right hemisphere, or the right hemisphere is 
implicated in the failure to integrate these signals into a high-order, veridical 
representation of body ownership and motor control (Karnath & Baier, 2010).  
 
6.3 Could error signals in AHP function as somatic warnings?  
 
Hemispheric lateralization provides one central feature of AHP that must be 
accounted for by any neuropsychological model of the disorder based upon motor 
planning and control, and the emotional component of unawareness provides a 
second. While the patients reported in Chapter 4 did not show a particular tendency 
to report less negative emotion, there are many observations within the anosognosia 
literature that unawareness of deficit is associated with, or precedes, a lack of 
concern (Heilman & Harciarek, 2010. Furthermore, there are several reports of 
altered emotional processes in anosognosic patients, including implicit emotional 
reactions to deficit-related stimuli (Fotopoulou et al., 2010; Nardone et al., 2008), 
extreme emotional reactions, for example hatred towards a paretic limb (Critchley, 
1973), or greater instances of crying triggered by events unrelated to their condition 
(Turnbull, Jones & Reed-Screen, 2002).  
Interestingly, this first feature, the predominance of hemisphere lesions in AHP, has 
been often cited as an argument against emotional accounts of the disorder, 
particularly those based on psychological processes of motivation and denial 
239 
 
(Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Heilman & Harciarek, 2010); if unawareness were 
driven by denial, there would be no reason to anticipate a greater need for defence 
against left-sided hemiplegia than right-sided. However, if emotion is considered at a 
neurological rather than psychological level, given the considerable evidence 
suggesting that the right hemisphere is preferentially involved in emotional 
processes, particularly unconscious, automatic ones (Gainotti, 2012), these two 
features are not incompatible. In fact, the role of the right hemisphere in processing 
emotions may underpin the asymmetry of lesion distribution in AHP, as well as the 
fluctuations in awareness that are frequently observed in anosognosia (Turnbull, et 
al., 2002). 
Some neuropsychological models, particularly those based on multiple factors, do 
make provision for an emotional component to AHP. Perhaps most explicitly, 
Turnbull et al. (2014) have suggested that right hemisphere lesions may lead to a 
disruption to an emotion regulation system that impedes the patient’s ability to 
perceive the world ‘allocentrically’, i.e. how things actually are, privileging instead 
an egocentric perspective of how he/she wants things to be. The patient therefore 
reverts to a developmentally-early tendency to deny the deficit, based on an 
emotionally-motivated view that the limb is functioning properly, rather than 
objective reality that it is not. This idea is supported by the observation that some 
AHP patients can become temporarily aware of their paralysis when viewing 
themselves in the third person, for example via video replay (Fotopoulou, Rudd, 
Holmes & Kopelman, 2009). There is also a role for emotional processes in the 
model presented by Vocat and Vuilleumier (2010), which suggests that error 
monitoring occurs by two separate channels, one explicit, leading to conscious 
awareness, and one implicit and non-conscious. This latter channel is hypothesized 
to contain dimensions that are connected to emotions and arousal:  “A lesion, 
disconnection or degradation affecting sensorimotor feedback to these pathways 
might therefore suppress any kind of implicit warning signal when an incorrect 
motor action occurs.’ (Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010 p. 377).  
I suggest that this warning signal may be an integral component of the motor self-
monitoring systems; a malfunction in its operation could account for the several of 
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the features observed in the clinical presentation of AHP.  Somatosensory signals are 
inherently emotional in nature (Damasio, Everitt & Bishop, 1996). Craig (2002, 
2009) has postulated that our internal model of bodily states – our ‘interoception’ - is 
derived from the integration of multiple sensory signals via a pathway that is 
phylogenetically unique to primates and converges in the anterior insular cortex 
(AIC), giving rise to a self-awareness that is based upon the physiological state of the 
body. The sensory feedback that should update awareness when there is a 
discrepancy between intended and actual movement outcome, (Blakemore et al., 
2002) is therefore likely to incorporate a powerful affective, autonomic component 
that acts as a warning when movement fails.  
How might such a warning signal be processed neurologically and manifest 
clinically? Considering the neuroanatomy of AHP, it has been proposed that several 
cortical and subcortical structures, as well as white matter tracts connecting these 
areas, are involved in generating motor awareness (Orfei et al, 2007; Pia et al., 2004; 
Vocat et al., 2010). These areas likely constitute a system of movement self-
monitoring that involves the generation of motor plans, detection of discrepancies 
between intended outcome and sensory feedback, the production of a 
somatic/emotional error signal, reception and appraisal of that signal and the 
generation of both the appropriate (implicit) behavioural response and conscious 
awareness of the error. Lesions to any one of the neurological regions implicated in 
these processes could cause a deficit of awareness. Moreover the type or degree of 
unawareness may depend upon the site and extent of the lesion, with damage to 
different elements giving rise to explicit or implicit levels of awareness (Vocat & 
Vuilleumier, 2010).  
One region that has been implicated in anosognosia is the premotor cortex, 
particularly in the hyperacute stage (Vocat et al., 2010). This area is involved in the 
production of motor plans, which suggests a direct correspondence between the 
generation and monitoring of movement (Berti et al., 2005). If damaged, it may be 
that anosognosia arises at the level of movement specification, for example 
generating motor plans that are too distorted to give rise to awareness (Berti et al., 
2005), especially if the comparator responsible for detecting a mismatch between 
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intention and outcome has pathologically relaxed the threshold for signalling errors 
(Jenkinson and Fotopoulou (2010); Preston et al., 2010), as described above. In this 
instance, no warning signal would be generated, which may result in total implicit or 
explicit anosognosia for movement failures, as awareness of action continues to be 
based on upon efferent copies of motor commands (Blakemore et al., 2002). 
However, it is plausible that damage to different regions of the brain may allow some 
aspects of a somatic warning signal to be processed. For example, lesions to the 
anterior insula have been frequently observed in anosognosic patients (Baier, & 
Karnath, 2008; Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010). Along with the cingulate cortex, this 
region (particular the anterior portion) has been associated with error monitoring 
(Vocat et al., 2010), the processing of emotional material (Damasio et al., 2000) and 
the sense of control over one’s own limbs (Farrer et al., 2003; Karnath & Baier, 
2010). Moreover, Straube and Miltner (2011) proposed that the perception of bodily 
responses is integral to emotional experience, and that the insula is the region 
responsible for making these evaluations. If motor error warning signals are 
generated but damage to the insula prevents them being integrated into 
consciousness representations of the body’s physical state, then these signals may 
only be processed at an autonomic level (Vocat and Vuilleumier, 2010), and 
awareness only evoked by tasks or measures that assess awareness through implicit 
or physiological means (Cocchini et al., 2010; Nardone et al., 2008). 
Alternatively, it is possible that some level of anosognosia may arise through direct 
damage to limbic structures involved in emotional experience, or subcortical tracts 
connecting these to cortical areas, for example, the amygdala, which projects to the 
insula and has been implicated in AHP (Vocat el al., 2010). Damage to these regions 
could potentially engender a situation whereby a patient has sufficient monitoring 
processes to acknowledge movement failures, but the absence of an 
emotional/somatic signal leads to a conflict between what the system ‘feels’ to be 
true and the evidence presented to it. This could lead to fluctuating levels of 
awareness (Turnbull et al., 2002), and the paradoxical situation whereby a patient 
explicitly acknowledges their paralysis but continues to act as though there is nothing 
wrong (Cocchini et al., 2010).  
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The absence, or lack of integration, of a somatic warning signal may contribute to the 
anosodiaphoria, or lack of concern, exhibited by some stroke patients (Heilman & 
Harciarek, 2010). Anosodiaphoria is typically described as a ‘milder’ form of 
unawareness (Heilman et al., 1998), or considered to develop from it (Vocat et al., 
2010). However, rather than being unconcerned by a deficit because there are 
unaware of it, perhaps these patients are unaware because they are unconcerned; 
without the affective component of the error signal to act as warning, it may only be 
possible to achieve a superficial level of awareness through inference from the 
functional consequences of hemiplegia, or the repeated assertions of clinicians 
(Cocchini et al., 2009; Cocchini et al., 2012; Heilman & Harciarek, 2010). 
The suggestion that delusional beliefs or behaviours can develop from the 
disconnection of affective information from cognitive appraisal is not without 
precedent. The Capgras delusion, whereby people become convinced that friends and 
family have been replaced by imposters, provides one example. Ellis and Lewis 
(2001) suggest that this delusion highlights that face recognition is a dual-route 
process, with separable autonomic and overt components. The authors compare this 
phenomenon to patients with prosopagnosia, who have been demonstrated to show 
autonomic responses to faces that they cannot overtly recognize (Bauer, 1984). Ellis 
and Lewis (2001) propose that the Capgras delusion and prosopagnosia represent a 
double dissociation between autonomic/affective and overt/cognitive processing. A 
similar point is made by Davies et al. (2005) in discussion of their general two-factor 
theory of delusions, of which they consider both the Capgras delusion and 
anosognosia to be examples. While the authors make no specific predictions about 
the role of affective processing in anosognosia, it is plausible that an absent, 
degraded or disconnected affective signal could be a first factor; a 
neuropsychological anomaly that forms the basis of the delusion of movement where 
none has occurred.  
Given the experimental evidence that AHP can manifest differently at explicit and 
implicit levels, there is surprisingly little research into whether different neural 
correlates underpin these different types of unawareness. One study by Moro et al. 
(2011), found that the complete absence of implicit and explicit awareness was 
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associated with lesions to the middle-temporal cortex and to white subcortical frontal 
matter around the basal ganglia. Fotopoulou et al. (2010) measured implicit 
awareness in stroke patients through increased response latencies to deficit-related 
stimuli, in the absence of any explicit acknowledgment of the self-relevance of those 
stimuli, on a modified version of the Hayling task (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). Only 
one patient exhibited no implicit awareness; this patient had lesions in similar areas 
to those who did show implicit awareness, particularly in the anterior insula, but 
interestingly not in the amygdala. This finding seems somewhat counterintuitive; as 
Vocat et al. (2010) suggest, if the amygdala is implicated in AHP, this is likely 
through “deficient processing of the abnormal or threatening feedback generated by a 
paralysed limb and motor failures,” (Vocat et al., 2010, p. 3594.) There are limits to 
the conclusions that can be drawn from a single patient in a single study; however, 
this highlights the importance of matching different levels of awareness to 
neurological correlates. 
 
6.4 Future directions and two proposed experiments 
 
Of the various potential avenues for future research that could follow from the 
findings reported in this thesis, there are two lines of investigation that I would be 
particularly interested in pursuing. These are outlined below. Both are very much 
idealized versions; they would likely require revision when faced with the practical 
challenges of obtaining NHS ethical approval and recruiting a sufficient sample of 
patients with AHP.  
 
6.4.1 Proposed study 1 
 
This experiment would extend the research conducted for Chapter 5 to incorporate a 
clinical element. I would utilise the self-monitoring task with a group of stroke 
patients, with and without AHP, in order to compare how their monitoring of the 
non-plegic limb compared with that of healthy controls. Certain modifications would 
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necessary; for example presenting all targets to the right visual field, to mitigate any 
effects of unilateral neglect, which may be disproportionately higher in the 
anosognosic group. Otherwise, as the programme calibrates task difficulty to each 
participant’s ability, it should be possible to match performance across anosognosic 
and non-anosognosic groups, and so compare any differences in their motor self-
monitoring, irrespective of actual performance.  
The study would recruit three groups of participants; hemiplegic patients with 
anosognosia, hemiplegic patients without anosognosia and healthy age-matched 
controls. In order to ensure reasonably homogenous groups, only patients with 
moderate to severe motor impairment would be selected and only those with 
moderate or severe unawareness designated anosognosic. The study would only 
recruit right-handed participants and, in the case of the patient groups, right-sided 
lesions, so that all participants were able to complete the task with their dominant 
hand. Following the results of Preston et al. (2010), it is anticipated that anosognosic 
patients would have far less awareness of the accuracy of their motor plans, which 
should be reflected in lower sensitivity to success and failure on the task, compared 
to hemiplegic patients without anosognosia and healthy controls. While the latter two 
groups may be more similar in performance, it is possible that the aware hemiplegic 
patients may also be less sensitive than healthy controls, if their own motor system 
has become degraded or damaged. It is also hypothesised that anosognosic patients 
would be more likely to overestimate their motor performance, however the already 
high levels of overestimation observed in the older adults in chapter 5 suggests that 
motor skill overestimation may be a feature of healthy ageing, and the anosognosic 
patients would need to show extreme overestimation in order to exceed the controls.  
One other modification that I would like to add to this study is the inclusion of a 
measure whereby participants provide global estimates of their scores and percentile 
ranking compared to their peers. It is a limitation to the study reported in chapter five 
that these measures were not included originally. The methodology employed, which 
extracted global estimated scores by summing trial by trial estimates, was tailored to 
the specific research questions of the study, however it limited the comparisons that 
could be drawn between my findings and the findings reported by other researchers 
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investigating the Dunning-Kruger effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). I could not be 
certain that my failure to replicate that effect was due to the fact that there was no 
relationship between lower ability and overestimation on these tasks, rather than 
because of methodological differences. For future research, the inclusion of pre-task 
and post-task global estimates would help clarify this, as well as providing a measure 
of emergent awareness (Moro et al., 2011), to address whether participants are able 
to use their experience of the task to update performance evaluations.  
 
6.4.2 Proposed study 2 
 
The second proposed experiment would investigate the hypothesis that different 
levels of implicit and explicit awareness may relate to the integrity of affective 
signals and their integration into subjective awareness of bodily states. The 
experiment would use different tasks to elicit explicit and implicit awareness, for 
example the modified emotional Hayling task used by Fotopoulou et al (2010), or the 
modified version of the bimanual actions task (Cocchini et al., 2010), used by Moro 
et al. (2011). Skin conductance responses (SCRs) would be measured during the 
performance of these tasks, as an index of autonomic responses to the stimuli. 
Participants would be divided into four groups on the basis of their performance on 
the tasks: total anosognosia; implicit awareness without explicit acknowledgement of 
deficit; explicit acknowledgement with no implicit awareness; full explicit and 
implicit awareness (non-anosognosic controls).  
SCRs during task performance would be investigated for any evidence of differential 
autonomic activity between the two groups, particularly to see whether patients 
showing implicit awareness exhibit higher levels of activity than those who are 
explicitly aware but not implicitly, or those with no awareness of deficit. The 
distribution of lesions would also be analysed for any differences between the 
groups. Very little research has been conducted on SCRs in AHP patients. 
Hildebrandt & Zieger (1995) report a case study of a patient with dense left-sided 
hemiplegia and AHP who showed increased electrodermal activity, measured by 
SCRs, when instructed to imagine various activities, for example peeling potatoes, 
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but not when instructed to attempt to open a bottle with the plegic limb. Therefore, 
while the patient sometimes exhibited amplified SCRs, this did not happen in 
response to intended movement. However, the study did not include any behavioural 
measures of implicit awareness; the research proposed here would further these 
investigations by testing whether behaviourally elicited implicit awareness would be 
accompanied by autonomic responses.  
6.5 Conclusions 
 
The experiments outlined in this thesis have presented several novel findings and 
provided some significant challenges to the assumptions of research into self-
awareness. Initial results from the VATA-ADL suggest that anosognosia for the 
functional difficulties after a stroke may persist long-term, which could interfere with 
the patient’s return to independent living. The observation that, not only do some 
stroke patients drastically underestimate their movement ability, but that 
underestimation and overestimation are consistent across motor and cognitive 
domains, suggests that it is problematic to use patient-caregiver agreement as a 
baseline of awareness, and that perhaps more attention should be given to cognitive, 
personality or mood differences that could affect self-assessment over and above any 
self-monitoring deficits linked to impairments in the primary function. Finally, the 
experiments reported in chapter 5 demonstrate that, in healthy individuals, there is an 
association between poor motor skills and inaccurate self-monitoring, suggesting that 
some of the mechanisms underlying AHP in stroke patients may also be present in 
neurologically intact populations. Future research could use similar paradigms to 
those employed in chapter 5, to address whether a continuum of self-monitoring 
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8.1 Appendix 1 
Outline for planned study, investigating the impact of acute 
stage anosognosia on functional outcome 
 
8.1.1 Data collection issues  
 
This study was planned as a follow-up to the acute stage stroke study presented in 
Chapter 4. Unfortunately, data collection was subject to several complications and 
setbacks, which had a serious impact upon participant numbers, ultimately making it 
impossible to conduct the follow-up investigations for this study.  
The first problem was caused by delays to beginning recruitment. After obtaining 
NHS ethical approval on 25th July 2013, it was brought to my attention that another 
researcher was already recruiting patients to a psychological study on the stroke ward 
at the Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh. Initially it was suggested that I delay the start of 
recruitment until March 2014, though ultimately my supervisory team were able to 
negotiate that we should co-recruit, and that I should attempt to expand recruitment 
to a second hospital. These changes required a substantial amendment to the original 
NHS ethics application, to allow for co-enrolment and for other medical 
professionals than my clinical supervisor to be involved in the identification of and 
approach to patients. As part of this amendment, I was required to provide 
information that all other studies recruiting on the wards, including clinical trials, 
gave permission for co-enrolment. This involved a substantial amount of work, 
obtaining protocols or contacting chief investigators, which meant that the final 
amendment document wasn’t approved until 4thMarch 2014.  
In addition to the above delay, changes in the allocation of patients to consultants 
meant that the majority of patients were not under the direct supervision of my 
clinical supervisor. Because of this, it was necessary to involve other hospital staff in 
the recruitment of patients far more heavily than planned. Ultimately a system was 
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put in place, whereby members of the occupational therapy team not only 
approached the patients with the information sheets, but also completed the caregiver 
versions of VATA-M and VATA-L. However, this meant that the rate of recruitment 
was dependent upon their availability and schedule.  
While these issues led to far lower recruitment levels than anticipated, I was 
ultimately able to test enough patients to address the questions relating to the acute 
stage of the study. However, a high rate of attrition between the acute stage and 
follow-up created insoluble problems for the follow-up phase. I had anticipated that 
approximately half of the patients recruited for phase one would continue to phase 
two; in the event, this number was closer to 15%. While the reasons for this can only 
be guessed, it seems likely that the methodology by which consent was obtained may 
have been a major contributory factor. Rather than consenting patients for both 
phases of the study prior to phase 1, I only asked for permission to contact them two 
months later, to introduce the second phase of the study. Those patients who 
expressed an interest in the follow-up were then re-consented for phase 2. I 
considered this methodology to be preferable, on the grounds that people in the first 
days after a stroke face an uncertain recovery trajectory, and can have little idea 
whether they will feel able or willing to participate three months later.  
Of course, if I had recruited for both stages at the same time, it would have been 
possible for any patient to withdraw from the study prior to the follow-up stage, but 
it is likely that this would have led to a far lower rate of attrition, as a sense of 
obligation to continue is likely to be more compelling than the desire to re-engage 
with a study. This method would likely have led to greater participation, but would 
also have run the risk of including patients who no longer wished to continue but felt 
unable to express this.  
Because of these various issues, it became apparent that a longitudinal study was 
impossible within the timeframe of this PhD, and it was decided to refocus entirely 
on questions that could be addressed using the data from the acute stage of the study. 
The information presented below is therefore just an outline of the aims and 








The follow-up study was intended to investigate whether acute stage unawareness of 
impairments of motor skills, language, attention and memory was associated with 
poorer functional outcome three months later. The same tests were administered as in 
the acute stage of the study, with the exception of the Barthel Index; instead, 
functional ability was assessed with the Nottingham Extended Activities of Daily 
Living scale (NEADL: Nouri & Lincoln, 1987), which has a greater focus on the 
type of instrumental activities required for independent living. Unawareness of 
deficits in memory and the ability to carry out activities of daily living was also 
assessed, using the Visual Analogue tests of Anosognosia for Memory Impairments 
(VATA-MEM: test in development, see Cocchini et al., 2012) and the Visual 
Analogue Test of Anosognosia for Impairments in Activities of Daily living (VATA-
ADL), which is presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
8.1.2.1 Does overestimation of ability predict functional outcome? 
 
It was intended to address whether NEADL scores at three months after a stroke 
differed according to acute stage self-estimation group on the VATA-M and VATA-
L, controlling for baseline differences in functional ability, measured by acute stage 
Barthel scores. In addition, multiple linear regression would be used to investigate 
whether self-estimation scores on the tasks of memory, spatial attention and 
executive function predicted functional outcome, measured by NEADL scores, 
above and beyond the contribution of acute stage Barthel scores and global and 
domain-specific cognitive status. Based on the reported association between AHP 
and poor outcome, and the likelihood that unawareness of cognitive problems may 
prevent patients adopting compensatory strategies for these problems, it was 
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anticipated that any type of acute stage overestimation would have a negative impact 
on functional ability at the follow-up stage.  
 
 
8.1.2.2 Comparison of VATA scores 
 
At the three-month follow up, four different visual analogue tests of anosognosia, 
measuring awareness in the domains of motor skills, language, memory and 
functional ability were administered. It was intended that correlations between 
discrepancy scores on these measures would be investigated for any association in 
unawareness across domains. Because there are no cut-offs provided for two of these 




8.1.3.1 Information sheets and consent forms 
 
As stage 2 participants were no longer in a hospital setting, completion of caregiver 
versions of the VATA questionnaires required the participation of a caregiver, close 
friend or family member. Therefore, two different information sheets were devised; 
one for patients and one for co-participants. As in the acute stage study, modified 
versions of the patient information sheet and consent form were devised, with 




All patients who participated in the first stage of the study were first asked for 
permission to be contacted three months later. Those who agreed, who had returned 
home at the three month point, and for whom I held up-to-date contact details, were 
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then sent a letter with the Stage 2 Information Sheets, a reply slip and a stamped-
addressed envelope. 25 patients were contacted, of whom eight agreed to participate, 
six declined and 11 did not respond. 
Exclusion criteria were the same as in the acute stage study. None of the patients’ 
circumstances had changed to the extent that they met these criteria.  
8.1.3.3 Measures 
 
The measures used in the follow-up were identical to the acute stage study, with the 
addition of the VATA-MEM the VATA-ADL and the NEADL. Descriptions of these 
latter two measures are given in Chapter 3.  
8.1.3.3.1 The Visual Analogue tests of Anosognosia for Memory Impairments (VATA-
MEM) 
 
The VATA-MEM is a currently unpublished test of anosognosia for memory 
impairments. It follows the same format as all other VATA tests, with both verbal 
descriptions and pictorial depictions of the items, though in this case the images are 
vignettes of three pictures, rather than single pictures. It consists of 16 questions that 
assess awareness of different aspects of memory function, including prospective and 
retrospective, short-term and long-term, and self-cued versus environmentally-cued. 
The total possible caregiver score on the VATA-MEM is 48, with higher scores 
representing greater levels of memory impairment, The total possible discrepancy 
scores run from -48 to +48, with zero showing perfect agreement, negative scores 
reflecting underestimation and positive scores reflecting overestimation.  
 
8.1.3.4 Patient information 
 
Five of the eight tested patients had lesions to the right hemisphere, one had a lesion 
to the left hemisphere, and one had bilateral lesions, as determined by CT scan. 
Lesion information was missing for one patient. Five patients were male and three 
female. All were right handed and able to complete the questionnaires with their 
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dominant hand. The patients had an average age of 70.86 years (SD = 11.79), 12.75 
average years of education (SD = 2.76) and an average of 137 days since the stroke 
(SD = 29). The mean NEADL score was 13.17 (SD = 7.33, Range = 6 to 22) (higher 
scores reflect higher ability), which suggests that the functional ability of the patients 




Patients were tested either at the University of Edinburgh in a private testing room, 
or in their own homes. Written informed consent was taken at the beginning of each 
testing session. The tasks were always given in the same order, with the four VATAs 
first, followed by the VAMS, digit span then BCoS. The subtests within the BCoS 
are always presented in a set order. The entire set of tasks took approximately 1½ 
hours to complete, with breaks. All patients were offered the opportunity to split 
testing across two sessions, but preferred to complete the tasks in one. 
Co-participants completed caregiver versions of the NEADL, the VATA-M, VATA-
L, VATA-MEM and VATA-ADL. They typically completed the forms at the same 
time as the patients were tested, in a separate room without reference to the patients’ 
answers. If no co-participants were available on the day of testing, the forms were 
left for them or posted to them, with instructions for completion and a stamped 
addressed envelope for their return.  
 
8.1.4 Summary data  
 
Descriptive statistics for the eight patients are shown below in Table 8.1. Because of 












 Acute stage Follow-up 
Cognition   
BCoS Domain scores   
Attention and Executive function .69 (.36) .78 (.22) 
Memory .91 (.13) 1 
Language .70 (.29) .87 (.12) 
Number .89 (.17) 1 
Praxis .84 (.22) .88 (.10) 
Global .79 (.20) .91 (.06) 
Digit Span: M (SD) 10.17 (2.99) 9.5 (1.77) 
Mood   
VAMS: M (SD)   
Low Mood 24.34 (17.77) 12.31 (11.81) 
Tiredness confusion 38.13 (25.51) 23.38 (17.42) 
Self-awareness measures   
VATA-M Discrepancy -1.25 (8.88) 1.2 (5.54) 
VATA-L Discrepancy -3.75 (4.37) -.4 (9.66) 
VATA-MEM Discrepancy NA 1.4 (12.48) 
VATA-ADL Discrepancy NA 3 (14.42) 
Story recall discrepancy 13.94 (9.55) -2.31 (12.61) 
Apple cancellation discrepancy 9.54 (20.97) -4.72 (19.21) 
Rule finding discrepancy 5.29 (34.34) -2.88 (11.90) 
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8.3 Appendix 3 
 




Instructions to researchers: 
 
This questionnaire for patients should be completed independently of the caregiver version, on the 
same day where possible. Patients and caregivers should not discuss their responses with each other 
before the end of the testing phase. 
 
First work through the demographic information with the patient.  
 
Place the practice item on the patient’s ipsilesional side and read the following instructions while the 
practice item is on view: 
 
“You will be asked to tell me how well you can currently perform day to day activities. Each 
activity will be illustrated by a picture. I will read each question aloud and the question is also written 
at the top of the sheet. You will be asked to rate what you think is, or would be, your ability now in 
performing each activity. Below each picture there is a rating scale. Please state your ability by 
stating a number from 0 (no problem, you can perform this activity without any difficulty) to 3 (you 
have such serious difficulty with this activity that you would not be able to perform it). You can also 
provide the responses simply by pointing to the rating scale where appropriate. Let's try an example.”  
 
Work through the questionnaire, placing each item on the patient’s ipsilesional side. If necessary, 
point to the stimuli or rating scale when/where appropriate. For each item, read aloud the entire 
question or just the core action. Emphasize that the question is about the patient’s current abilities and 




Examine the participant and caregiver scores for the four check items: 
· Items 4 and 13: These scores should be 0 or 1. If any other scores are given, please disregard 
the questionnaire and note on the datasheet that this questionnaire could not be included 
because of failure to answer the check questions correctly.  
· Items 9 and 19: These scores should be 2 or 3. If any other scores are given, please disregard 
the questionnaire and note on the datasheet that this questionnaire could not be included 





Sum the scores from the six experimental items for each subscale, patient and caregiver versions, and 
add to the participant data sheet: 
1. Self-care items ( 2, 3, 8, 14, 18, 21) 
2. Activities inside the home (6, 10, 12, 15, 20, 22) 
3. Activities outside the home (1, 5, 7, 11, 16, 17) 
 
Subscale scores should be bewteen 0 and 18 
 
Sum the scores for all items for the patient version and for the caregiver version. Total scores should 
be bewteen 0 and 54. Add these to the participant datasheet. Subtract the patient’s total score from the 
caregiver’s total score to provide a caregiver-patient discrepancy value. Please add this score (between 









Participant Information Sheet 
 
This questionnaire is anonymous so please do not put your name on this 
sheet, or on the questionnaire.  
 
Please answer the following information about yourself.  
 
 




Highest educational qualification: 
 
 
Living arrangements (delete as applicable):   At home alone / at home with 
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Would you have difficulty getting in 
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Would you have difficulty hearing 
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Would you have difficulty taking a 
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Would you have difficulty making 
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Would you have difficulty travelling 
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Would you have difficulty 
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Would you have difficulty getting 
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Would you have difficulty making 
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Would you have difficulty swinging 
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Correct check questions (expected scores)  4 (0-1)    9 (2-3)    13 (0-1)    19 (2-3)     
    Patient   _____     _____      _____       _____  
    Caregiver 1                 _____     _____      _____       _____            
    Caregiver 2                 _____     _____      _____       _____       
 
Total rating (without check questions):  Patient: _____/54       Mean Caregiver: ____/54 
 
Discrepancy score (caregiver’s rating minus patient’s rating):  __________ 
